Darwinian Evolutionary Ideas in Business Economics and Organization Studies by Dollimore, Denise E.
 Darwinian Evolutionary Ideas in Business Economics  
and Organization Studies 
 
Denise Ellen Dollimore 
PhD  
April 2006 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of 
Hertfordshire for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The programme of research was 
carried out in the Accounting, Finance and Economics Department, Business School,  
University of Hertfordshire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis is a study of the use of Darwinian evolutionary ideas in business economics 
and organization studies. Mindful of the explosion of evolutionary rhetoric in the socio-
economic domain over the last three decades and informed by the modern generalized 
Darwinian perspective, the research has been focused on the evaluation of the precise 
nature and extent of use of Darwinian ideas in three of the most influential evolutionary 
accounts in these disciplines. Notably, Nelson and Winter’s Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change (1982), Hannan and Freeman’s Organizational Ecology (1989), and 
Howard Aldrich’s Organizations Evolving (1999). It is a work of comparative theory. 
 Also since 1980, theoretical and conceptual advances in evolutionary theory 
confirmed the generic nature of Darwinian theory and provided generalized terms for its 
articulation. Whilst some major criticisms of Darwinism are easily dismissed, 
significantly scholars have shown that Lamarckian acquired character inheritance must 
be accommodated within the meta-theoretical framework of Darwinism. This study 
shows that whilst the damaging rhetoric of ‘Social Darwinism’ continues to discourage 
widespread active engagement with Darwinian theory, the pervasive implicit or ‘covert’ 
adoption of Darwinian ideas by social scientists nevertheless clearly endorses its general 
nature, confirms a Darwinian social ontology and underlines the inevitability of 
Darwinism in the socio-cultural domain.  
 Following a detailed exposition of general Darwinism, this study presents a forensic 
comparative evaluation of the evolutionary theories under study, highlighting theoretical 
gaps and inconsistencies, and demonstrating their resolution within the Darwinian 
framework. Through the systematic application and dissection of these disparate 
theories, one of which is labelled ‘Lamarckian’, the analysis shows the deep extent to 
which they all are Darwinian. And furthermore, underlining the promise of the 
Darwinian system for yielding further results, the study clearly illustrates the 
importance of the explicit adoption of modern Darwinian concepts for helping scholars 
to understand the complex evolutionary processes they seek to explain.  
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 Part I 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The key factor in widening the field of application of evolutionary reasoning is the 
realisation (Campbell 1974) that this is a general mode of historical change, of which the 
evolution of biological organisms is only one example. 
John Ziman (2002) 
 
 1     Introduction 
The Explosion of Evolutionary Rhetoric 
 
 
 
The evolution of theories in many different disciplines from providential through 
instructionist to selectionist is a provocative suggestion of the superiority of selectionism. 
And this recent movement in so many different fields of inquiry constitutes what may be 
considered a second Darwinian revolution.  
Gary Cziko (1995) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a positive explosion of evolutionary rhetoric in the socio-economic 
domain over the last three decades (Murmann et al 2003; Hodgson, 1996). The recent 
flourishing of evolutionary theory in business economics is widely attributed to Nelson 
and Winter (1982) and their seminal work An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(Coriat and Dosi, 1982; Metcalfe, 1987, 1998; Hodgson, 1996). In organization studies 
this accolade is shared by Howard Aldrich (1972, 1979) for pioneering the ecological 
perspective (McKelvey and Baum, 1999; Galunic and Weeks, 2002), and Hannan and 
Freeman (1989) for establishing the approach in their seminal work, Organizational 
Ecology (Murmann et al, 2003; Zald, 1994).  
 Through such works the evolutionary perspective is having a growing impact on the 
respective disciplines with theoretical and empirical research being undertaken, for 
example, in the fields of management and strategy (Teece et al, 1997; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Burgelman, 1991, 1994), jobs and routines (Miner, 1987, 1990, 1991, 
1994), technological innovation (Ziman, 2000) and industrial economics (Metcalfe, 
1994; Klepper and Simmons, 1997; Audretsch and Klepper, 1999; Amburgey and Rao, 
1996; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). One of the points established in this thesis is that 
regardless of how they may be cast, the ideas at the heart of these new evolutionary 
theories are Darwinian in origin and form.   
 Whilst the expansion and momentum of evolutionary theorizing in these fields is 
frequently observed (Coriat and Dosi, 2002; Vromen, 1995; Nelson, 1993; Baum and 
 
Singh, 1994), 1  it is argued here that the Darwinian lineage is often unrealized, 
unrecognized, played down or simply just ignored. This is a very important observation 
since, in the first instance, this subtle camouflaging effect belies the true influence of 
Darwinism on these disciplines. And, secondly, it thwarts the productive exploitation of 
what is demonstrably the most promising evolutionary theory for the socio-cultural 
realm (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Hull, 1988; Hodgson, 2002b, 2005; Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006a; Wilson, 2002).  
 
‘Evolution’: A very Imprecise Term 
 
Significantly, and rather confusingly, the evident explosion of evolutionary theory 
across the socio-economic domain covers a very broad spectrum of evolutionary 
approaches. And these are variously described as Lamarckian, developmental, self-
organization, ‘BVRS’ (blind-variation-selective-retention), selectionist, ecological, and 
Darwinian. The point is, as observed in evolutionary economics (Hodgson, 1996), the 
use of the term ‘evolutionary’ is often vague and imprecise, and tends to be roughly 
understood as ‘development’ (sometimes in the rather special and old-fashioned sense 
of the ‘unfolding’ of a predetermined process). Moreover, given its assorted 
interpretations (Hodgson, 1996, pp. 37-51), it has not served to clarify matters that the 
term ‘evolutionary’ has been used as a ‘catch-all’ description for the variously inspired 
theories of earlier prominent thinkers. For example, the ‘stages’ approach of Marx2 
(1867); the Darwinian natural selection perspectives of Veblen (1898, 1899) and 
Campbell (1965); the ‘Spencerian’ Lamarckian perspective of Marshall (1890) and the 
explicitly non-biological development approach of Schumpeter (1934). 
 The term ‘evolutionary’ is undoubtedly a very vague concept and clearly, with the 
evident confusion and the fragmentation of evolutionary perspectives in these 
disciplines, it does not bode well for the much sought-after ‘unified’ theory of socio-
economic evolution (Pfeffer, 1993). The dilemma is classically illustrated in the 
theoretical and empirical irreconcilability of the ‘innovation effect’ and the ‘selection 
effect,’ in other words, the apparent irreconcilability of adaptation and selection 
(Murmann and Rivkin, 2004). And this unquestionably relates to the widespread and 
erroneous view amongst social scientists that Lamarckism and Darwinism are rival 
                                                 
1 And evidenced in the appearance of new periodicals, for example, the Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, the Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems, and the Journal of Bioeconomics. 
2 Marx promotes a teleological ‘stages’ theory of evolution where he perceives history as advancing 
‘inevitably’ through a series of stages, such as feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism.   
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evolutionary theories (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1982; Hodgson, 2001; Knudsen, 2001).3 
Although important inroads into this ‘false dichotomy’4 have been achieved, such as 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) recognition of a causal relationship between micro and 
macro level phenomena, and Aldrich’s (1999) challenge to the overplaying of 
organizational inertia (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and 
emphasis on the inherent dynamism of organizations (in the face of the selection 
mechanism), these important theoretical insights have not been widely appreciated or 
explored. Indeed for several reasons, evolutionary theory is not progressing as well as 
it should or could. Rindos (1985, p. 65) below offers a fair summary of the nature of 
the problem;  
 
Most contemporary views of cultural change are derived from pre-Darwinian 
sources and hence are conditioned by a series of unstated assumptions that governs 
the analysis of cultural dynamics. Reification, typological thinking, and a belief in 
directed variation – remnants of a Spencerian evolutionism – are still present in 
most modern analyses of cultural change, even those that claim to apply modern 
evolutionary theory. 
 
 To be sure, the current diversity of evolutionary perspectives continues to be shaped 
by various combinations of deeply ingrained (and constraining) assumptions about the 
nature of evolutionary change (Dewey, 1997), and this diversity is augmented with the 
overlaying of the variously interpreted biological theories of Jean Baptiste de Lamarck 
(1809) and Charles Darwin (1859, 1871). Indeed close examination of this literature 
reveals numerous configurations of both Lamarckian (development, ‘adaptationism’ and 
‘acquired character inheritance’) and Darwinian (‘population thinking’, variation, 
inheritance and selection) ideas, with most accounts comprising a mixture of the two. 
While ‘alternative’ theories like ‘spontaneous order’ (Hayek, 1988) and ‘self-
organization theory’ (Kauffman, 1995; Foster, 1997; Witt, 1997, 2003) characterise the 
remaining diversity in evolutionary theory, these represent a very small element of a 
genre which is predominantly fuelled by the biological metaphor. And indeed it is this 
particular diversity that the present study has investigated - with illuminating results. 
 
                                                 
3 This is discussed in Chapter 2 below and discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
4 From a modern Darwinian perspective it is a false dichotomy. Lamarckian adaptation and Darwinian 
selection are both accommodated in modern Darwinism. See Chapter 6 below. 
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The Unmentionable Darwin 
 
Remarkably, a puzzling and important paradox emerges in the investigation of this 
expansive literature and it is curiously suggested in the combined citations of Cziko and 
Rindos above. Essentially, it appears that in spite of the apparent Darwinian pedigree of 
most evolutionary accounts, Darwin’s name or his influence is rarely mentioned. 
Darwinian ideas, particularly the selection mechanism, can be shown to be variously 
deployed and invariably propping up theories which are associated with the names of 
other evolutionists. Nelson and Winter (1982) are the classic case in point. As is 
demonstrated here in Chapter 8, the key Darwinian principles are clearly adopted 
throughout Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of economic change, and yet they 
explicitly describe it as ‘Lamarckian’.  
 The point is, regardless of the label or composition, there appears to be a ‘Darwinian 
thread’ woven into each of these evolutionary theories. This could be in the underlying 
philosophy, the structure of the theory, or, in the handling of variety or the selection 
mechanism. However, what is of crucial significance here is that this Darwinian 
influence is mostly implicit. Furthermore, even where it is explicit it is called by 
different names, played down or simply just ignored. Thus, mysteriously, within this 
recent explosion of evolutionary literature in organization studies and business 
economics there appears to be a hidden or ‘covert’ Darwinism.  
 
JSTOR Journal Analysis 
 
This assertion is born out in a JSTOR journal analysis where the upsurge of 
evolutionary theory was observed over the three decades from 1970 to 1990, and where 
references to Darwin were rare. The figures were compiled by conducting keyword 
searches of the titles and or abstracts of articles in sociology and economics journals. 
Searching for the terms ‘evolution’ or ‘evolutionary,’ the combined figures for both 
disciplines were, 38 in the 1970s; 66 in the 1980s; and 128 in the 1990s. If the search is 
extended to include book review articles, these figures rise substantially, for example, to 
50 in the 1970s; 145 in the 1980s and 230 in the 1990s. However, when the same search 
is conducted for the terms ‘evolution’ or ‘evolutionary’ combined with ‘Darwin’, 
‘Darwinian’ or ‘Darwinism’ there are only a handful of results.  Specifically there were 
five in the 1970s; none in the 1980s and only two in the 1990s. Thus, confirmation that 
the terms ‘evolution’ and ‘Darwin’ are rarely found together in these disciplines. 
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 The same paradox is also observed in relation to books produced by evolutionary 
economists. Citing several notable texts, Laurent (2001, p. 15) comments that many 
have ‘evolution’ or ‘evolutionary’ in the title, but then;  
 
one seeks with difficulty, however, for economics titles with the words ‘Darwin’ or 
‘Darwinism’ in them, notwithstanding the common use of ‘Darwinian’ or similar 
words in everyday economic discourse5  
  
 Indeed it is interesting to note that whilst many scholars observe and applaud the 
explosion of evolutionary theory in organization studies and evolutionary economics 
(Dietz et al, 1990; Coriat and Dosi, 2002; Baum and Singh, 1994), very few discuss its 
Darwinian composition or heritage. It is to Laurent and Nightingale (2001) and a small 
number of evolutionary colleagues that the interested reader needs to turn for 
enlightenment here (Hodgson, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003a, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; 
Knudsen, 2001, 2002, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a; Metcalfe, 1987, 1988; 
Vromen, 1995). 
 Certainly this ‘covert Darwinism’ presents a striking anomaly given Darwin’s historic 
influence on the social sciences (Bagehot, 1872; James, 1880; Pierce, [1898] 1992; 
Baldwin, 1909; Ritchie, 1890, 1896) and the relevance of Darwinism (Veblen, 1898, 
1899; Campbell, 1965; Dawkins, 1984; Dennett, 1995), particularly in its modern 
formulation (Mayr, 1982, 1988, 1991; Hull, 1988, 2001; Sober, 1984; Brandon, 1990, 
1999), for the socio-economic domain (Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b, 2004a; Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006a). Indeed, it is suggested here that the reluctance on the part of 
organization theorists and evolutionary economists to explicitly acknowledge 
Darwinism basically reflects a widespread and unnecessary ‘fear’ of Darwinism.  
 Evolutionary theory continues to be developed in business economics and 
organization studies, and indeed Darwinism continues to be exploited in different and 
understated ways. This study pays close attention to the theoretical foundations of these 
various theories, and to their composition and their reliance, implicit or otherwise, on 
Darwinian principles. Drawing attention to the little known theoretical developments in 
Darwinian theory over the last thirty years and to its subsequent exploration and 
constructive application, and with particular reference to the influential works in 
business economics and organization science (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989; Aldrich, 1999), this thesis essentially ‘uncovers’ the Darwinian thread 
                                                 
5 Laurent (2001, p.15) searched the ‘Worldcat’ database and reported just eight titles. 
6 
that runs through the literature. Thus, it ultimately demonstrates the importance and 
indeed the inevitability of Darwinism for socio-cultural theories of evolution, and 
moreover it crucially reinforces the notion of a ‘generalized Darwinism’. This now 
fittingly brings the present Chapter to the aims of the thesis and to its programme and 
scope.  
 
Aims of Thesis 
 
The central aim of this conceptual research project is to evaluate the degree and 
manner of application of Darwinian evolutionary ideas in business economics and 
organization studies. It is essentially a work of comparative theory, drawing on, for 
example, biology, and philosophy of biology, anthropology, organization studies and 
evolutionary economics. Its purpose is fourfold; firstly, it is to examine the range of 
evolutionary theories in organization studies and business economics, paying special 
attention to the seminal accounts in both disciplines; secondly, it is to reveal and 
document the true extent of Darwinian usage across these disciplines examining the 
nature of that adoption; thirdly it is to explore the tractability of the theories under 
study, highlighting gaps and inconsistencies, and where appropriate, pointing to their 
resolution in modern Darwinian theory; and finally and most importantly, it is to stress 
the implications of the existence of ‘covert Darwinism’ in socio-economic theories of 
evolution, showing how it signals the inevitability of Darwinism for the social domain 
and thus, ultimately, the validity of the notion of a ‘generalized’ Darwinism.  
 The original contribution of this thesis is in the presentation of a systematic, incisive 
Darwinian dissection and comparative analysis of the leading evolutionary theories in 
organization studies and business economics. Whilst Darwinian ideas have notably 
been exploited in a variety of ways in these distinct fields, seminal works have not yet 
been evaluated side by side in any study nor specifically compared or contrasted to 
discover the nature and extent of use of Darwinian ideas, or their theoretical 
tractability.  The present study embraces this task through examination of the key texts 
in evolutionary economics and organization studies, noted for the quality and 
influence of their evolutionary accounts. Set in the context of the explosion of 
evolutionary rhetoric in their respective disciplines, the ‘Lamarckian’ theory of Nelson 
and Winter, and ‘Darwinian’ accounts of Hannan and Freeman and Howard Aldrich 
are all carefully unpacked and the explicit and implicit use of Darwinian ideas is 
demonstrated and discussed. The analysis notably shows the very deep extent to which 
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the authors are all Darwinian. And furthermore, highlighting the promise of the 
Darwinian system for yielding further results in the socio-economic domain, the study 
clearly illustrates the importance of the explicit adoption of the modern Darwinian 
concepts for helping scholars understand the complex evolutionary processes they 
seek to explain. The following section will proceed by setting out the programme and 
scope of the thesis  
 
Research Programme and Scope 
Evolutionary Theory and the Philosophy of Biology 
 
As stated above, this study is specifically focused on the nature and extent of use of 
Darwinian ideas in organization studies and evolutionary economics.  And Darwinism 
here refers to the modern formulation of the theory, which is defined by the general 
principles of variation, inheritance and selection, and builds around a replicating and 
heritable entity (Hull, 1988). Accordingly, in order to assess the sense in which 
Darwinism has been deployed in the socio-economic domain, the foremost literature on 
evolutionary theory has been consulted in the philosophy of biology. Indeed the 
necessary understanding of the ontological foundations of the theories under discussion 
would be impossible without this philosophical and theoretical underpinning (Dewey, 
1910, 1957).  
 Over the last three decades there have been important theoretical developments in 
evolutionary theory coupled with conceptual clarifications that have made the theory far 
more accessible and its general application far more apparent. Moreover, these 
developments, little known outside the field (Jablonka, 2000), decisively address the 
traditional misconceptions about Darwinism which have thwarted its productive 
exploitation and delayed the progress of evolutionary theory in the socio-economic 
sphere.  For example, the erroneous view that group selection is not possible, that 
Darwinism discounts purposive behaviour and that Darwinism and Lamarckism are 
rival theories. 
 Mayr’s (1959, 1976) articulation of Darwin’s ‘population thinking’ perspective helps 
to clarify the ontological foundations of Darwinism. Mayr contrasts this with the 
‘typological thinking’ of Darwin’s own era, demonstrating how Darwin’s revolutionary 
approach critically established that variety was necessary for evolution to occur.  
Clarification of the role of variety was complemented by important theoretical advances 
in selection theory. The long-running ‘units of selection’ debate was successfully 
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untangled and resolved (Lewontin, 1970; Hull, 1980, 1981; Sober, 1984) through, 
amongst other things, the realization that selection was a ‘two-step’ process (Mayr, 
1978) which involved a replicating entity and an interacting entity (Hull, 1981,1988).  
These advances in theory have simultaneously resolved the group-selection issue and 
usefully encouraged the theoretical possibility of multilevel selection theory (Brandon, 
1986, 1990; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1999; Henrich, 2004; Field, 2004). 
 Of particular interest for social scientists, the resolution of these theoretical problems 
largely came about through the deliberate conceptualization of Darwinian evolution as a 
general theory (Hull, 1980, 1981). And indeed conversely, evolutionary economists 
have subsequently clearly demonstrated its generalized nature (Hodgson, 2005; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006). The ‘replicator’ and ‘interactor’ concepts (used to denote 
the genotype and phenotype in biology and the organizational routine and the 
organization in socio-economic theories), which have served to clarify the complex 
processes involved in natural selection, have now become ‘generalized terms’ (Brandon, 
1990), with their usage now witnessed in sections of the organization studies (Baum and 
Singh, 1994b; Baum 2002) and evolutionary economics literature (Hodgson, 2002b; 
Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 2006a, 2006b). 
 
Application of Evolutionary Theory to Socio-Economic Domain 
 
Regarding the application of these principles to phenomena beyond the sphere of 
biology, in other words, the notion of ‘universal’ or ‘generalized’ Darwinism (Hodgson, 
2005; Hodgson, and Knudsen, 2006a), key theorists have been closely consulted. These 
include the zoologist, Richard Dawkins, (1983), who coined the term ‘universal 
Darwinism’, the philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995) and psychologists Gary Cziko 
(1995) and Henry Plotkin (1997, 1994) who unpacked and popularized the idea, others 
like Hull (2001) and Sober and Wilson (1998) who similarly articulated and 
demonstrated its credibility as a meta-theory, and finally those who have since 
promoted and specifically explored its feasibility in the disciplines here under study 
(Hodgson, 2005; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a). The important 
and central notion of universal or generalized Darwinism is discussed at length in 
Chapter 3.  
 This grounding in the key literature on evolutionary theory has guided the research 
agenda which has involved tracing the development of evolutionary theory in the 
organizations studies and evolutionary economics literature (Cyert and March, 1963,  
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Cohen and Sproll, 1996; Baum and Singh, 1994a; Baum and McKelvey, 1999; Baum, 
2002; Ziman, 2000; Laurent and Nightingale, 2001; Wheeler et al, 2002; Hodgson, 
2002b, 2004a), examining the various ways that social scientists have thought about and 
analysed organizational change and economic growth over time, and engaging in the 
detailed analysis of the foremost evolutionary theories in the respective fields (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982, Hannan and Freeman, 1989, Aldrich, 1999).   
 Indeed up-to-date knowledge of evolutionary theory has essentially enabled a 
systematic survey of this disparate literature, directing evaluation of the evolutionary 
analyses through pertinent and incisive questioning. Accordingly the study has focused 
on how scholars have conceived of and analysed the entities, processes and events that 
pertain to the evolution of socio-economic phenomena (Baum and Singh, 1994b). For 
example, what is their unit or level of analysis? Do they focus on the individual agent or 
the collective entity of the organization? Or do they adopt a systems-level approach and 
focus on the environment or population? Moreover, what do they see as the main agent 
of change? Or indeed, the key processes of change? Is causality located, for example, in 
the learning or innovative behaviour of individuals, the adaptive behaviour of 
organizations or the selective forces of the macro-social environment?  To be sure, the 
considerable theoretical advances and conceptual refinements achieved in evolutionary 
theory over the last three decades have provided a reliable means of assessing the 
coherence of these socio-economic theories of evolution, crucially bringing to light the 
character of the causal assumptions therein. 
 Thus, having established the focus and nature of the evolutionary approach under 
study the research then goes deeper by exploring the following type of questions; are 
Darwinian ideas being used in these disciplines metaphorically or by analogy? Is 
Darwinism being used wholly or partially, or is it perhaps merged with other 
evolutionary ideas such as Lamarckism? Are these social scientists using Darwinian 
ideas explicitly or implicitly in their theories? Are they knowingly adopting and 
developing a Darwinian approach or is there an ‘unwitting’ deployment of the general 
principles? More significantly, are some of these theorists actually applying the 
Darwinian principles to socio-economic phenomena? Indeed, does the empirical and 
theoretical research in these fields imply a Darwinian ontology?  
10 
 What do Evolutionary Theories Seek to Address? 
 
In addressing this broad range of questions the approach has thus essentially been to 
explore precisely what it is that evolutionary theories of organizations or firms seek to 
explain, and then to examine the structure of the analyses and nature of its evolutionary 
attributes. As indicated, such theories typically have three major foci (Baum and Singh, 
1994b, p. 3), namely entities, (e.g., routines, jobs, organizations, ecosystems) processes 
(institutionalization, convergence, entrepreneurship, competition), and events (birth, 
death, transformation, speciation) and it is the precise handling of these interrelated 
phenomena, by social scientists, that has concerned this research project. For as Baum 
and Singh summarize, ‘organizational evolution is concerned with the events in the 
histories of these entities that are produced by these processes’. 
 Accordingly, the thesis is loosely structured around the three themes of entities, 
processes and events. And, woven into this structure is acknowledgment of another 
related threesome, that is, the three levels of inquiry that is typically deployed across the 
literature (Baum and Rowley, 2002; Aldrich, 1999). In organization studies these are 
described as the intraorganizational level (within organizations), dealing with 
individuals, groups, knowledge and tasks; the organizational level (organizational), 
dealing with organizational processes, boundaries and strategies; and the 
interorganizational level (activities between organizations), dealing with relationships 
among aggregates of organizations (Baum and Rowley, 2002). And these apply equally 
well to the evolutionary economics literature.   
 Awareness of these levels is very important when navigating this literature, because 
the level of analysis impacts on how individual scholars perceive the levels above or 
below their chosen level and thus the operation of their evolutionary mechanisms. 
Inevitably this causes a certain amount of confusion when trying to unpack the analyses 
and attempting to compare like with like. And moreover it reveals a certain amount of 
confusion on the part of the theorists themselves as they attempt to reconcile units and 
levels in their elucidation of the selection process. Much of this confusion relates to 
misunderstandings around the proper articulation of the selection process, and 
significantly it is reminiscent of the ‘units debate’ that occurred in biology which has 
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long since been resolved (Lewontin, 1970; Hull, 1980, 1981; Sober, 1984; Brandon and 
Burian, 1984; Brandon, 1990, 1999).6  
 Throughout the study key issues and debates in organization studies and evolutionary 
economics are highlighted, such as the use of biological analogy and the issue of 
intentionality. Attention is drawn to the relevant developments in biology and 
evolutionary theory and how these influenced social scientists and advanced their 
evolutionary analyses, for example, the conceptualization of groups as cohesive wholes 
in a selection process. Correspondingly, attention is also drawn here to the perceptible 
and emerging commonality of approach between the two fields, as important theoretical 
assumptions, consistent with modern evolutionary theory are evidenced in the literature, 
for example, a population thinking perspective and acknowledgement of a some kind of 
social replicator. Finally, due attention is also paid to the current status of evolutionary 
theory in the socio-economic domain, highlighting contemporary issues of concern and 
future theoretical and empirical research questions. 
 In consequence this thesis is coursed with a number of interrelated themes; the 
questions poised by organizational theorists and evolutionary economists as they seek 
evolutionary explanations of social phenomena; the entities, processes and events that 
are the foci of these inquiries; the level at which the analysis takes place; the issues and 
debates that  have ensued; the advances in evolutionary theorizing in the respective 
fields; and finally, identification of the current issues of concern and future research 
questions. The aim here is to pull these multidimensional themes together and map the 
development of Darwinian thinking in the socio-economic domain.  
 
Summary of Chapter Contents  
 
The remaining two Chapters of Part I focus on the concept of general Darwinism. 
Chapter 2 looks at the origins and chequered history of Darwinian theory in the social 
domain providing, through a discussion of the rhetorical  impact of ‘Social Darwinism’, 
background to an evident fear of the theory and the notion here of ‘covert Darwinism’. 
The idea of general Darwinism is explained whilst major objections to it are addressed 
through demonstrations of how the theory has been, and continues to be, misunderstood 
and misrepresented. The evident revival of Darwinian thinking in the socio-cultural 
realm is discussed, and significantly it is revealed that whilst this is widespread in the 
                                                 
6 This issued is fully explained in Chapter 5 and highlighted in examples throughout the text. It is 
particularly relevant for Nelson and Winter (1982) featured in Chapter 8, and it also appears as an issue 
for Aldrich (1999) in Chapter 10. 
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organization studies and evolutionary economics literature, it is largely implicit or 
‘hidden.’ The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of covert 
Darwinism for socio-economic theories of evolution. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the need for a generalized Darwinism. The theory is unpacked 
and its generic nature made clear through its modern formulation. As well as assisting 
evaluation of current evolutionary theories in the socio-economic domain and drawing 
out their Darwinian characteristics, it is shown how engagement with general 
Darwinism, particularly the replicator-interactor distinction, assists understanding of the 
entities and processes that the former seek to explain, unraveling confusions and 
meeting theoretical shortcomings. 
 In preparation for a rigorous evaluation of the case studies, Part II of the thesis is 
devoted to the explanation of Darwinian theory. Returning to its roots in biology and 
Darwin’s construction of the theory, Chapter 4 provides an explanation of its 
important ontological foundations and an introduction to its key evolutionary concepts. 
These include; ‘population thinking’, adaptation, variation, inheritance and selection. 
The evolutionary significance of the Darwinian ‘population thinking’ perspective (for 
the conceptualization of change in form over time) is established, as is its relevance for 
the socio-economic sphere. 
 In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the most critical developments in evolutionary theory over 
the last three decades are set out.  Chapter 5 focuses on the selection process, and is 
centred on the notorious ‘unit of selection debate’. It is shown how conceptualization 
of selection as a ‘two-step’ process and deployment of the ‘replicator’ and ‘interactor’ 
concepts have served to both illuminate the intricacies of Darwinian natural selection 
and paved the way for its articulation as a general theory. Chapter 6 builds on these 
clarifications and looks in detail at Lamarckism, the question of the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, and at the important relationship between Lamarckism and 
Darwinism.  Significantly, it is shown how these are not mutually exclusive theories, 
but that Lamarckism is theoretically dependent upon Darwinism in order to work as a 
theory. Chapter 7 brings general Darwinism right up to date and is focused on group 
and multilevel selection. Again drawing on the replicator-interactor concepts, it is 
demonstrated how developments in selection theory have facilitated the clearer 
articulation of group selection and thus the conceptualization of multilevel selection. 
The significance of these developments for the social domain is underlined where with 
reference to the individual problems of the case studies it is indicated how explicit 
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engagement with the clarifying concepts of general Darwinism would positively 
advance these theories. 
 Part III focuses on the case studies and the examination of the explicit and implicit 
adoption of Darwinian ideas. Chapter 8 introduces the first, which is from the field of 
evolutionary economics. This is Nelson and Winter’s seminal work, An Evolutionary 
Theory of Economic Change (1982). Here I show how, despite their claims to be 
Lamarckian, the authors actually develop a modern Darwinian theory by applying the 
core principles of variation, inheritance and selection to socio-economic phenomena, 
and significantly, by assuming the replicator-interactor distinction.  I highlight the 
parities they draw between entities and processes in the biotic and the social sphere 
(establishing their Darwinian social ontology), illustrate the intractability at the heart 
of their theory around selection and inheritance (showing how they inadvertently 
develop a multilevel selection theory), and demonstrate its resolution and advance in 
generalized Darwinism. 
 Chapter 9 features the sociologists, Hannan and Freeman, whose theory, 
Organizational Ecology (1982) derives from population ecology.  I show here how 
Hannan and Freeman, by emphasising one particular strand of evolutionary theory, 
namely selection, end up presenting a rather one-sided view of organizational 
phenomena.  I illustrate how their complete shift in focus, away from the individual 
organization in its ‘local environment,’ inevitably leaves out the important causal story 
generating from this lower level of the hierarchy, and fuels the infamous ‘adaptation 
versus selection’ debate of organization studies.   Again with reference to recent 
theoretical advances, in particular, ‘General Selection Theory’, I show that implicit in 
the authors’ selectionist account is an undeveloped inheritance mechanism and a social 
replicator, thus signalling reconciliation of the adaptation versus selection polarization 
of theory. 
 Chapter 10 is devoted to the third and final case study, Organizations Evolving 
(1999), by sociologist, Howard Aldrich. I show here how this account builds on the 
achievements of its predecessors and benefits from Aldrich’s insightful plundering of 
the philosophy of biology.  Aldrich’s work proves to be the most ambitious and 
exciting yet and it is explicitly Darwinian. However, whilst it appears the most 
comprehensive Darwinian account it is shown here how important ideas, like the 
replicator-interactor distinction and multilevel selection, nevertheless remain confused 
and undeveloped, so that the theory similarly has much to gain from the explicit 
engagement with modern generalized Darwinism.  
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 The Conclusion in Part IV discusses the important implications of ‘covert 
Darwinism’ and makes the case for the explicit adoption of general Darwinism. 
Reflecting on the analyses of the case studies, with their various strands of covert 
Darwinism and evident theoretical confusions, the Chapter stresses the importance for 
evolutionary scholars to explicitly recognise the Darwinian concepts and engage with 
the promise of the Darwinian system. Summarizing the key findings of the study, it 
underlines the significance of the generalized Darwinian concepts for helping to 
understand the evolutionary processes these scholars seek to explain. The Chapter 
closes with a resume of on-going theoretical and conceptual research in this area, 
identifying the most important and productive areas for future research. 
 Thus, by drawing attention, in this interdisciplinary research project, to recent 
developments in biology and the philosophy of biology I illustrate the generic nature of 
Darwinian theory.  I show how, as a result of the theoretical and conceptual 
clarifications achieved, socio-economic theories of evolution can be clarified, 
reinterpreted, and advanced. Modern Darwinism is here defined, explained, expanded 
and applied.  It is furthermore evaluated in the context of a general resistance to its 
importation into the social field where common fallacies and misunderstandings have 
prejudiced and delayed its fruitful advance. Chapter 2 begins the exploration of this 
resistance by posing the provocative question, ‘Who is Afraid of Darwinism?’ 
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 2     Who is Afraid of Darwinism? 
 
 
 
The history of science is replete of examples in which concepts, ideas, insights and 
modelling techniques that were first introduced in one domain, have turned out to be 
fruitfully applicable also in other domains. So why would we rule out that possibility for 
Universal Darwinism from the outset? 
Jack Vromen (2004) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Why is there a near silence of Darwinism in the organization studies and evolutionary 
economics literatures? In view of the long-standing (Veblen, 1898, 1899; Campbell, 
1965) and widespread adoption of Darwinian ideas in these fields, as well as the 
common use of Darwinism in everyday discourse (Laurent, 2001), the lack of explicit 
reference to Darwinism in these literatures obviously presents a peculiar anomaly. In 
order to properly address this puzzle and realize its important implications it is vital to 
consider the history of Darwinism in the socio-cultural domain, and to confront the 
hostility that emerged over the use of Darwinian ideas in the social sphere. Following a 
long and controversial history in sociology (Haines, 1992), for example, much of the 
field still remains influenced by an ‘antibiological and antievolutionary outlook’ 
(Neilson, 1994) and it has systematically ignored and rejected biological thinking for a 
half century (van den Berghe, 1974, 1990). Albeit perhaps to a slightly lesser degree, a 
similar picture has emerged in economics where ‘the role of biological ways of thinking 
in economics has been a source of genuine puzzlement and not infrequent outbursts of 
irritation’ (Metcalfe, 1987, p. 54) and where even evolutionary economists remain 
largely ignorant about Darwin’s theory (Laurent, 2001). 
 This strong antagonism towards Darwinism and biological analogies in the social 
sciences is largely due to the rhetorical impact of ‘Social Darwinism’ (Hodgson, 2004b) 
whereby ‘Darwinism’ has been blamed for providing the ideological and pseudo-
scientific motivations for such evils as eugenics, Nazism, racism and fascism. The 
impact of these negative and powerful beliefs on the development of evolutionary 
theory in these fields cannot be ignored; since they have coloured and constrained the 
thinking of past and present evolutionary scholars. Indeed it is upon this hostile and 
persuasive platform that several other major objections to Darwinism continue to be 
 
pursued. These include enduring concerns about ‘reductionist’ methodology and 
biological determinism (Gould, 1981; Lewontin et al, 1984; Kitcher, 1985; Rose, 2000), 
the rejection of biological analogies, and the claim that Darwinism is unable to deal 
with human agency and intentionality (Penrose, 1952; Foster, 1997; Witt, 1997, 1999), 
and the widespread but mistaken view that Darwinism and Lamarckism are mutually 
exclusive evolutionary theories, with the latter being perceived as more relevant than 
the former.  
 It is argued here that it is the resulting general antipathy towards Darwinism (Dietz et 
al, 1990; van den Berghe, 1974, 1990: Degler, 1991; Sanderson and Ellis, 1992; Udry, 
1995; Hodgson, 2004b) that explains an on-going deep-seated ‘fear’ of Darwinism 
amongst social scientists, a fear which has in turn frustrated the productive exploitation 
of evolutionary theory in the fields of organization studies and business economics. 
Moreover, it is this antipathy, and the fear it provokes, that ultimately explains both the 
‘silence’ of Darwinism in the literature as well as the pervasive ‘covert’ Darwinism 
discussed above in Chapter 1; both of which misleadingly camouflage the true extent of 
Darwinian influence across these disciplines. However, significantly, it is also argued 
here that the prevailing fear of Darwinism is basically unwarranted, since it is 
essentially fuelled by the historic misappropriation (Haeckel, 1874) and 
misrepresentation (Parsons, 1934; Hofstadter, 1944) of Darwin’s theory, as well as by 
continuing fundamental misunderstandings about the nature and scope of modern 
Darwinian theory (Hodgson, 2002b, 2004a; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a).  
 Demonstration of these propositions will begin in this Chapter with a discussion of 
the ambiguous term ‘Social Darwinism.’ Here it will be shown how Darwin’s theory 
was misappropriated and misrepresented and how this led to antipathy and fears about 
Darwinism that prevented engagement with the theory and thus engendered 
misconceived objections towards its use in the social arena. Following these sections, 
where both the ideological and theoretical objections are shown to be unwarranted, 
there is a reflection on the origins of Darwinism in the socio-cultural domain and an 
historical review of its application to social phenomena. Here the general nature of the 
theory is highlighted and its long and productive use in this arena is shown to underline 
its relevance for socio-economic theories of evolution. This leads into a discussion of 
‘covert Darwinism’ and exploration of the paradox observed in the enduring rejection of 
Darwinism and its recent revival in the socio-economic literature. The penultimate 
section highlights the link between the ‘fear of Darwinism’ and ‘covert Darwinism’ and 
considers the positive and negative implications of widespread hidden Darwinism for 
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the development of theory. The Chapter concludes with demonstration of the need for a 
generalized Darwinism in the socio-economic realm.   
 
Social Darwinism 
 
In spite of the considerable theoretical advances and conceptual clarity achieved in 
evolutionary theory over the last thirty years,7 all of which have clearly demonstrated its 
applicability beyond the realms of biology, the view of Darwinism amongst social 
scientists has nevertheless continued to be predominantly hostile. As indicated above, 
the underlying cause of this hostility is largely traced to the rhetorical impact of ‘Social 
Darwinism’ and to the damaging myths that emerged about Darwin and his science 
(Hodgson, 2004a, 2004b). In an historical review of the meaning of the term ‘Social 
Darwinism’ in the Anglo-American academic literature Hodgson (2004b) recently 
demonstrated how Darwin’s name became associated with all manner of political 
ideologies and distasteful ideas. It was used, for example, to refer to those who used 
Darwinian ideas to mean war or individualist competition and to describe those who 
used it to support capitalist competition and laissez faire economics. It was also used to 
describe the German biologist Ernst Haeckel who notably (McGovern, 1941; Gasman, 
1971, 1998) harbored racist sentiments, as well as the American Darwinian enthusiast 
Joseph Le Conte (1892) and anthropologist Daniel Shute (1896), who made no secret of 
their racist, imperialist and sexist views. And, it was in the post war years, following 
publication of Hofstader’s influential treatise, Social Darwinism in American Thought 
(1944), that the term was then to become forever associated with the promotion of such 
terrible ills as eugenics, racism, nationalism and war. ‘Social Darwinism’ was 
consequently generally seen as a ‘Bad Thing’ (Bannister, 1979).  
 However, as Hodgson (2004b) and others (Himmelfarb, 1959; Bannister, 1979) have 
since demonstrated, it is now patently clear that over time, at the hands of influential 
authors of various persuasions, Darwin’s ‘seductive’ theory (Dennett, 1995) has been 
frequently and variously misappropriated (Haeckel, 1874) and misrepresented (Parsons, 
1932, 1934, 1937; Hofstadter, 1944). The truth is that Darwin himself was neither racist 
nor jingoistic (Richerson, and Boyd, 2001; Hodgson, 2004b), and he advocated neither 
selfishness, competitive behaviour, imperialism nor war.  Indeed, as is now well 
documented, he was unquestionably a progressive liberal and was notably appalled by 
man’s inhumanity to man (Desmond and Moore, 1991; Browne, 1995). Social 
                                                 
7 These will be discussed at length in Chapters 5 to 7 
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Darwinism incorrectly linked Darwin with ideological and scientific doctrines that he 
never proclaimed and Darwinism with propositions that bear no logical relation to the 
scientific principles of the theory.  
 Clearly the customary ideological reasons for the continuing rejection of Darwinism 
from the social sciences are ungrounded. Significantly, however, as Hodgson also 
makes clear, through the work of Parsons and others (Perry, 1918; Woods, 1920), the 
meaning of the term ‘Social Darwinism’ began to change so that it was used to describe 
scientific as well as ideological doctrines. The reviled ‘Social Darwinism’ also came to 
represent the crossing of boundaries between the biological and the social spheres, and 
as a result Darwinian theory itself became discredited. This subtle extension of meaning 
has proven to be equally damaging to the development of theory, with contemporary 
scholars still bitterly disputing the relevance of biological evolutionary ideas for the 
socio-economic domain (Ellis, 1996; van den Berghe, 1990; Metcalfe, 2004). Social 
Darwinism has essentially been used to banish biological ideas from the social sphere, 
and by discouraging theoretical discourse between biology and sociology it has  ‘forced 
an unwarranted division between conceptualizations of the natural and social’ 
(Hodgson, 2004b). 
 The critical point to note is that not only has ‘Social Darwinism’ been shown to be a 
highly ambiguous and unreliable term, associated with ideologies as dissimilar as 
liberalist, socialist, individualist, racist and nationalist (Himmelfarb, 1959; Bannister, 
1979; Hodgson, 2004b), but through it, Darwinian theory has been woefully 
misrepresented. However, this point does not appear to be widely appreciated, and the 
fear of Darwinism that was established in the 1930s and 1940s seemingly continues to 
permeate the collective conscience of social scientists. Critically, as a direct result of 
these misrepresentations, and the damaging myth that any relationship between biology 
and the social sciences would inevitably be unsafe, Darwinian theory has become fixed 
in the minds of social scientists as a ‘Bad Thing’.  
 Indeed the eventual upshot of the rhetorical impact of Social Darwinism is that 
generations of scholars in the social sciences have failed to explore the rich pickings of 
a truly generalized and accessible Darwinian theory. Indeed because of the unwarranted 
ideological and scientific prejudice, knowledge of modern Darwinian theory actually 
remains very limited (Haines, 1992; Udry, 1995; Laurent, 2001), and the crucial 
theoretical and conceptual developments achieved over the last thirty years have not 
been widely disseminated in the socio-economic arena (Blute, 1976; Jablonka and 
Ziman, 2000). Indeed, for van den Berghe (1990) and others (Ellis, 1996; Sanderson 
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and Ellis, 1992), this ‘biophobia’ has ultimately led to the ‘trained incompetence’ of 
sociologists. Essentially, as noted by Hodgson, ‘those misguided by the rhetoric of 
“Social Darwinism” are less well prepared to engage with these developments’ (2004b), 
and this is nowhere more apparent than in the misconceptions and objections that 
continue to be raised against Darwinism. 
 
Objections, Misconceptions and Generalized Darwinism 
 
The most prominent objections to Darwinism in the socio-economic sphere pertain to 
the use of biological analogies. As indicated above, critics are sceptical about the 
relevance of ideas from biology for the social domain; they fear the reduction of socio-
cultural phenomena to biological phenomena, they worry about genetic determinism, 
and they are concerned that Darwinism appears to ignore human agency and intentional 
behaviour. Another widespread misconception is the view that Darwinism and 
Lamarckism are rival evolutionary theories, so that for the majority of those who do 
engage with evolutionary ideas from biology it is that later that they explicitly pursue. 
 However, what each of these objections and misconceptions reveal are fundamental 
misunderstandings about the nature and scope of Darwinism, as well as a general lack 
of awareness of important conceptual developments in biology. Essentially, as will be 
demonstrated below, these objections are misconceived. Social scientists need to 
understand that Darwinism is not domain-specific. On the contrary it is a substrate-
neutral general theory (Plotkin, 1994; Dennett, 1995); its core principles of variation, 
inheritance and selection are general principles that govern the evolution of all open 
complex systems which share fundamental ontological similarities (Hodgson, 2001b, 
2002b, 2005; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a). Furthermore, Darwinism embraces a basic 
philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations of change 
(Hodgson, 2002b, 2005), so that the explanatory mechanisms critically attend to 
cumulative cause and effect relationships. Hodgson usefully sums up the general nature 
of Darwinism below highlighting the important ontological similarities (2002b, p. 103); 
 
As long as there is a population of replicating entities that make imperfect copies of 
themselves, and not all of these entities have the potential to survive, then Darwinian 
evolution will occur. 
 
 Indeed for Darwinians the application of the general principles to the social domain is 
clear, because assuredly such populations do prevail in the socio-cultural sphere and it is 
20 
not difficult to perceive how they would meet the minimal conditions (Blute, 1976; 
Metcalfe, 1987). To illustrate, the requisite codifying or replicating entity may exist in 
the form of ideas (Dawkins, 1976; Hull, 1988), habits (Veblen, 1898) or organizational 
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). And, in the transmission or replication of these 
entities a certain amount of variation will inevitably result, through, for example, 
communication or copying errors. And, given this variation it is equally inevitable that 
not all of the entities will have the same potential to survive, or reproduce, so that 
selection and evolution will be the inevitable outcome (Blute, p. 730). It is thus in this 
fashion that the basic Darwinian ontology is established; it just remains for the social 
evolutionist to specify the nature of the mechanisms in their own particular domain of 
enquiry.  This is essentially what is understood as the modern formulation of 
‘Darwinism’ by those who promote a generalized theory of Darwinism in the socio-
cultural domain. And indeed, as will be illustrated below, it is through its modern 
articulation that the main objections to its use are clearly shown to be ungrounded.   
 One of the most notable critiques of the use of biological analogies in economics was 
made by Edith Penrose (1952). In response to Alchian’s (1950) attempt to develop an 
economic selection process, Penrose famously argued that Darwinian ‘blind’ selection 
did not take account of human agency and the important intentional or deliberative 
behaviour which characterizes, and indeed strongly influences, the social realm. 
However, contrary to popular belief, it has been shown that Darwinism does not deny 
intentionality (Mayr, 1988, 1992). Indeed, the Darwinian commitment to detailed causal 
explanation asserts that there is no such thing as an ‘uncaused cause’ (Hodgson, 2002b, 
2004a), meaning that  intentional behaviour would itself need to be explained by a 
linked causal process (for example, present circumstances, education, childhood 
experiences, and indeed ultimately, as Darwin suggested, the evolution of the capacity 
to form intentional behavior). The crucial, but subtle, technical point here is that 
Darwinian selection processes act on variety regardless of their cause (Vromen, 2004). 
This is not the same thing as saying that human agency and intentionality are 
unimportant or that they do not play a part in the causal story. Indeed a Darwinian 
account of the social realm accommodates both deliberative action and selection 
processes.  
 The rejection of biological analogies, however, continues to be expressed in 
economics, most notably by Ulrich Witt (1997, 2003, 2004) and John Foster (1997), 
both of whom propose a theory of self-organization as an alternative to Darwinian 
selection. While Witt’s critique is more akin to that of Penrose and others with his views 
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on human intentionality and updated concerns about the lack of a close analogy to the 
gene in the socio-economic domain (Hodgson, 2002b), importantly Foster’s critique 
appears to be centered on a particular understanding of Darwinism which does not 
correspond with the Darwinism being discussed here (Hodgson, 2001a; 2002b). 
Essentially Foster rejects biological analogies because, amongst other things, he 
believes that the selection mechanism analogy is based on ‘selfish gene theory’ 
(Dawkins, 1976) which refers to atomistic competing ‘selfish genes’, and is 
anthropomorphic (Foster, 1997, pp.  431-433). And furthermore because he perceives 
that natural selection is presented by evolutionary biologists as a ‘time reversible 
process’ and is thus ‘ahistorical’ (1997, p. 432). In the first case, Foster is simply wrong 
to suggest that the biological analogy being proposed in a generalized Darwinian 
account is based on the marginalized ‘gene-centered’ view of Darwinism. And in the 
second case, Foster is essentially mistaken in his reading of Maynard-Smith (1970)8 and 
in his blanket characterization of biology and biological analogies (Hodgson, 2001a, p. 
281). Indeed, it would be very difficult to find an evolutionary biologist who would 
support Foster’s view of evolution by natural selection as a time reversible process. 
Essentially these and others of Foster’s criticisms of Darwinian biological analogies are 
misconceived. 
 With regard to the suggestion of ‘self-organization theory’ as an alternative to 
Darwinism, it has been shown in the literature that this is an incomplete and insufficient 
explanation of evolutionary change, because essentially self-organization theory is 
unable to explain the adaptation and survival of the self-organized structures themselves 
(Hodgson, 2001a; 2002b; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a). So that while self-
organization theory does indeed explain important evolutionary processes it is not 
enough on its own, and requires the Darwinian principle of selection to complete its 
explanation.  
 In addition to these particular misconceptions of Darwinism there is a much more 
fundamental ontological point about Darwinian biological analogy, the lack of 
awareness of which has clearly hindered progress for evolutionary scholars. This was 
clearly articulated in the theoretical developments and conceptual clarifications that 
ensued in evolutionary biology during 1970s and 1980s,9 and has been indicated here in 
                                                 
8 Knudsen (Personal Communication, 11th December 2005):  ‘Since naked natural selection concerns 
change between two time-steps*, it is ahistorical.  Maynard Smith (1970) may well have supported this 
claim. However, the irreversibility problem concerns the cumulative effect of natural selection. It is (the 
long-term) evolution by natural selection which is historical and irreversible’. (*Natural selection was 
shown by Mayr (1978) to be a ‘two-step’ process. This is explained in detail below in Chapter 5) 
9 These will all be covered in detail in Chapters 5 to 7 below. 
22 
the outline of Darwinism above. The simple truth is that modern Darwinism is not 
essentially about analogy; indeed it positively shifts the theoretical approach beyond 
metaphor and analogy towards the more analytically tractable platform of a Darwinian 
social ontology (Hodgson, 2002b). This is the whole point of a generalized Darwinian 
theory; the acknowledgement and analysis of Darwinian entities and processes in the 
social world (Campbell, 1965; Lewontin, 1970; Hull, 1981, 1988; Dawkins, 1984; 
Plotkin, 1994; Dennett, 1995; Cziko, 1995; Wilson, 2002).  
 Equipped with this insight it would certainly be easier for evolutionary scholars in the 
socio-economic domain to realize that their fears of Darwinism are ungrounded. The 
concern about reductionist methodology is a classic case in point. With the realization 
that Darwinism is not domain specific, that it has moved beyond analogy and is indeed a 
general theory it becomes easier to see that social phenomena are emphatically not 
being analyzed in terms of biological phenomena and nor is biology determining the 
social research agenda.10 Correspondingly, the modern literature on Darwinism makes 
absolutely clear that there are no allusions to eugenics, genetic-determinism or indeed 
any of the racist, imperialist or sexist ideologies that have misleadingly become 
associated with name of Darwin (Hodgson, 2004a, 2004b). Quite simply, Darwinism is 
about the application of general principles, an approach that implicitly assumes a 
Darwinian ontology and thus has no need for a reductionist methodology.  
 This important observation leads to another point that underlines the general nature of 
Darwinism and introduces the final major objection to the use of Darwinism in the 
socio-economic sphere, which relates to the little understood relationship between 
Darwinism and Lamarckism.11  Whilst the general nature of Darwinism is evidently 
asserted, and its status as a meta-theory is frequently proclaimed (Hull, 1981; Dawkins, 
1984; Plotkin, 1994; Dennett, 1995), it is important to stress that this does not therefore 
mean that it is a ‘complete’ theory; this is not a claim of Darwinism. In other words, 
‘Darwinism cannot itself give a full detailed explanation of evolutionary processes or 
outcomes’ (Hodgson, 2004b, p. 6). However, significantly, the theory’s 
‘incompleteness’ is nevertheless indicative of its generic nature and indeed its 
consequential accessibility for scholars in the analysis of other evolutionary systems. 
The important point is that Darwinism provides an overarching conceptual framework 
within which domain-specific auxiliary explanations are accommodated; for example, a 
                                                 
10 See, for example, multi-authored works such as Baum and Singh (1994), Ziman (2000), Wheeler et al 
(2002), Baum (2002), 
11 Lamarckism refers to the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. It is discussed at length in 
Chapter 5 below. 
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different type of replicator12 or a different type of inheritance mechanism. And notably 
this positively includes the Lamarckian inheritance mechanism favoured by most 
scholars in the socio-economic domain. 
 Hence the related and equally significant point highlighted here is that, contrary to the 
widespread misconception, Darwinism and Lamarckism are not rival or mutually 
exclusive theories (Dawkins, 1986; Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001). The fact is 
Darwin himself (1859) did not deny the possibility of acquired character inheritance. 
Indeed as has been well documented, he embraced Lamarckism in his theory (Mayr, 
1976, 1988) and indeed gave it increasing attention in later works. However, it is 
important to note here that it is the particular meta-theoretical framework of Darwinism 
that facilitates the accommodation of this ‘alternative’ inheritance mechanism. Modern 
Darwinism stresses that the detail about entities and their particular mechanisms will 
inevitably vary from one domain to another, since what happens in the social domain is 
clearly quite different to what happens in the biological domain. Indeed, in response to 
related criticisms of Darwinism (Nelson, 1995; Witt, 2004), this structural feature 
underlines the point that Darwinism does not mean that the analysis of social evolution 
will be dictated or skewed by a biological perspective or agenda.13  
 Thus although Lamarckian inheritance is no longer considered viable in evolutionary 
biology (Mayr, 1982)14 significantly this does not deny its link with Darwinism or 
indeed its occurrence in the social domain. To be sure Lamarckian inheritance is 
accommodated within a modern generalized Darwinian account, where it is simply seen 
as a different type of inheritance mechanism; an inheritance mechanism for the social 
realm. As stressed above, Darwinism does not claim to be a complete theory; it is a 
generalized meta-theoretical framework that incorporates supplementary explanations 
appropriate to the domain of inquiry.15 The critical theoretical point here is that, unlike 
                                                 
12 The now ‘generalized’ term for the unit of replication (Brandon 1990). Defined by Hull (1988) as ‘an 
entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications’.   
13 Indeed many social scientists already acknowledge this point, for example, Baum and Singh (1994b, p. 
10), ‘fortunately, Darwin’s idea of evolution - descent with modification - is not tied to particular features 
of biological inheritance (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Campbell, 1965; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hull, 
1988). Natural selection is a very general mechanism’.  
14 Note that a tiny minority in biology disagree (Steele, 1979; Steel et al, 1998). However, this does not 
affect the argument about the validity of Lamarckism in the social sphere. See Chapter 6 below. 
15 This point is also recognised by organization scientists, for example, Baum and Rowley (2002, p. 24 ); 
‘An evolutionary meta-theoretical framework based on Campbell’s (1965) VSR model is suggested by 
Aldrich (1977, 1999) and McKelvey (1982) …  We do not offer this evolutionary meta-framework as the 
correct meta-framework, but rather as one standing proposal that enables us to interpret and connect 
contemporary perspectives on organizations in a meaningful way.  [The VSR model] offers an appealing 
way to categorize multiple organizational perspectives based on their contributions to the evolutionary 
view of organizational persistence and change, as well as an explicit basis for examining the overlaps and 
relationships among them’.  
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Darwinism, and in common with self-organization theory, Lamarckism cannot stand 
alone as a theory (Hodgson, 2001b, 2004a; Knudsen, 2001) it basically needs the 
selection process and conceptual framework of Darwinism in order to work. 16  
Accordingly, whilst Lamarckism ‘nests’ as an explanatory mechanism within the meta-
theoretical framework of Darwinism (Knudsen 2001), significantly, the reverse situation 
is not true; this is not a symmetrical relationship.   
 With regard to the wider relevance of this for the social domain, it has been 
demonstrated unequivocally that social evolution is both Lamarckian and Darwinian 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Metcalfe, 1998; Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001). Indeed 
paradoxically, even the polarization of the socio-economic literature into ‘Lamarckian’ 
or ‘Darwinian’ accounts (Murmann and Rivkin, 2004) testifies to this observation, with 
some scholars clearly perceiving a Lamarckian evolutionary story in the social realm 
whilst their colleagues evidently identify the same entities and processes with 
Darwinism.  Consequently the theoretical accommodation of Lamarckism is a very 
important aspect of Darwinism that should not be overlooked by social scientists; 
indeed it is poised to considerably enhance their analytical approach, where both 
deliberation and selection need to be explained for a complete causal story.  
 In summary, all the major ideological and theoretical objections to Darwinism have 
been shown to be groundless. And significantly it is also acknowledged that in the 
socio-economic literature these criticisms tend to be based on a very crude Darwinism 
and limited understanding of the theory (Metcalfe, 2004; Blute, 1976; Haines, 1992; 
Freese, 2001). As suggested at the outset hostility and fear of Darwinism has prevented 
thorough acquaintance with the theory so that the remarkable theoretical advances 
achieved in evolutionary biology which have clarified the theory, illustrated its generic 
nature and admirably addressed the objections, have seemingly all been lost on its 
critics. And indeed hostility and misunderstandings evidently continue to prevail.
 Hence a curious irony emerges at this stage and it concerns the evident revival of 
Darwinian evolution in the literature as well as the notion of ‘covert Darwinism’. 
Essentially, in spite of the overt hostility towards Darwinism, the theory is nonetheless 
being extensively deployed in evolutionary accounts currently being developed in the 
socio-economic literature. It must be noted that the extent of this revival is not 
                                                 
16 There are important gaps in the Lamarckism explanation (see Hodgson, 2004a p.52-57), for example it 
fails to explain why only advantageous adaptations are inherited and not disadvantageous ones.  And, at a 
more fundamental level, it also fails to explain why organisms try to adapt to their environments, in other 
words how is intentionality explained? It is suggested (Hodgson, 2004a, Dawkins, 1983, 1986; Cronin, 
1991; Plotkin, 1994) that such gaps need to be filled by a Darwinian or other explanation. 
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immediately apparent, however, since for the most part the widespread use of 
Darwinian ideas is implicit. And this is where the ‘covert Darwinism’ comes in. What 
becomes apparent on close reading of the literature is widespread ‘incipient’ 
Darwinism, in other words even if the term is not being used ‘Darwinism’ nevertheless 
bubbles to the surface. Thus the revival consists of a small number of evolutionary 
theories that explicitly adopt Darwinism, supported by a much greater number of 
theories where that adoption is largely implicit. 
 
The Revival of Darwinian Thinking 
 
Clearly, against the aforementioned hostile backdrop the paradox to emphasize here is 
the recent veritable explosion of implicit Darwinian thinking in some parts of the 
organization studies and evolutionary economics literature. As highlighted above, it 
appears that in spite of decades of negative portrayals, Darwinism is undeniably 
experiencing a revival. There are strong signs that Darwinism is remerging as a model 
for the socio-economic domain,17 with its implicit adoption increasingly acknowledged 
(Galunic and Weeks, 2002) and its explicit adoption increasingly apparent (Ziman, 
2000; Wheeler et al, 2002). In fact, growing numbers of conferences are being held in 
business economics and organization science with Darwinism as the central or 
underlying theme (Hodgson, 2002c; Murmann and Rivkin, 2004; Witt, 2004),18 and 
many of these have resulted in multi-authored volumes on the subject (Ziman, 2000; 
Wheeler et al, 2002). Indeed the expanding literature (Baum and Singh, 1994; Laurent 
and Nightingale, 2001) on the topic bears testimony to the growing impact of 
Darwinism on the socio-economic field, with some scholars acknowledging Darwinism 
as an ‘indispensable tool of thought’ (Ziman, 2002), and others proclaiming its status as 
a general theory (Hodgson, 2005; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a). Clearly it would 
appear that not all in academia are afraid of Darwinism.  
 Fundamentally what these developments indicate is growing recognition of the 
explanatory power of Darwinian theory, and ultimately, the inevitability of its 
widespread adoption by evolutionary scholars in the socio-economic domain; 
                                                 
17 Having initially been introduced to economics by Veblen (1898), and to organization studies by 
Campbell (1965).       
18Hodgson (2002c) University of Hertfordshire ‘How do Institutions Evolve?’; Murmann and Rivkin 
(2004) New Orleans ‘Adaptation vs. Selection in Industry Change: Toward a Contingency View’; Witt 
Max Planck Institute (2004) ‘Evolutionary Concepts in Economics and Biology’; Plus the annual 
conferences of the European Association of Evolutionary and Political Economy.     
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unquestionably very important outcomes. Significantly, however, on another level what 
these developments also reveal is that there is still a long way to go in terms of breaking 
down prejudice and intellectual barriers. The silence of Darwinism tells its own story 
about the continuing reluctance of scholars to be associated with the name of Darwin, 
and, moreover, the pervasive covert Darwinism similarly signals deep-seated fears 
about Darwinian theory.  
 Before expanding on covert Darwinism and in order to put it in its proper context it is 
important here to reflect on the background to the current revival and take account of 
the full history of Darwinism in the socio-cultural domain. Indeed, it is important for 
critics to realize that Darwinism has been around for a very long time in the social 
realm, and moreover that there has been a long and positive history of the application of 
Darwinism to socio-cultural phenomena. To be sure Darwinism’s general nature was 
recognized from the earliest days of the theory. Accordingly, the next section will 
outline this history and critically illustrate its various applications as a general theory. It 
will thus draw attention to the origins of the ‘Darwinian thread’, which so evidently 
runs through increasing numbers of contemporary socio-economic accounts, and 
critically thereby presents the little known parentage of the important notion of a 
‘generalized Darwinism’. This will then lead into a discussion of the current position of 
Darwinism in the organization studies and evolutionary economics literature, where 
incipient or covert Darwinism will be highlighted in the various configurations of 
evolutionary theory. 
 
What are the Origins of Darwinism in the Social-cultural Domain?  
 
The use of Darwinian evolutionary ideas in the social sciences was already being 
proposed as long ago as the end of the 19th Century. This is evidenced, for example, in 
the work of Walter Bagehot (1872), William James (1880), Charles Sanders Pierce 
[1898] (1992), James Mark Baldwin (1896) and David Ritchie (1890, 1896); all of 
whom explored the broader application of the theory of natural selection to areas such 
as customs, morality and epistemology. Indeed notably, such explorations were 
prompted by Darwin himself in Origins (1859), where he alluded to the extension of the 
principles of variation, inheritance and selection to human behaviour and social 
phenomena, and in Descent (1871), where he elaborated on the evolution of language, 
morality and social groups (Laurent 2001). To be sure these promptings were soon 
picked up by other social thinkers and there followed a number of serious attempts to 
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extend Darwinism to socio-economic evolution (Hodgson 2004a). Significantly, what 
each of these early contributors had in common was an unfettered appreciation of the 
general nature of Darwin’s theory and, consequently, an ability to effectively 
conceptualize Darwinian entities and processes in these disparate fields.   
 This ability was shared by Thorstein Veblen (1898, 1899), who is credited with 
introducing Darwinism to the field of economics (Hodgson, 2004a; Witt, 2003; 
Vromen, 1995), and Donald T Campbell (1965), an inspirational figure for scores of 
evolutionists in sociology and widely  acknowledged for his pervasive influence on 
socio-cultural theories of evolution (Baum, McKelvey 1999; Ziman, 2000; Baum, 
2002). Veblen was struck by what he saw as Darwin’s detailed processual explanation 
of the origin of species, which he understood as a cumulative causal sequence (1898). 
This ‘continuity of cause and effect’ (1907) summarized the causal sequence he saw in 
Darwin’s variation inheritance and selection dynamic. Here was a theory that could 
explain the evolution of socio-economic systems (institutions, customs, habits) in terms 
of cumulative cause and effect relationships, a process Veblen (1898) promptly labeled 
‘cumulative causation’ and which later came to characterize his approach (Hodgson 
2004a). 
 Significantly, in terms of the development and generalization of Darwin’s theory, 
Veblen proposed the actual application of Darwin’s core principles to entities and 
processes in the socio-economic realm. In other words he acknowledged a Darwinian 
social ontology. Most importantly Veblen recognized and highlighted the crucial roles 
of variation, inheritance and selection (Hodgson, 2004a).  In true Darwinian form, he 
emphasized that there must be sustained variation in the population and moreover that 
variation is preexisting in the system. He perceived inheritance, or continuity, in the 
relatively stable and enduring ‘units’ of institutions and habits (including habits of 
thought) and these were featured in his perspective as the key objects of selection.  
 Indeed textual analysis testifies to Veblen’s clear understanding of Darwinian 
causality which, contrary to the aforementioned widespread misconceptions, included 
explanation of intentionality; a causal explanation that reconciled purposive behaviour 
with material cause.19 However, whilst Veblen’s Darwinian insight and credentials are 
unquestionable,20 unfortunately he failed to present a synthetic overview of his ideas or 
indeed a clear outline of the principles of his evolutionary economics. Thus, it has been 
suggested that having introduced Darwinism to economics, offering valuable inspiration 
                                                 
19 The issue of intentionality in evolutionary theory is discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
20 See Hodgson (2004a), Chapter 7, for an in-depth survey of ‘the Darwinian Mind of Thorstein Veblen’. 
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to evolutionary economists, this is one of the reasons why Veblen’s influence was not as 
widespread and enduring as it might otherwise have been (Witt, 2003; Hodgson, 
2004a). 
 Some time later however, Campbell (1965) picked up the torch in organization 
studies and went a critical step further by setting out a more formulaic Darwinian 
evolutionary framework for the social sciences. Hailed as ‘the father of evolutionary 
epistemology’ (Hull, 2001, p. 33), Campbell, in his promotion of the generic quality of 
Darwinism, instructively suggested that we think of organic evolution as being ‘but one 
instance’ of a general theory of evolution. Campbell (1965) is author of the ‘blind-
variation-and-selective-retention’ epistemology, otherwise known as the ‘BVSR’ theory 
of socio-cultural evolution. Matching Veblen for his incisive grasp of Darwinian theory, 
Campbell included the adjective ‘blind’ because he sought to stress the undirected 
nature of the selection process. For, as Campbell points out, ‘rather than foresighted 
variation, hind-sighted selection is the secret of rational innovation’ (1977, p. 506).21  
 Without doubt, what these insightful scholars usefully demonstrated was the generic 
nature of Darwin’s theory.  Indeed, they were absolutely clear about the manner of use 
of Darwinian ideas in the socio-economic realm. Significantly, there is no suggestion of 
biological reductionism here (Anderson, 1999; Hodgson, 2004a), but instead only the 
direct application of the Darwinian principles. And, to be sure, this says as much about 
the theory, in terms of its general nature, as it does about the achievements of these 
early Darwinian thinkers. 
 Undeniably both Veblen and Campbell have had a marked impact on evolutionary 
theorizing in their respective fields (Hodgson, 2004a; Baum and McKelvey, 1999) 
although it is fair to say that Campbell’s influence has been far more enduring across 
these and other disciplines. However, as suggested above, in spite of this Darwinian 
ancestry, and except for a few notable and recent exceptions (Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b, 
2003b, 2004a, 2005, 2006b; Knudsen, 2001, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 
2006a, 2006b), neither organization studies nor evolutionary economics have 
explicitly  pursued, fully fleshed-out or updated the Darwinian perspective. Indeed, 
‘the significance of Darwinism for the social sciences has been largely unrecognised 
since Veblen’ (Hodgson, 2004a, p. 9). 
                                                 
21 For some evolutionists, however, the notion of ‘blind variation’ invites confusion about the theory 
(Hull, 2001), whilst for others it has actively discouraged consideration of the adoption of Darwinism in 
the mistaken belief that it discounts the intentional behaviour of the social world. Veblen likewise invited 
the same confusion in his own expressions of the Darwinian schema (Hodgson, 2004a, p. 151). 
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The New Age of Darwinism 
 
Since the 1970s, however, after this notable lull, at the fringes of certain research groups 
there has been an important but hitherto minimally acknowledged resurgence of interest 
in Darwinism in the social sciences (Popper, 1972; Campbell, 1974; Cziko, 1995). 
Explicitly Darwinian in form, this significant stream of thinking is just beginning to be 
noticed, and its development has prompted the suggestion of a ‘Second Darwinian 
Revolution’ (Cziko, 1995). Demonstrative of its universal character, Darwinism, like 
the proverbial ‘universal acid’ (Dennett, 1995), has been adopted and reinforced by 
scholars across a wide range of disciplines. For example, following William James 
(1880), Popper (1972), Toulmin (1972) and Campbell (1974) each formulated their own 
evolutionary epistemologies.  Along similar lines and focusing on the evolution of 
science, Hull (1988) later offered an updated elucidation of how selection forces impact 
on conceptual changes in science. Edelman (1987) used Darwinism in his exploration of 
the development of neural connections in the brain, whilst Plotkin (1994) and Hull et al 
(2001) applied it to immune systems. More recently Aunger (2002) discussed the 
Darwinian evolution of computer viruses; Hodgson and Knudsen (2004a) explored the 
evolution of firms; and Wilson (2002) offered a lucid and credible account of the 
evolution of religions. Indeed, significantly, as was outlined earlier, this revival of 
Darwinism has also been witnessed in the organization studies and evolutionary 
economics literature.  
 What is remarkable about the work of all of these Darwinian thinkers is the explicit 
application of Darwinian principles; similar entities and causal processes have been 
identified in their respective socio-cultural realms. The critical common factor is that 
evolutionary theory’s roots in biology did not thwart this group of theorists; essentially 
they are able to see past this fundamental association, and recognize that there are 
general principles in Darwinism covering all complex evolutionary systems. Clearly the 
application of Darwinism has evidently proven, for some, to be a very useful analytical 
device. And, significantly, this development of theory, in terms of its subtle progress 
‘from analogy to ontology’ (Hodgson 2002b), will have been facilitated and enhanced 
by the major theoretical developments and conceptual refinements that have occurred in 
evolutionary theory over the last three decades. 
 Assuredly, as Aunger (2001, p.1) recently observed, through such developments, 
which have subsequently been complemented and reinforced by the emergence of new 
fields such as evolutionary ecology (Krebs and Davies, 1997), evolutionary economics 
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(Nelson and Winter, 1982), evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al, 1992) and 
evolutionary linguistics (Pinker, 1994), Darwin’s legacy continues to grow, so that the 
new millennium might justifiably be called ‘The Age of Universal Darwinism’ 
(Dennett, 1995, Cziko, 1995).22  
 Evidently Darwinism has been around for a very long time and as Aunger and others 
suggest, it is certainly not about to go away. The most significant aspect of this 
however, is that what has been observed in the historical review and all the way through 
to contemporary contributions, is the clear and sustained use of Darwinism as a general 
theory. Indeed, in response to the critics, it is apparent in both the elucidation of the 
theory (particularly in its modern articulation)23 and illustration of its application, that 
Darwinism is a truly general theory. It is therefore quite legitimate and appropriate to 
refer to this as ‘generalized Darwinism’ (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a) since this 
clarifies and admirably sums up the nature of Darwin’s theory. 
 More recently, as indicated by Dennett and others cited above, this general nature was 
captured in the notion of  ‘universal Darwinism’, a term coined by Richard Dawkins 
(1983), who famously, and controversially (Dawkins, 1976), drew attention to the 
general application of Darwin’s theory, and who undoubtedly influenced the recent 
revival of Darwinism in the socio-cultural domain. However, whilst Dawkins has 
certainly made an invaluable contribution to the theoretical and conceptual advances 
achieved in modern evolutionary biology, it is very important to note here that his views 
on genetic determinism are not embraced in ‘generalized Darwinism.’24  Indeed, as 
became obvious in the preceding sections, the idea encapsulated in the notions of 
‘universal’ or ‘generalized’ Darwinism is, in fact, a very old idea; Dawkins was clearly 
not its originator, and earlier proponents have clearly not taken the ‘gene-view’. 
Consider, for example, the contributions of Veblen and Campbell; the gene-view is 
simply not necessary. In truth because of the recurring association of the term ‘universal 
Darwinism’ with Dawkins and thus, genetic determinism, in an attempt to avoid 
confusion here I avoid using the term and instead follow Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a) 
and use the term ‘generalized Darwinism’, which is, in any case, the more accurate of 
the two terms, and certainly better expresses the ‘New Age of Darwinism’. 
                                                 
22 Indeed the generic promise of Darwinism has being acknowledged, implicitly and explicitly, by a 
growing number of academics in every conceivable domain of inquiry (Aunger, 2000).   
23 This has not been elaborated here but will be set out in detail in Chapters 5-7. 
24 Furthermore nor are they embraced by the vast majority of other scholars who use the term ‘universal 
Darwinism’.  As Hull explains (Personal Communication, 6th June 2004) ‘you can be a universal 
Darwinian without being a genetic determinist’  
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 However, as remarked earlier, the revival of Darwinism that marks this new age has a 
most peculiar manifestation, for whilst it is extensive it is also largely hidden; with 
‘explicit Darwinism’ (Hull, 1988; Baum and Singh, 1994; Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b, 
2003b, 2004; Knudsen, 2001, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 2006a, 2006b; and 
others) representing just the tip of the iceberg. The next section explores this widespread 
covert Darwinism and thus returns the analysis to the subtle and understated issue of the 
on-going fear of Darwinism. 
 
Covert Darwinism and the Darwinian Thread 
 
Significantly, the revival of Darwinism celebrated above essentially refers to the explicit 
adoption of Darwinism and its subsequent impact. But, as previously suggested, within 
the explosion of evolutionary approaches that have occurred in the socio-economic 
literature the pervasive adoption of Darwinism is predominantly implicit.  A 
comprehensive cross-disciplinary survey of the literature reveals that very few scholars 
explicitly exploit or promote the Darwinian model. Correspondingly, as the JSTOR 
analysis indicates, 25  evolutionary theories are variously described as Lamarckian, 
developmental, self-organization, ‘BVRS’, selectionist, ecological and, only rarely, as 
Darwinian. The critical point is that regardless of the labels most of these theories 
implicitly adopt key Darwinian ideas; there is a Darwinian thread running through most 
contemporary accounts. Indeed, in various guises the Darwinian thread clearly runs 
through the disparate case-studies of the present work; these are the notable and 
influential works of Nelson and Winter (1982), Hannan and Freeman (1989) and 
Howard Aldrich (1999).  
 Hannan and Freeman, for example, are explicitly Darwinian in their adoption of 
Darwin’s selection process, but they only implicitly adopt the Darwinian principle of 
variety , and they describe their theory as ‘population ecology’.  Nelson and Winter, on 
the other hand, implicitly adopt the three core Darwinian principles of variation, 
inheritance and selection, but label their theory Lamarckian. Whilst Aldrich, perhaps the 
most explicitly Darwinian in orientation, adopts the Darwinian principles of variation 
and selection, but is remiss in explicitly identifying with Darwinism in a theory 
described by the author simply as an ‘evolutionary’ approach.  For these and other 
reasons detailed in later Chapters, these accounts are thus here characterized 
respectively as, ‘partial’, ‘hidden’ and ‘underdeveloped’ Darwinian accounts. 
                                                 
25 See Chapter 1 above 
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 The critical issue here is what this ‘covert Darwinism’ says, firstly, about the way in 
which scholars are thinking about evolution, and secondly, about the status of 
Darwinian theory. It is proposed here that whilst pervasive implicit Darwinism 
camouflages and belies the extent of Darwinian influence in these disciplines, and 
indeed hampers development of evolutionary theory in the socio-economic domain, its 
occurrence nevertheless critically reflects an ‘explosion’ of Darwinian thinking amongst 
evolutionary scholars (whether they recognize this or not) and in consequence indicates 
the inevitability of Darwinism for the social realm.  
 Indeed as will become more apparent in the next and subsequent Chapters implicit 
Darwinism says a great deal about the way in which scholars are thinking about 
evolutionary theory in general and about Darwinism in particular. Thus it would be 
useful at this juncture to consider precisely what is meant here by ‘implicit Darwinism.’  
It is important to note that a distinction emerges in the literature between the 
‘unknowing’ implicit adoption of Darwinian ideas and ‘knowing’ implicit adoption. 
And considerations of these differences are important for what they reveal about how 
scholars conceptualize the Darwinian evolutionary processes. Moreover, careful 
examination of the character of  the ‘Darwinian thread’, in other words, the various 
configurations which comprise Darwinian and other evolutionary ideas, similarly 
instructively sheds light on the status of Darwinism amongst social scientists. 
 Examples of apparent ‘unknowing implicit’ adoption include those accounts where 
theorists appear to ‘intuitively’ arrive at a Darwinian principle or underlying assumption 
without any obvious reference to its biological analogy. Clearly such occurrences would 
strongly indicate the relevance of Darwinism for these fields as well as confirm its 
general nature. There is evidence of this unknowing adoption of Darwinism in each of 
the case studies featured here and it is present throughout much of literature. A 
prominent example of unwitting or unknowing adoption is the widespread assumption 
of Darwin’s ‘population thinking’ perspective26 with its revolutionary conceptualization 
of variety and evolutionary change. 
  In organization studies, for example, scholars became receptive to the population 
thinking approach through their disciplines’ important transition, over twenty years ago, 
                                                 
26 ‘Population thinking’ contrasts with the ‘typological essentialism’ that dominated the thinking of 
Darwin’s own era, and which was committed to the notion of fixed and ideal types, and thus prevented 
the conceptualization of evolutionary change (Mayr 1959).  This will be explained in detail in Chapters 3 
and 4. 
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to the ‘open systems’ perspective (Baum and Rowley, 2002).27 Whilst in economics, 
where the concept was notably introduced by Metcalfe (1987), its unwitting 
development is traced by him back through the various efforts of economists to 
understand the role of variety in economic selection processes. Indeed, underlining the 
logic of the population thinking perspective and its inevitability for socio-economic 
theories of evolution is a very interesting and undocumented irony.  This relates to 
Penrose’s (1952) infamous critique of the use of biological analogies and to her 
subsequent development of an implicit population thinking perspective in the Theory of 
the Growth of the Firm (1959). Essentially in the later work where Penrose is dealing 
with the growth of the firm she inevitably has to abandon equilibrium assumptions, and 
in her detailed analysis and elucidation of variety (its sources, distribution and impact 
on the growth of the firm) it is clear from the text that without realizing it she then 
comes to a population thinking conceptualization.  
 Significantly however, the majority of cases indicate a ‘knowing’ implicit adoption, 
where the handling of concepts are clearly Darwinian in orientation but there is the 
distinct lack of reference to Darwin. Since knowing adoption appears to make up the 
majority of cases their sheer volume tells an important story regarding the status of 
Darwinian theory amongst these scholars. Firstly, their mere existence wholly endorses 
the relevance of Darwinism for the socio-economic domain and demonstrates that more 
and more scholars are adopting a Darwinian perspective. And secondly and importantly, 
in spite of this, they also suggest an on-going ‘fear’ of association with Darwinism.   
 It is telling, for example, that Nelson and Winter’s classic work, which is so 
transparently Darwinian, is very consciously labeled Lamarckian, and that even 
‘Darwinian’ theorists like Aldrich (1999) avoid calling their theories Darwinian, or 
appear to carefully cull Darwinian references from the text, while others who explicitly 
praise the model (Ziman, 2000; Wheeler et al, 2002) thereafter prefer to refer to it 
simply as ‘evolution’ or ‘ecology’. The Darwinian thread nevertheless remains. 
 
                                                 
27Organizations are now defined as ‘open-systems’ perceived as ‘adaptive and interdependent systems, 
comprised of various interrelated – possibly conflicting subsystems – attempting to meet and influence 
the dynamic demands of the environment’ (Baum and Rowley, p. 6).  Open systems approaches have 
notably advanced the analysis by shifting attention away from the internal activities of the organization, 
with its focus on individuals, towards ‘the behaviour of organizations as entities in and of themselves’ 
(Baum and Rowley, p. 3). In other words there is a focus on organizational processes, boundaries and 
strategies. 
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Covert Darwinism and its Implications 
 
Fear of Darwinism has effectively disguised the extent of the Darwinian revival in 
organization studies and evolutionary economics. Thus covert Darwinism represents an 
important paradox. Whilst it inadvertently discourages and effectively thwarts the 
positive exploitation of Darwinism in these fields it also simultaneously celebrates its 
explanatory potential. Covert Darwinism, whether ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’, endorses 
the relevance of Darwinism for these fields, significantly underlining the inevitability 
and the generalizability of Darwinism. Indeed, as will be discussed in more detail in the 
next Chapter, close examination of the literature reveals the important changing 
ontological assumptions and the convergence of thinking that have been quietly taking 
place behind the mask of covert Darwinism.  
 Covert Darwinism certainly gives out mixed and confused messages about the 
relevance of Darwinism for the social arena, and its ‘practice’ seemingly serves to 
fragment rather than unite theory development. Given the fear of Darwinism and its 
negative consequences, it is suggested here that one of the most important messages to 
emerge from the exploration of covert Darwinism is that labels still matter. For this 
reason as much as any other there is clearly a need for a ‘generalized Darwinism’.  
 
Fear of Darwinism and its Implications  
 
It is the contention here that fear of Darwinism, or perhaps more specifically, fear of 
association with ‘Social Darwinism’ (and all that this has come to represent) remains 
the main obstacle to its productive exploitation in the socio-economic sphere. This is 
because it ultimately prevents active engagement with the theory and its development 
and thus generates continued misunderstandings about the nature and scope of 
Darwinism. This is clearly demonstrated in the fragmentation of evolutionary accounts 
discussed in Chapter 1 (Pfeffer, 1993; Murmann and Rivkin, 2002), in the nature of the 
theoretical and methodological problems experienced, and in the evident gaps in theory 
(Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a; Knudsen, 2001; Metcalfe, 
2004). All of which will be illustrated here in the evaluation of the case studies in 
Chapters 8, 9 and 10. 
 The theoretical and methodological reasons for rejecting Darwinism in the social 
arena are exacerbated by the veil of ignorance that fear of Darwinism generates, and 
covert Darwinism sustains. And this is typified in the somewhat primitive attitude 
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assumed by critics towards the use of metaphor and analogy and what this suggests 
about their view of the development of scientific theory (Blute, 1976, 1979; Hodgson, 
2002b, 2004a].  For example, in their rejection of the use of biological analogy critics 
appear to overlook a critical and legitimate part of the scientific process and theory 
development. The fact is that most scientific theories start out as analogy; indeed 
metaphor and analogy are foundational conceptual tools for scientists in their 
hypothesis-building and speculative reasoning. As Vromen (2004) reflects in the 
opening citation of this Chapter, the cross-fertilization of ideas, insights and modelling 
techniques from one domain to another, is a well-practiced and perfectly legitimate 
theoretical device; it is simply illogical to rule out the possibility of Darwinism for the 
social domain. 
  The evident resistance to cross disciplinary dialogue, fittingly described as a ‘Berlin 
Wall’ between biology and the social sciences (Hodgson, 2004a), is, of course, very 
counterproductive. There is a considerable waste of intellectual resources through 
‘reinventing the wheel’ type activities, as numerous theorists independently grapple 
with the same problems, a fact which is very apparent when traversing the socio-
economic literature. Moreover, the marked lack of investigation of modern Darwinian 
theory (Blute, 1976, 1979; Jablonka and Ziman, 2000; Hodgson, 2004a) keeps the 
disciplines stuck in outmoded attitudes and theoretical structures, still raising the same 
objections that have long since been dismissed.  
 In summary, fear of Darwinism fuels embedded prejudices and outmoded historical 
assumptions and promotes misunderstandings of the nature and scope of Darwinism, all 
of which seriously frustrate theory development. And this is dramatically illustrated in 
the stark and unnecessary polarization of theory, evident across the disciplines; between 
the Lamarckian inspired ‘adaptationism’ and Darwinian inspired ‘selectionist’ 
approaches (Murmann and Rivkin, 2004; Baum and Singh, 1994). Referred to as the 
‘adaptation versus selection debate’ this polarization unhelpfully perpetuates the 
falsehood that that Lamarckism and Darwinism are mutually exclusive. And, clearly, 
this does not bode well for the much sought-after unified evolutionary theory for the 
socio-cultural realm.  
 
The Need for a Generalized Darwinism 
 
Evidently within the well-documented explosion of evolutionary rhetoric in the socio-
economic domain there has also been a parallel explosion of Darwinian evolutionary 
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thinking. However, in spite of the palpable potential, there is little indication of the 
emergence of a unified theory of evolution. It is argued here that what this signals is the 
need for a generalized Darwinism; for both theoretical as well as ideological reasons.   
 The rhetorical impact of ‘Social Darwinism’ has clearly been profound, and yet 
ironically the much pilloried and rejected Darwinism is the only theory that comprises 
the necessary principles and explanatory framework to explain the evolution of complex 
systems (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a). It is thus critically important to clarify for 
social scientists precisely what is meant by the use of ‘Darwinism’ in the social domain. 
Accordingly, the need for a ‘generalized Darwinism’ relates to the issue of rhetoric; 
specifically, the use of the term generalized Darwinism is encouraged in order to avoid 
those misunderstandings which have become associated with the notion of ‘universal 
Darwinism’. Although for most Darwinians ‘generalized’ and ‘universal’ mean the 
same thing, and are thus used interchangeably in the literature, it is important to 
recognize that the phrase, ‘universal Darwinism’, conjures up negative associations for 
a significant number of social scientists, primarily because of its links with Richard 
Dawkins (1976) and genetic determinism. And, as has been noted above, social 
scientists remain very sensitive to labels and their associations. On another point 
regarding clarity, the term ‘generalized Darwinism’ also subtly acknowledges the 
important theoretical and conceptual advances that have essentially articulated its 
general nature, and indeed facilitated the greater accessibility of Darwinian theory. Thus 
generalized Darwinism is clearly preferable to that of universal Darwinism since, apart 
from being less provocative, it more accurately describes an approach centered on 
general principles and general application. 
 Putting the issue of labels to one side, there are other more fundamental reasons why 
we need a generalized Darwinism, and these relate to theory itself. In 1979 the 
sociologist John Langton (1979) lamented the theoretical impoverishment of the social 
sciences and he and others (van den Berghe, 1975; Ellis, 1977) anticipated that this 
would be addressed by a generalized Darwinism. Twenty years later this had not yet 
happened and Pfeffer (1993) complained about the multi-paradigmatization of 
organization studies and the lack of a unified theory, while Lopreato and Crippen 
(1999), who also called for a Darwinian analysis, declared a state of crisis in 
Sociology28 observing that in over a hundred years it had not come up with a single 
well-established law or principle (Udry, 2000). Today the fragmentation of theory 
                                                 
28 Ellis (1996) makes the same point in a paper entitled ‘A Discipline in Peril: Sociology’s Future Hinges 
on Curing its Biophobia’ 
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continues to provoke calls for the unification of evolutionary theory (Murmann and 
Rivkin, 2002) and, significantly this is now being actively sought in Darwinism.  
 The need for a generalized Darwinism is currently being variously expressed by many 
Darwinian thinkers (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a; Jablonka and Ziman, 2000; Blute, 
1976, 1979; Haines, 1992). For these scholars, it is imperative that evolutionary 
theorists working in the socio-cultural realm update themselves on modern Darwinian 
theory. They all stress the remarkable explanatory power of the theory, pointing, for 
example, to the conceptual tools that unravel the confusion and makes sense of variety 
in economic and social behaviour (Metcalfe, 1987). For these scholars it appears that 
Darwinism simply asks the right sort of questions, guides research and provides 
testability (Gallunic and Weeks, 2002). Darwinism is praised for the example it 
provides in how to describe and theorize about an historical process (Blute, 1979; 
Dennett, 1995), as well as for the way that it ‘enriches, facilitates and partially shapes 
our understanding’ (Ziman, 2000, p. 312). Moreover, for those few scholars who 
recognize the accommodation of Lamarckism within a Darwinian framework it offers 
reconciliation, and addresses the polarization of theory in the socio-economic realm 
(Ziman, 2000; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a; Metcalfe, 2004). Certainly, the need for 
Darwinism will be underlined in this study where the importance of its explicit adoption 
in the social domain will be clearly demonstrated.  
 Having demonstrated here that the major criticisms of Darwinism are ungrounded and 
that there remains no cause for social scientists to be afraid of Darwinism, the following 
Chapter will now proceed to underline this claim by elaborating on the concept of 
generalized Darwinism. By outlining the little-known but critical developments in 
biological evolutionary theory, and drawing attention to the understated convergence of 
thinking in socio-economic evolutionary rhetoric (which signals its inevitability) it will 
be shown here that there really is no alternative to a generalized Darwinism for the 
socio-economic realm.   
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 3     Generalized Darwinism 
 
 
 
The open question is not whether there will be a Darwinian theory of culture but  
what shape such a Darwinian theory will take. 
Daniel Dennett (1995) 
 
Complex evolving systems, consisting of populations of varied and replicating entities, 
are found in both nature and human society … at a general level there is no alternative to 
the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and inheritance to explain the 
evolution of such systems. 
G. M. Hodgson and T. Knudsen (2006a) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ‘New Age of Darwinism’ heralds the advent of Darwinism as a general theory. 
Lucidly elaborated by Dennett (1995) and others (Plotkin, 1994; Cziko, 1995) and long 
anticipated by earlier Darwinians (Bagehot, 1872; James, 1880; Pierce, 1898; Ritchie, 
1896; Veblen, 1898, 1899; Campbell, 1965), generalized Darwinism ultimately found 
its authority and formal articulation during the 1970s and 1980s through the important 
theoretical developments and conceptual refinements that were achieved in evolutionary 
biology. Darwinism was finally and clearly shown to be applicable beyond the realms of 
biology.29
 Essentially through the unraveling and clarification of the foundational Darwinian 
‘population thinking’ perspective (Mayr, 1959), the mechanisms of variation, 
inheritance and selection became much more easily understood and their general 
application more readily apparent. By purposefully adopting a general approach to the 
analysis of these evolutionary processes, in other words separating them from their 
biological origins, scholars finally untangled the interminable confusions over the units 
and levels of selection (Lewontin, 1970; Hull 1980, 1981). Thus in an incisive 
development which properly situates the heritable unit, the selection process is now 
generally understood as a ‘two-step’ process (Mayr, 1988) which notably involves both 
                                                 
29 These developments relate to the established Darwinism which has long since embraced Mendelian 
genetics, and which biologists often call ‘neo-Darwinism’ - specifically to signal its synthesis in the 
1950s with Mendelian genetics. It is important here to distinguish this meaning of ‘neo-Darwinism’ from 
another that tends to occur in the social sciences literature where neo-Darwinism has sometimes been 
used pejoratively to refer to genetic determinism or ‘ultra-Darwinism’. 
 
 
a ‘replicating’ entity and an ‘interacting’ entity (Hull, 1988) and specifically entails 
selection ‘of’ the interacting entity and selection ‘for’ the replicating entity (Sober, 
1984). Through the resolution of the long-standing ‘unit of selection’ debate and 
subsequent developments in group selection (Wilson, 1994; Sober and Wilson, 1998; 
Henrich, 2002, 2004) and related multilevel selection (Hull, 2001; Brandon, 1990, 1996; 
Brandon and Burian, 1984; Keller, 1999) the historic notion of generalized Darwinism 
has now been wholly substantiated. Significantly, ‘evolutionary theory is no longer 
dogmatically committed to the view that there can only be individual or gene selection’ 
(Vromen, 2001) or indeed, that it is only relevant to the biotic world. And furthermore, 
the much sought after conceptual apparatus at last exists to clearly articulate the 
evolution of socio-cultural phenomena. 
 It is currently being argued and has convincingly been demonstrated that at a general 
level there is no alternative to the core Darwinian principles of variation, selection and 
inheritance to explain the evolution of complex open systems (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2006a). In a series of papers where the aforementioned theoretical and conceptual 
developments in evolutionary theory have been illuminated and explored, Hodgson and 
Knudsen have clearly shown that Darwinism is a substrate neutral theory and, 
moreover, that the most important objections to its adoption in the socio-economic 
sphere are ungrounded.30 Crucially focusing on the types of phenomena involved in 
evolutionary processes, they demonstrate that there are fundamental ontological 
similarities between all complex evolving systems, that Darwinian entities and 
processes are operating in the social domain, and moreover, that Darwinism is thus 
inevitable in the socio-economic sphere. Furthermore, indicating the meta-theoretical 
framework of the theory, and addressing concerns about fundamental differences 
between the natural and the social realms, Hodgson and Knudsen notably stress that 
whilst we clearly need the general Darwinian principles to explain evolving population 
systems, generalized Darwinism is not enough on its own. Meaning, that Darwinism is 
not claimed to be a complete theory and that ‘attention to specific detailed mechanisms 
is always required’ for completion of the evolutionary story in each particular domain of 
enquiry (2006a, p. 3).  
 Indeed, as Hodgson and Knudsen and many others have clearly demonstrated, 
evolutionary scholars across the social sciences have much to gain through familiarity 
with modern generalized Darwinism. And this suitably indicates the theme of this 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Hodgson (2001b, 2002b, 2003), Knudsen (2001, 2002, 2004) and, Hodgson and 
Knudsen (2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2006a). 
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Chapter. The purpose here is to explain the notion of generalized Darwinism, to show 
how it is relevant to the socio-economic sphere and to highlight its potential. It is also to 
illustrate, through an outline of the developments in evolutionary theory and examples 
of theories of socio-economic evolution, that the adoption of Darwinism is inevitable 
and is indeed already widespread. Thus the first section begins with a description of 
generalized Darwinism. This is followed by a review of the modern expression of 
Darwinism which centres on the generalized replicator and interactor terms.  The next 
sections focus in turn on the explicit and implicit use of Darwinism in social theories of 
evolution, drawing attention to a notable convergence of thinking which assumes a 
Darwinian ontology and underlying metaphysics.  Highlighting problems in socio-
economic accounts and pointing to their resolution in general Darwinism, the Chapter 
then concludes with the assertion of the need for general Darwinism in the social 
domain. 
 
Generalized Darwinism  
 
In order to properly convey what generalized Darwinism means, it is important to 
clarify at the outset what it does not mean. As observed in Chapter 2, misapprehensions 
and objections, resulting from the rhetoric of ‘Social Darwinism’ and lack of 
engagement with Darwinian theory, are abundant and influential, thus their dismissal 
should not be overlooked. In summary, Darwinism, as Hodgson (2004, pp. 7-8) 
explains, does not imply; 
 
any form of racism, sexism, nationalism or imperialism, any moral justification of 
‘the survival of the fittest’, that militant conflict is desirable or inevitable, that human 
inequalities or power or wealth are desirable or inevitable, that cooperation or 
altruism are unfit or unnatural, that evolution generally involves optimization or 
progress, that social phenomena can or should be explained in terms of biology 
alone, that organisms can or should be explained in terms of their genes alone, that 
human intention is unimportant, or that human agency is blind or mechanistic.  
 
 Indeed as discussed in Chapter 2 above and as demonstrated later in this study, the 
major objections to Darwinism are basically misconceived. Essentially Darwinism is 
not about analogy but ontology (Hodgson, 2002b), it posits Darwinian entities and 
processes in both nature and human society (and thus has no need for reductionist 
methodology), human intentionality is certainly not overlooked in a Darwinian theory 
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which is committed to causal explanations for all phenomena, and Lamarckism and 
Darwinism are not rival or mutually exclusive theories.31
 Assuredly, even preliminary acquaintance with the theory soon reveals that 
generalized Darwinism is not ideological, reductionist, optimizing, progressive or 
teleological, and nor does it propose equilibrium outcomes. On the contrary, what 
Darwinism represents is a dynamic theory which is essentially concerned with 
explaining patterns and causes of change in open-ended systems which show no signs of 
coming to a stop (Metcalfe, 2004). Indeed Darwinism is committed to detailed, 
cumulative, causal explanations of change. And this is clearly seen in its process-
orientated mode of analysis which explains cause and effect relationships through the 
‘algorithmic’ explanatory device encapsulated in Darwin’s interrelated mechanisms of 
variation, inheritance and selection (Dennett, 1995).32 Generalized Darwinism refers to 
the general application of this dynamic causal mechanism. 
 
Darwinian Evolution as an Algorithmic Process 
 
Significantly, in Darwin’s treatment of the core principles, he presents the mechanism 
of evolution as being deducible by a formal argument. In other words, if the conditions 
are met, a certain outcome is assured. By way of illustration of this important theoretical 
point, Dennett (p. 41) cites a well-known passage from Origins 33  where Darwin 
discusses the principles of variation, inheritance and selection, and then he goes on to 
observe how Darwin’s formulation of these conditions amount to a mindless, 
mechanical, ‘algorithmic process’. This is clearly where the power of generalized 
Darwinism resides and evidently what has been perceived by countless evolutionary 
scholars in the socio-cultural domain. In the following affirmation of their general 
                                                 
31 See Chapter 6 below. 
32 Dennett (p. 50): ‘Darwin had discovered the power of an algorithm.  An algorithm is a certain sort of 
formal process that can be counted on – logically - to yield a certain sort of result whenever it is “run” or 
instantiated’. 
33 Darwin’s passage [Darwin, Origin p.127 (fas. ed. of 1st edition)] appears here in full (Dennett’s 
boldfacing): “If, during the long course of ages and under varying conditions of life, organic beings vary 
at all in the several parts of their organization, and I think this cannot be disputed; if there be owing to the 
high geometric powers of increase of each species, at some age, season, or year, a severe struggle for life, 
and this certainly cannot be disputed; then, considering the infinite complexity of the relations of all 
organic beings to each other and to their conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity in structure, 
constitution and habits, to be advantageous to them, I think it would be a most extraordinary fact if no 
variation ever had occurred useful to each being’s own welfare, in the same way as so many 
variations have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly 
individuals thus characterized will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and 
from the strong principle of inheritance they will tend to produce offspring similarly characterized.  This 
principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural Selection.” 
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application, the evolutionary economist, Metcalfe, offers a useful description of these 
‘essential’ interrelated mechanisms of evolutionary change (1987, p. 56); 
 
These are: the principle of variation, that members of a relevant population vary with 
respect to at least one characteristic with selective significance; the principle of 
heredity, that there exist copying mechanisms to ensure continuity over time in the 
form and behaviour of the entities in the population and the principle of selection, 
that the characteristics of some entities are better adapted to prevailing evolutionary 
pressures and consequently increase in relative significance compared to less adapted 
entities.  
 
 As Metcalfe thus concurs, so long as the said conditions are met, the principles at the 
heart of this causal story hold true for any evolutionary system, irrespective of the 
domain of inquiry. Thus generalized Darwinism is a substrate-neutral general 
evolutionary theory (Plotkin, 1994; Dennett, 1995) meaning that Darwinism is not 
confined to genes or DNA (Dawkins, 1983) and that the core principles of variation, 
inheritance and selection can be generalized to apply to areas beyond the purely 
biological, for example, to language, customs or economic systems. Essentially 
Darwinism may be used to explain the evolution of any open complex system which 
shares ontological similarities (Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b), in other words, complex 
evolving systems consisting of populations of varied and replicating entities (customs, 
routines or institutions) which have different capacities to survive.  
 An important point to note about generalized Darwinism however, and which has 
only recently been highlighted, is that whilst these core principles are always necessary 
for the explanation of such systems, they are never sufficient on their own (Hodgson 
and Knudsen, 2006a), meaning that the specific mechanisms of the particular domain of 
enquiry must be taken into account. Every system is naturally going to differ in such 
details and generalized Darwinism takes account of these. Significantly, generalized 
Darwinism provides an overarching conceptual framework in which other ‘auxiliary’ 
explanations can be accommodated (Lamarckian inheritance, self-organization theory) 
but it is not, and nor does it claim to be, a complete theory. In truth this is a very 
important feature of generalized Darwinism which serves to underline its generic 
character.  
 Indeed, as stated in the introduction, it is the recent theoretical advances and 
conceptual developments in evolutionary theory that have enabled such firm 
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clarifications. In the following section the discussion thus focuses on these and 
highlights the modern articulation of Darwinian theory.   
 
Modern Expression of Generalized Darwinism  
 
Hodgson’s neat summary expression of generalized Darwinism is worth repeating, 
immediately indicating, as it does, the potential for all complex evolving systems 
(2002b,  p. 103); 
 
As long as there is a population of replicating entities that make imperfect copies of 
themselves, and not all of these entities have the potential to survive, then Darwinian 
evolution will occur. 
 
 As observed in Chapter 2 above, whilst the notion of generalized or universal 
Darwinism has had a long history in the social sciences, its full realization has been 
severely curtailed by theoretical difficulties, misguided objections and the distinct lack 
of a viable conceptual apparatus. However, through the modern expression of 
generalized Darwinism this position has now changed. The conceptual tools now exist 
to formulate a comprehensive evolutionary theory of organizational and industrial 
change. The meta-theoretical framework anticipated by earlier Darwinians has finally 
found its clear expression through the recently established and ‘generalized’ replicator-
interactor concepts. The path to this crucial development will be briefly outlined below 
where the implications for the social domain are also highlighted. It begins with the 
ontological foundations of the theory and the revolutionary ‘population thinking’ 
approach that Darwin introduced to facilitate its tractability. 
 
Population Thinking and the Fuel of Evolutionary Change 
 
Population thinking was a profound challenge to the ‘typological essentialism’34 that 
had characterized the thinking of Darwin’s own era. Through it Darwin presented an 
entirely new way of thinking (Mayr, 1976, p. 26), effectively creating a philosophical 
schism that was barely perceived at the time and which tends, even today, to be 
underappreciated by evolutionary scholars (Hull, 1990). Essentially Darwin totally 
dismissed the prevailing analytical priority of representative ‘types’ and introduced the 
                                                 
34 Population thinking and typological essentialism are explored in more detail in Chapter 4 
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population thinking perspective which instead privileges variety, the critical source of 
change in evolving systems. For the essentialist, entities are grouped according to a 
fixed number of typical traits that describe their ‘essence’. The typical or average ‘type’ 
is central to the analysis.  For population thinkers, on the other hand, the emphasis is on 
variable populations of entities in which each individual entity is unique; variety is 
paramount. Variations from type are perceived by essentialists as being ‘deviations’ or 
‘noise in the system’, and are thus discounted in the analysis. Whereas, for population 
thinkers variation serves as is the critical fuel of evolutionary change, without which 
there could be no selection process.  
 Clearly population thinking has direct relevance for the analysis of open-ended socio-
economic systems where scholars need to make sense of the prevailing variety, and 
where ultimately there are policy implications.35  Metcalfe (1987), who highlighted its 
significance for economics, showed that ‘the shift from analyzing ideal cases to 
examining frequencies and their distribution is central to the elaboration of an 
evolutionary perspective’ (p. 56).  It is relevant and important to observe the evidence 
suggesting that other scholars working in the social domain have gradually come to 
recognize, either theoretically or through empirical investigation, that evolutionary 
selection processes simply cannot be articulated in a schema constructed around 
typological essentialism.36  Indeed, the implications are that in order to understand 
evolutionary change researchers need to pay far more attention to the processes that 
generate and regenerate variation.  
 Fundamentally, population thinking is what is at the heart of the claim about the 
existence of a Darwinian social ontology (Hodgson, 2002b; Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2006a), and supports its articulation in the social world. Indeed the replicating entity 
and algorithmic processes of variation, inheritance and selection, are inextricably rooted 
in this distinctive underlying philosophy which facilitates their operation and 
illuminates the important role of variety in evolving systems. It becomes clear to 
evolutionary scholars, for example, that the replenishment of variety (replication and 
inheritance), as well as its creation (innovation, entrepreneurial activity, ‘copying 
                                                 
35 For example, in economics, how much variety is desirable or sustainable in a particular industry? Is 
limited variety an indicator of competition or of monopolistic practices? And relatedly, should variety be 
encouraged or prevented for the health of the general economy? 
36 This ‘gradual realization’ forms an important part of the argument presented here about implicit 
Darwinism, and the curious epistemological development that can be traced in the literature which shows 
how scholars, including ‘non-Darwinians’ have unwittingly fumbled in this direction (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Indeed, significantly, even those (Penrose, 1953) who were famously opposed to the use of 
biological analogy in economics found themselves coming to a population thinking perspective (Chapter 
2).  
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errors’) and dispersion, are all critical aspects of any evolutionary story and therefore 
should be not be discounted but instead carefully researched and fully integrated into 
the explanatory schema.  
 
Replicators and Interactors 
 
Building on the firm foundations of the population thinking perspective the geneticist, 
Richard Lewontin (1970) and philosopher of biology, David Hull (1980, 1981) finally 
resolved the infamous ‘units of selection’ debate of evolutionary biology37 wherein 
evolutionists were divided over the true unit of selection. It eventually became apparent 
that ‘units’ and ‘levels’ had become confused within the debate and moreover that 
selection was a two-step process (Mayr, 1978) which involved a replicating entity and 
an interacting entity. Indicating the nature of the debate and the import of his 
generalized replicator and interactor terminology, Hull (2001, p. 61), below, illustrates 
the linguistic confusion; 
 
When Dawkins says that genes are the units of selection, he means replication. 
Genes are the primary units of replication and ‘hence’ selection.  When others such 
as Mayr say that organisms are the primary focus of selection, they mean 
environmental interaction.  In gene-based biological evolution, organisms are the 
primary units of environmental interaction and ‘hence’ selection. 
 
 Conceptual clarification of this ‘indirect selection’ of genes, with the properly 
apportioned location of causality, was greatly assisted by the observation that 
evolutionists often confused the distinction between ‘selection of’ an object and 
‘selection for’ a property (Sober, 1984). In the generalized Darwinian terminology this 
amounts to the ‘selection of’ an interactor and the ‘selection for’ its replicator. These 
were significant developments in theory, for as well as demonstrating that selection is a 
two-step process, and making clear what happens at each level of the organizational 
hierarchy, they highlighted the critically important ‘dual aspect’ nature of the primary 
unit of selection (Mayr, 1988); otherwise known  as the ‘primary interactor’ (Hull, 
1988, p. 434).  
 The replicator is defined by Hull (1988, p. 408) as ‘an entity that passes on its 
structure largely intact in successive replications’, and the interactor is defined as ‘an 
entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that 
                                                 
37 The ‘units of selection’ debate is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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this interaction causes replication to be differential.’ These are the entities that function 
within the selection process and their combination amounts to what we generally think 
of as the ‘individual’, in other words, the organism, the organization or the firm. As 
indicated, these terms were inspired by the replicating function of the genotype and the 
interacting function of the phenotype. In biology the genotype is understood as the 
genetic composition of an organism whereas the phenotype is its developed 
characteristics or capacities. With this important ‘dual aspect’ notion of the ‘primary 
interactor’, where the selection process is then defined as ‘a process in which the 
differential extinction and proliferation of interactors cause the differential perpetuation 
of the relevant replicators’ (p. 409), it is clearly possible to conceive of firms, comprised 
of replicating organizational routines, operating as interactors and units of selection in 
an industrial selection process.  
 Indeed this is precisely what Nelson and Winter (1982) and Howard Aldrich (1999) 
imply in their respective theories. Whilst they do not use the terms, and their 
evolutionary interpretations vary, it is clear that they are aware of this important 
distinction and its causal role in the evolutionary process. In fact some scholars (Baum 
and Singh, 1994; Galunic and Weeks, 2002) are explicitly promoting the adoption of the 
terms in organization studies, while others (Hodgson, 2003, 2006; Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) continue to explore these and other social entities as 
viable social replicators (habits, routines, rules) and social interactors (groups, 
organizations, institutions).  
 Significantly, as implied here and will become apparent in later Chapters, the 
replicator and interactor concepts also enable the conceptualization of group and thus 
multilevel selection, and moreover they crucially facilitate the articulation of 
Lamarckian inheritance within the Darwinian meta-theoretical framework, 38  all of 
which elements are critically important to the development of an evolutionary theory of 
socio-cultural change. 
 Crucially what these theoretical and conceptual developments confirm is that 
Darwinism is unquestionably a general theory. They enable us to see that the social 
realm is Darwinian and moreover that Darwinism is inevitable in socio-economic 
accounts of evolution. Indeed as will be demonstrated below, the organizations studies 
                                                 
38 Indeed it has been shown that it is impossible to conceive of Darwinian or Lamarckian inheritance 
without the replicator-interactor distinction (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006b). Hull (Personal 
Communication, 6th June 2004) ‘In order for any process to be Lamarckian, we need a genotype-
phenotype distinction. Of course, in order for a process to count as Darwinian, we also need the genotype-
phenotype distinction’. 
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and evolutionary economics literatures reveal that scholars in these disciplines are 
actually thinking this way, there is a notable movement away from ‘Darwinian analogy’ 
towards a ‘Darwinian ontology’.  
 
From Analogy to Ontology  
 
Undoubtedly, through its theoretical clarifications and modern articulation the generic 
nature of Darwinism has become much more apparent, and significantly, Darwinism is 
visibly shorn of biological associations as well as associations with reductionism and 
ideology. Indeed in its abstract, transparent formulation, now conceptually enhanced 
with the generalized ‘replicator’ and ‘interactor’ terminology (Hull, 1988), the theory 
has also become much more accessible and consequently it has since been productively 
employed across a wide range of disciplines (Hull et al, 2001; Edelman, 1987; Plotkin, 
1994; Aunger, 2002; Wilson, 2002) including organization studies (Baum and Singh, 
1994; Ziman, 2000; Wheeler et al, 2002) and evolutionary economics (Laurent and 
Nightingale, 2001; Field, 2002, 2004; Metcalfe, 1987, 1998; Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b, 
2003b; Knudsen, 2001, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 2006a, 2006b). The 
dramatic implication here is that these scholars, as well as scores of others (too 
numerous to mention here), have recognized the relevance of Darwinism for the 
analysis of socio-cultural phenomena. They understand that Darwinism is not domain 
specific and evidently perceive that similar entities and processes exist in both nature 
and human society. Thus, significantly, what this growing literature confirms is the 
inevitability of the Darwinian model for socio-cultural theories of evolution. Clearly 
Darwinism is in the nature of the phenomena under study, it is in the very nature of 
complex population systems.  
 Certainly for those who have already explored the theory there is wholehearted praise 
for the insight it has produced (Baum and Singh, 1994; Ziman, 2000; Wheeler et al, 
2002). Scholars realize that by adopting a Darwinian perspective it guides the research 
questions and sorts out a lot of the confusion (Metcalfe, 1987, 1998; Ziman, 2000; 
Field, 2002). Indeed, as Ziman and his co-authors concur, ‘Darwin’s naturalistic 
account of temporal change in the living world has a logical coherence and proven 
explanatory power that is hard to match’ (p. 312). And as Galunic and Weeks (2002) 
explain, Darwinism suggests ‘some important constructs (particularly organizational 
routines) and provides testable ideas for how these may behave (through birth, 
competition, complementarity, adaptation and death)’. For these writers and their like-
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minded colleagues, Darwinism has evidently facilitated a tractable way forward for their 
evolutionary theorizing, providing an overarching meta-theoretical evolutionary 
framework, integrated conceptual tools and an accessible general language.  
 However, as has frequently been observed, the dramatic developments that occurred 
in evolutionary biology over the last thirty years have not been widely disseminated, 
even amongst leading evolutionary scholars who are liberally adopting the biological 
analogy (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Aldrich, 1999). 
Needless to say the widespread ignorance of modern Darwinism has had a profound 
effect on the development of evolutionary theory in organization studies and 
evolutionary economics. As discussed in the previous Chapter, misconceptions and 
prejudice against Darwinism have clearly hampered progress in the development of a 
viable evolutionary theory of socio-economic change by, for example, dismissing the 
theory altogether; by diverting attention away from Darwinism towards alternative but 
limited evolutionary perspectives like self-organization theory (Witt, 1997; Foster, 
1997); by generating multiple disparate evolutionary accounts (Pfeffer, 1993) and 
finally; by creating an unnecessary polarization of theory between Lamarckian 
‘adaptationist’ accounts and Darwinian ‘selectionist’ accounts.  
 It is evident from a broad survey of the literature in organization studies and 
evolutionary economics that clarification of Darwinian theory is long overdue, scholars 
clearly need updating on Darwinism if they are to move forward with their own 
evolutionary theories (Udry, 1995; Jablonka and Ziman, 2000; Metcalfe, 2004). It is 
time for myths to be quashed, misconceptions to be corrected and confusions to be 
untangled. Evolutionary scholars of all persuasions need to know about what Darwinism 
is and indeed what Darwinism is not. They can no longer afford to remain in the dark 
about the explanatory potential of generalized Darwinism, particularly since its 
influence in their disciplines is really beginning to take hold (Murmann et al, 2003). The 
irony is, of course, as observed in Chapter 1, that most evolutionary scholars are in fact 
already adopting Darwinian ideas, whether they realize it or not, only that adoption is 
variable and often confused. Thus it would surely help progress if they were to engage 
with the important theoretical developments that have taken place in modern Darwinian 
theory.  
 Indeed, it is the assertion of this thesis that on several fronts, from the theoretical to 
the ontological, Darwinism has revealed itself to be ‘generalizable’ and thus wholly 
relevant to explanations of socio-economic evolution.  It is tellingly evidenced, for 
example, in the changing nature of use of Darwinism in the organization sciences and 
49 
evolutionary economics literature, where significantly, there has been a perceptible 
movement away from what might be termed, ‘analogical’, ‘reductive’ or ‘ideological’ 
Darwinian reasoning, towards the implicit and increasingly explicit theorization about 
actual ‘Darwinian’ entities, processes and events in the socio-economic domain. 
Specifically, there is the frequent adoption, in varying guises, of the Darwinian 
principles of variation, inheritance and selection, and the implicit or ‘covert’ 
acknowledgement therefore of a Darwinian social ontology and underlying 
metaphysics.   
 To be sure, it is this changing nature of use by social scientists, together with the 
theoretical developments and conceptual clarity that has ensued in evolutionary theory, 
which confirms the dramatic potential of Darwin’s theory and its inevitability for the 
social realm.  For what these developments crucially indicate, as Hodgson and Knudsen 
(2006a) rightly observe, is that ‘socio-economic evolution is Darwinian by virtue of 
(social) ontology, not (biological) analogy’. Clearly, the theory can no longer be 
considered the exclusive preserve of biologists.39
 
Darwinian Inclinations and Implicit Darwinism 
 
There is now overwhelming evidence in the organization studies and evolutionary 
economics literature of a significant reorientation of thinking towards Darwinism40 
(Baum and Singh, 1994; Laurent, 2001; Baum, 2002; Ziman, 2000; Wheeler et al 2002; 
Metcalfe, 2004). ‘Darwinian inclinations’ here refers to indicators in socio-economic 
accounts of the subtle recognition or inclusion of the Darwinian formulation and its 
underlying metaphysical assumptions, in other words, implicit or covert Darwinism. 
The identification and exploration of the implicit use of Darwinism in this literature is 
very important, primarily because of what it reveals about the way in which scholars are 
thinking, but also because of what it says about the credibility of the theory. And, it 
must be said that its useful investigation has been greatly assisted by the theoretical 
developments discussed above. It is clear that Darwinian ideas are variously implied, for 
example, ‘knowingly’ (Ziman, 2000, 2002; Baum and Singh, 1994; Aldrich, 1999) 
‘unwittingly’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982), ‘wholly’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aldrich, 
                                                 
39 A sentiment variously expressed by participants at a recent international conference on ‘Evolutionary 
Concepts in Economics and Biology’ (Jena, Germany 2004). For example, Moykr: ‘Evolution is just too 
important to be left to the biologists’; Metcalfe: ‘Why should biologists have the monopoly on evolution? 
Just because evolution was discovered in biology it does not mean that it cannot be used and developed in 
other fields’   
40 See Chapter 1 above. 
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1999) and ‘partially’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), and moreover that there appear to be 
different reasons why it is only implied, for example, possible fear of association with 
social Darwinism (Nelson and Winter, 1982) or conversely, a taken for granted 
acceptance of the Darwinian model (Aldrich, 1999; Ziman, 2000).  
 The critical point here is that implicit Darwinism, in a different and yet decisive way 
also supports the notion of generalized Darwinism. Implicit Darwinism draws attention 
to the development of Darwinian thinking in the socio-economic domain, indicating the 
background to the theory’s emergence and the continuing ‘rediscovery’ of its relevance 
by social scientists. Clearly this is an endorsement that contrasts with that of explicit 
Darwinism, in terms of its subtlety, but corresponds with the latter in terms of its 
persuasive logic, since implicit Darwinism effectively typifies the ‘scientific realist’ 
approach41 to theory corroboration,42 in other words, the esteemed scientific trial-and-
error process of theory development. Thus, we are referring to that section of the 
literature where, instead of deliberately and explicitly adopting Darwinian ideas, 
scholars, through grappling with phenomena like variety, dispersion and selection, 
inadvertently end up adopting Darwinian explanations. 
 
Development of Underlying Assumptions and Emerging Darwinism 
 
It is argued here that evolutionary theory is seen to have evolved towards the Darwinian 
model as scholars have altered or replaced their underlying assumptions and modified 
their theoretical frameworks. For example, in organization studies where the theories 
are markedly different to those employed 20 years ago (Baum and Rowley, 2002) the 
evolving definition of organizations to that of ‘open-systems’43 signifies the changing 
theoretical position and corresponding approaches to research (Scott 1998, Baum and 
Rowley, 2002; Baum, 2002; Aldrich, 1999).  The prevailing ‘open systems’ approaches 
are seen as improved  hybridized versions of the ‘rational systems’ and ‘natural 
systems’ perspectives, 44  where organizations are now perceived as ‘adaptive and 
                                                 
41 What Baum (2002) calls the ‘logic-in-use’ of organization scientists 
42 Scientific realism is currently the most favoured epistemology of philosophers (Azevedo, 1997).  As 
Galunic and Weeks (2002) explain, Darwinism suggests ‘some important constructs (particularly 
organizational routines) and provide testable ideas for how these may behave (through birth, competition, 
complementarity, adaptation and death)  
43 ‘An open system is one whose boundaries are not predetermined. Further, the nature and range of its 
constituent variables and the structure of their interrelationships are not predetermined’ (Dow, 2002)  
44 Aldrich (1999, p. 2), for example, defines organizations as ‘goal directed, boundary-maintaining, and 
socially constructed systems of human activity’.  This compares with the ‘goals, formal structure and 
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interdependent systems, comprised of various interrelated – possibly conflicting 
subsystems – attempting to meet and influence the dynamic demands of the 
environment’ (Baum and Rowley, 2002, p. 6).  Thus, while combining elements of the 
former perspectives, the open systems approaches have notably advanced the analysis 
by shifting attention away from the internal activities of the organization, with its focus 
on individuals, towards ‘the behaviour of organizations as entities in and of themselves’ 
(Baum and Rowley, p. 3). In other words there is a focus on organizational processes, 
boundaries and strategies. 
 Correspondingly, in evolutionary economics where there has been a shift from a static 
to a dynamic approach and where attention has been drawn to the importance of 
historical specificity (Hodgson, 1993), there have also been dramatic changes in 
perspective. For example, the equilibrium, maximization and optimization assumptions 
of neoclassical economics have been abandoned. Moreover, following the Carnegie 
School (Simon, 1945, March and Simon, 1958, Cyert and March, 1963) and its concept 
of ‘bounded rationality’, and indeed mirroring organization theorists and their dismissal 
of ‘administrative man’ (Simon, 1945), evolutionary economists have also dispensed 
with the traditional notion of ‘rational economic man’.  
 Indeed it would appear that the stage has been reached where certain Darwinian ideas 
and foundational metaphysics are simply assumed. As noted, we are increasingly seeing 
theories wherein the mechanisms are clearly Darwinian but the intellectual inheritance 
is simply not mentioned. Clark and Juma (1998) below, offer a reflection on why this 
might be the case, which reinforces the argument here that scholars are merely 
‘discovering’ the Darwinian nature of the social realm, and that general Darwinism is 
thus inevitable; 
 
We do know that that an important factor influencing adherence to particular 
theoretical positions lies in the character of underlying metaphysical positions, 
positions which are often not fully appreciated by practising scientists themselves.  
 
 In Chapter 2 above, this phenomenon was exemplified through the gradual 
assimilation in evolutionary economics of the population thinking approach. Here it will 
again be demonstrated through the example of the subtle acknowledgement of 
Darwinian ‘downward causation’. Like population thinking this is not a widely 
                                                                                                                                               
efficiency’ that embody the rational system view, and the ‘emergent purpose, informal structure and 
adaptation’ that characterize the natural system view (Baum and Rowley, 2002, p. 5)  
52 
discussed feature of Darwinism, but theorists nevertheless intuitively appear to 
recognize its causal significance in evolutionary explanations.  
 
Downward Causation 
 
In both the evolutionary economics and organization studies literature, there is ample 
evidence of the recognition of ‘Veblenian’ (Hodgson, 2001) and ‘Campbellian’ 
(Anderson, 1999) notions of Darwinian ‘downward causation’ (Baum and Singh, 1994). 
This relates to perceptions of the relationship between agency and structure, and 
recognition that while the individual may be constrained and molded by the social 
structure it nevertheless remains causally effective; ‘the institutional fabric is an 
outcome of the conduct of the individual members of the groups’ (Veblen, 1909 p. 629). 
In other words, scholars are paying closer attention, for example, to entrepreneurship 
and agency and linking these to the establishment and development of organizations and 
their impact at the community level (Aldrich, 1999; Galunic and Weeks, 2002; Ziman, 
2000, 2002).  
 Significantly, and rather ironically, given their Lamarckian label, Darwinian 
downward causation is unmistakable in Nelson and Winter’s influential account. 
Notably, what these scholars uniquely achieved (upon implicit population thinking 
foundations) was the direct application of Darwin’s three core principles of variation, 
inheritance and selection, the handling of which critically acknowledges both micro and 
macro causal processes. It is unquestionably a ‘micro-founded’ approach (Coriat and 
Dosi, 2002; Metcalfe, 1987). Indeed, together with other important theoretical 
contributions on the selection process (Nelson, 1974, 1995; Winter, 1964) and variety 
(Nelson, 1991) Nelson and Winter effectively continued Veblen’s insightful project 
(Hodgson, 2004a) and paved the way for the emergence of a distinctly Darwinian and 
much more workable theory in evolutionary economics.  
 The implications of these Darwinian assumptions for socio-cultural theories of 
evolution are profound, for while they admit a Darwinian social ontology they also 
permit resolution of theoretical problems through a modern general Darwinism.  At the 
heart of the adaptation (Lamarckian) versus selection (Darwinian) debate is the thorny 
question of intentionality or purposive behaviour, and downward causation essentially 
refers to the theoretical accommodation of this in Darwin’s ‘“causal dualism” - of 
intentional and mechanical causality’ (Hodgson, 2001c). Significantly, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, contrary to popular belief, Darwinism does not deny intentionality. The 
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crucial point is that whether behaviour is intentional or not, it will still be subject to a 
selection process. Darwinian selection works on the existing variation regardless of how 
this might have been produced.45  
 Ironically, in spite of the rejection of Darwinism over the misunderstanding of this 
theoretical point, many traditionally ‘Lamarckian’ scholars are finding that the 
Darwinian causal story appears nevertheless to be born out in empirical investigations. 
Regardless of the deliberative intentions of agents, outcomes suggest a considerable 
degree of ‘inertia’ on the part of firms (Levinthal, 1997; Carroll and Hannan, 2000, 
Sorenson and Stuart, 2000). Indeed organizational ecologists stress the relative 
powerlessness of managers to control the organization’s destiny (Hannan and Freeman, 
1989), so that at the theoretical level Lamarckian adaptationism clearly needs to be 
afforded a more appropriate causal position. Certainly, agency and intentionality has an 
important role to play in the evolutionary process of change, but it is not the only force 
of change (Metcalfe, 1987).46
 The important point here is that whilst ‘selectionists’ and ‘adaptationists’ continue to 
debate the causal significance of Lamarckian inheritance and Darwinian selection, not 
only has it been clearly shown that the social realm is both Lamarckian and 
Darwinian,47  but developments in evolutionary theory have also demonstrated that 
Lamarckian adaptation (purposeful or intentional behaviour) can be accommodated 
within the meta-theoretical framework of general Darwinism. 
  
The Darwinian Thread and the Need for a Generalized Darwinism 
 
Thus, as indicated, and indeed will be demonstrated at length in each of the case studies 
below,48 in such underlying assumptions, there is clear evidence of a convergence of 
thinking amongst evolutionary scholars in the organization studies and evolutionary 
economics literature.  And significantly it is distinctly Darwinian. Whilst variously 
deployed and not identified as such, Darwinian ideas, entities and processes permeate 
these evolutionary accounts. There is a ‘Darwinian thread’ linking, what appear to be, 
                                                 
45Vromen (2004) ‘When applied to individual human behaviour, ‘(cumulative) blind variation and 
selective retention’ does not imply that search for better ‘variants’ is conducted unintentionally, without 
any conscious thinking or thought, or whatever.’   
46 (Metcalfe, 1987, p. 60) ‘Because it is precisely the existence of varieties of behaviour which is the 
central issue, the exact motivations underpinning these behaviours are of secondary importance. 
Adaptations may be maximising, they may be satisficing, they may be habitual, they may be unthinking.  
No matter, providing the relevant motivations result in consistently different behaviours then the scope is 
created for economic selection’. 
47 Hodgson (2001b), Knudsen (2001) 
48 See Chapters 8, 9, and 10  
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disparate evolutionary theories. Darwinism is present and, clearly inevitable in socio-
economic domain. 
 It is not articulated but it is nevertheless clear that there has been a crucial shift in 
theoretical approach from analogy to ontology. The literature reveals that scholars now 
recognise, whether implicitly or explicitly, that Darwinian entities, processes and 
events, actually exist in the social sphere. And as a result, in spite of historic and 
continued resistance to it, generalized Darwinism appears to be nevertheless emerging 
of its own volition. Indeed this assertion and its demonstration is the central aim of the 
thesis. Through the close examination of seminal works in evolutionary socio-economic 
accounts of change a detailed evaluation is made of the extent to which Darwinian ideas 
have been deployed. And, as will be demonstrated, these case studies unquestionably 
indirectly support a generalized Darwinism.   
 However, as indicated, although the explosion of Darwinian thinking is evident 
across these disciplines it is also apparent that in most cases it is a crude or outmoded 
form of Darwinism which is deployed; hence the inherent limitations on theory. Whilst 
scholars appear to imbibe critical strands of modern Darwinian theory, including, for 
example, the notion of group selection49 and the replicator-interactor distinction, they 
tend not to unpack these elements or demonstrate their consistency with the overarching 
theoretical framework. Consequently, as will be shown in the case studies, theories end 
up confused, incomplete, underdeveloped and ultimately prevented from reaching their 
full potential. Thus, as previously suggested, there is a discernible need for generalized 
Darwinism in the socio-economic domain.  
 Undoubtedly, as well as dispelling traditional objections to Darwinism, familiarity 
with modern Darwinian theory, would liberate theorists from many of the self-imposed 
theoretical constraints on their theories, such as the erroneous view that Lamarckism 
and Darwinism are rival theories or that Darwinian does not account for intentional 
behaviour. And, it would enable them to perceive the Darwinian causal consistency in 
seemingly conflicting accounts.  This is nowhere more apparent than in the unresolved 
question of the unit of selection (Aldrich, 1999). For example, as is well documented 
(Baum, 2002), the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection are 
deployed at various levels of analysis. 50  And significantly, although the research 
                                                 
49 Group selection is assumed, for example, in the presentation of collective entities like organizations and 
firms as ‘units of selection’ 
50 Indeed, The Companion (2002, Baum) chapters are divided up very specifically to reflect the different 
levels of analysis. At the intra-organizational level, for example, the individual competence or routine is 
taken as the unit of analysis (and / or selection) (Burgelman, 1991; Weiks, 1979), whereas for population 
ecologist at the inter-organizational level, it is the individual organization or set of routines that is taken 
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methods are strikingly different at each level, with intra-organizational ecologists 
undertaking detailed and longitudinal studies of individual organizations, and 
population ecologists focused on large-scale quantitative analysis, and, although the 
causal explanations of evolutionary change are completely different, with the former 
positing the impact of routines on populations (adaptationist) and the later arguing that 
causality runs in the opposite direction (selectionist), both camps explicitly deploy the 
Darwinian model (Galunic and Weeks, 2002). 
 The point is this development highlights a widespread confusion amongst 
evolutionary theorists, for whilst they may recognize the applicability of the Darwinian 
principles at multiple levels of socio-economic hierarchies, even leading scholars are at 
odds over causality (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Aldrich, 
1999). Significantly, however, the unraveling of such confusions is clearly suggested in 
general Darwinism where the unit of selection issue is now resolved and where 
Lamarckism and Darwinism are reconciled within its generalized meta-theoretical 
framework. 
 There is plenty of evidence to suggest that a generalized Darwinism is actively being 
sought by social scientists, with scholars frequently lamenting, for example, the 
‘multiparadigmaticism’ of organization science (Pfeffer, 1993; March, 1996) stressing 
the need for a unified evolutionary paradigm (Levinthal, 1991; Baum and McKelvey, 
1999; Murmann et al, 2003) and pointing to the Darwinian framework (Aldrich, 1979, 
1999; Lopreato and Crippen, 1999; McKelvey, 1982, Baum and McKelvey, 1999). The 
current polar positions emanating from the organization science and business economics 
literature (Baum and Singh, 1994) relating to the ‘adaptation versus selection’ debate51 
is very counterproductive. As indicated, it reflects traditional associations with key 
aspects of Lamarckian and Darwinian theories respectively and confusingly perpetuates 
the myth that these are rival evolutionary theories, in the social as well as the biotic 
sphere. The problem is that both kinds of approach will inevitably be limited and 
incomplete, with one lacking a selection mechanism and the other lacking an 
inheritance mechanism. But with generalized Darwinism, on the other hand, such 
polarization of evolutionary theory can be rectified.  
 However, as demonstrated in previous sections, in spite of this obvious need to catch 
up on evolutionary theory, Darwinism is nevertheless positively evident in the literature, 
                                                                                                                                               
as the unit of analysis (and / or selection) (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Carroll 1984, 1988; Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000). 
51Indeed it was made explicit in the title of a recent workshop, organized by Murmann and Rivkin, 
(2004); ‘Adaptation Versus Selection in Industry Change: Toward a Contingency View’.  
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specifically in the way that scholars speculate and theorize about the nature of the 
phenomena under study. Although these social scientists work in very different 
disciplines, they are essentially puzzling over similar types of entities and similar types 
of processes (Baum and Singh, 1994). They are frequently and quite unwittingly 
working with a Darwinian social ontology, their use of evolutionary ideas essentially 
revealing their movement away from Darwinian biological analogy.   
 Indeed, as social scientists continue to gradually discover, excursions into Darwinism 
only serves to enhance understanding of the important peculiarities of evolutionary 
theorizing (Vromen, 1995). And it would appear that more scholars are coming to 
appreciate that it is Darwinism that exemplifies how to describe and theorize about 
historical processes (Blute 1979, p. 46). In an ‘end word’ by contributors to a multi-
authored volume on technological change, the authors, whose evolutionary perspectives 
were predominantly Darwinian,52 observe the exact same points and stress the relevance 
and implications of the theory for the socio-economic (Ziman, 2000, p. 312); 
 
But at a much more mundane level, an evolutionary perspective – whether we call it 
an ‘analogy’, a ‘metaphor’ or a ‘model’ – is clearly a very fruitful way of looking at 
the actual business of making and doing … it poses practical questions and suggests 
useful answers for designers, technology managers, policy makers and others in 
industry, government and academia.  These insights are not only valuable in 
themselves: they also help us to develop and refine our understanding of the 
underlying principles of technological change.  
 
 To be sure, both the need for a generalized Darwinism and evidence of its adoption 
are not difficult to find in the socio-economic literature. They are evident in the 
character of evolutionary theories that have been developed, and moreover, they are 
evident in the epistemological background to this development. As has been 
demonstrated here, traditional foundational metaphysical assumptions have gradually 
been eroded and a Darwinian metaphysics is seen to be emerging in theories of the 
social realm. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In summary, it has been shown here that Darwinism is a general theory, that it is 
implicit in evolutionary accounts of organizational and economic change, that scholars 
                                                 
52 This is a classic example of where authors use Darwinian theory without attributing it or labelling it as 
such.  But when they talk about ‘evolution’ they invariably mean Darwin’s theory of evolution.   
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assume a Darwinian social ontology, and finally, that Darwinism is therefore inevitable 
in the social realm.  This returns us to the fundamental questions that prompted this 
thesis. The task is to investigate the extent to which Darwinian ideas have been 
employed in socio-economic theories and to evaluate the sense in which they are being 
employed, whether implicitly or explicitly.  For example, are economists using natural 
selection simply as an analogy? Or, are there phenomena in the socio-economic domain 
that evolve according to basic Darwinian principles? And, furthermore, are the theories 
tractable?  
 In order to properly address these questions and establish a Darwinian parentage in 
evolutionary theories we need to be very precise about the use of the terms and 
interpretation of ideas.  For example, what do we mean by replication and selection? 
What is being replicated? And what is being selected?  Can we, for example, establish 
parities with these evolutionary mechanisms and entities in economics?  And, are the 
ideas really being used in the same sense as in Darwinism?  If so, then we have an 
instance of generalized Darwinism and the foundations of a credible social theory of 
evolution. 
 The next four Chapters in Part II critically inform this process by examining Darwin’s 
theory and the evolutionary concepts in detail. In the next Chapter Darwinism is taken 
back to its origins in biology, where in an overview of Darwin’s development of the 
theory it will be seen how it easily and unambiguously lends itself to general 
application. In the subsequent three Chapters the focus will be on the more recent 
developments in evolutionary theory, and deal in turn with the units of selection debate, 
Lamarckism and multilevel selection theory. This then paves the way for a systematic 
and incisive Darwinian evaluation of the case studies that appear in Part III 
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 Part II 
Evolutionary Theory and Recent Developments 
in Biology and the Philosophy of Biology 
 
 
Even today’s controversies have a root that usually goes far back in time.  It is precisely 
the historical study of such controversies that often contributes materially to a conceptual 
clarification and thus makes the ultimate solution possible. 
 
Ernst Mayr (1982) 
 
 
 4    An Introduction to Evolutionary Concepts 
 
 
 
I am fully convinced that species are not immutable; but that those belonging to what are 
called the same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct species, 
in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one species are the descendants 
of that species.  Furthermore, I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the main but 
not exclusive means of modification. 
Charles Darwin (1859)53
 
 
Introduction  
 
In order to gain access to the explanatory power and potential of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution for the social sphere this Chapter aims to break it down into its essential 
features.  Underpinning the previous Chapter and the notion of generalized Darwinism, 
Darwin’s theory is here taken back to its roots in biology where the modern 
understanding of the theory has been clarified and illustrated through the insightful 
work of eminent scholars in biology, philosophy of biology, genetics and zoology. 
 Darwin’s theory is first put into context with acknowledgement of its revolutionary 
nature and a brief discussion of Darwinian ‘causality’. A detailed description of the 
early development of Darwin’s theory, and in particular his population thinking 
perspective, begins with his early speculations about variety during his voyage on the 
Beagle, and it traces the philosophical conundrums that he faced as he attempted to 
conceptualize change in form over time. The analysis leads into an explanation of 
Darwin’s core principles of variation, selection and inheritance, and then, with a 
reflection on the clarifications that ensued in the light of Mendelian genetics, Darwin’s 
causal mechanisms are further illuminated through discussion of the important 
distinction between the genotype and phenotype. Related clarifications about the ‘unit 
of selection’ and thus causal ‘direction’ in the organizational hierarchy is then shown to 
throw light on the critical process of adaptation as well as the notion of acquired 
character inheritance. The basic theory is thereby set out, preparing the way for its 
                                                 
53 Darwin, Charles [1859] (1975, p. 6) with an Introduction by Ernst Mayr  On the Origin of The Species: 
A Facsimile of the First Edition  
 
further elaboration in subsequent Chapters which discuss the more recent developments 
in evolutionary theory.  
 
Darwinian Ontological Foundations: Causality 
 
Although it is generally understood that Darwin’s theory created a dramatic schism 
between theology and science through the momentous intellectual controversies it 
provoked, this historic but inevitable division actually served to mask the true nature 
and locus of the controversy (Dewey 1997, p. 2). Indeed, as Dewey makes clear, ‘the 
issue lay primarily within science itself’. Essentially, while the arguments that were 
riled against Darwinism were inflamed by their religious associations, Dewey (p. 3) 
stresses that ‘their origin and meaning are to be sought in science and philosophy, not in 
religion’. And what Dewey alludes to here is Darwinian causality, the Darwinian mode 
of thinking that completely overturned historic scientific and philosophical assumptions.    
 In contrast to the teleological determinist explanations that dominated the thinking of 
his own era, Darwin’s science involved a commitment to causal explanation. Essentially 
there was no need for a prior intelligent causal force, or for purposive goal-oriented 
final cause explanations in Darwin’s theory of natural selection. In Darwinism, complex 
outcomes are explained in terms of a detailed succession of step-by-step causal 
mechanisms. Darwinism means causal analysis (Romanes 1893); it embraces a method 
of cumulative cause and effect explanation, where every step in the process is expected 
to have a causal explanation.54 Clearly Darwinism is focused on processes of change 
and their causal mechanisms, and the emphasis, as Darwin makes clear below [1985] 
(1975, p. 471), is on the gradual, accumulative effect of selection; 
 
As natural selection acts soley by accumulating slight, successive favourable 
variations, it can produce no great or sudden modification; it can only act by very 
short and slow steps. 
 
 Darwin’s theory of evolution involves a continuous interplay between random 
variation and natural selection, so that causality cannot be described as strictly 
deterministic or indeterminate. Indeed as Monod (1971) suggests Darwinian causality 
combines ‘chance’ and ‘necessity’. This unpredictable and indeterminate nature of 
                                                 
54 Whilst Darwin [1859] (1975 p. 167) admits ignorance of certain causes, for example, with regard to the 
mechanisms that lead to variation, this does not mean that he thought they arose spontaneously, without 
prior cause, but only that their cause was ‘unknown’. 
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evolution by natural selection has generated a certain amount of confusion about 
Darwinian causality and explanation, with recognition that prediction in biology is far 
more probabilistic than in the physical sciences (Mayr, 1976, p. 58). However, this does 
not therefore mean that it necessarily involves or implies a stochastic or probabilistic 
concept of causality (Hodgson, 2004, p. 87).  Mayr illustrates the point by highlighting 
the sheer magnitude of stochastic perturbations in a species consisting of one million 
uniquely different individuals confronted with innumerable factors which determine 
reproductive success. As he makes clear, it is chance that will determine to a large 
extent how the unique individuals and their unique environmental constellations will 
mesh together, but these factors do not weaken the Darwinian principle of causality,55 or 
indeed the principle of determinacy.  
  Noted by Dewey and others, Darwin’s revolutionary theory not only overturned the 
most cherished religious beliefs of the western world, but, as Mayr (1982, p. 501)  
elaborates, it replaced one scientific belief (‘immutable species’) with another, 
encompassed profound philosophical implications (replacement of a static with an 
evolving world; implausibility of creationism; explanation of ‘design’ by purely 
materialistic process; replacement of essentialism with population thinking) and 
introduced a raft of philosophical and methodological innovations, which, significantly,  
included the consistent application of the scientifically respected hypothetico-deductive 
method (Ghiselin, 1969).56 To reiterate, the schism that Darwin created was to find its 
true origin and explanation in science and philosophy. Accordingly, having briefly 
outlined the nature of Darwinian causality and indicated its philosophical implications, 
these will now be fleshed out with a detailed description of the theory. The discussion 
will begin with Darwin’s replacement of essentialism with ‘population thinking’. 
 
Darwinian Ontological Foundations: Population Thinking   
 
Rather imperceptibly a new way of thinking began to spread through biology soon after 
the beginning of the nineteenth century.  It is now most often referred to as population 
thinking. 
Ernst Mayr (1976) 
                                                 
55 Mayr (1976, p. 42) ‘Stochastic processes occur at every hierarchical level from the atomic nucleus up 
to the systems produced by the big bang. And stochastic processes, even though making predictions 
probabilistic (or impossible) rather than absolute, are just as causal as deterministic processes.  Only 
absolute predictions are impossible owing to the complexity of the hierarchical systems, the high number 
of possible options at each step, and the numerous interactions of simultaneously occurring processes.’ 
56 Mayr (1982, p. 501) also stresses ‘a new evaluation of prediction … and the bringing of the study of 
ultimate (evolutionary) causations into science.’  
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 One of the most important challenges that Darwin’s theory posed to the thought of his 
age was the replacement of ‘typological essentialism’ with ‘population thinking’. Ernst 
Mayr (1959), who is credited with the first full articulation of this revolutionary change, 
describes it as ‘perhaps the most important conceptual revolution in the history of 
biology’ (Mayr, 1976, p. 12), providing a well defined philosophical basis to Darwin’s 
theory, an understanding of which is a prerequisite for the understanding of the 
evolutionary process (p. 11).  This change in perspective requires an appreciation of the 
‘deeper sense’ in which evolutionary biology is historical (Hull, 1990), and significantly 
it wholly explains the variability so crucial to evolutionary theory. In contrast to the 
essentialists, population thinkers stress the uniqueness of everything in the organic 
world; for them there is no such thing as a ‘typical’ individual, and mean values are an 
abstraction (Mayr, 1976, p. 46). Significantly, although population thinking was not an 
idea articulated by Darwin himself, he could not have arrived at a theory of natural 
selection without it (p. 47). This assertion will now be demonstrated by turning to 
Darwin himself. The following account of the development of his theory illustrates how 
he arrived at the population thinking perspective and leads into a demonstration of its 
foundational role in natural selection. All of which usefully informs understanding both 
of the logic of the theory as well as its general application. 
 Population thinking was born out of Darwin’s need to explain change in form over 
time.  Darwin was fascinated by the variety he saw in nature.  On his five year voyage 
on the Beagle (1831 -1836) he became intrigued by the variety of species of finches on 
the different Galapagos Islands and observed in his Journal of Researches (Darwin, 
[1839] 1989) how, with their noticeably different beaks, they each appeared ideally 
adapted to their own particular environment. He reflected on the relationship between 
species and the environment. He was similarly curious to learn that natives of the 
islands were able to identify turtles by their different markings and thus know the 
particular island they inhabited (1989, p. 276-279). He pondered on the obvious familial 
likenesses between these species of finches and species of turtles and wondered how to 
explain their similarities and differences. Fossils and bones of extinct animals that 
Darwin collected presented similar puzzles, for again there were clear signs of some 
kind of continuity with existing animals as well as evidence of differences and 
discontinuity. Darwin later confirms that it was his experience of the Galapagos Islands 
that presented ‘isolation’ as an evolutionary factor (Mayr, 1959) and the environment as 
thereby being causally significant. 
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 Darwin was strongly influenced by his friend and geologist, Charles Lyell57 (1830), 
who concluded that the physical landscape had been shaped over many thousands of 
years and that such changes were brought about by the same geological processes that 
operate today, for example, sedimentation, erosion, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.  
Lyell’s (uniformitarian) view of gradual, cumulative change effected by environmental 
conditions, resonated with Darwin.   
 Indeed Darwin became convinced that species changed over time.  But how could he 
explain the mutation of species to a scientific community who believed in fixed forms 
and the immutability of type?  This question encapsulates the foundational metaphysical 
problem that confronted Darwin; its resolution difficult to appreciate today when we 
have long since jettisoned the closed world-view of Darwin’s era.  In order to illustrate 
the significance of this population thinking approach for our understanding of the 
evolution of complex systems, it is contrasted it below with the Aristotelian 
metaphysics of Darwin’s contemporaries; foundational beliefs about the nature of being 
that informed the ‘typological essentialism’ perspective and which left a lasting 
impression across the sciences.  
 
Metaphysical Foundations and Ontological Commitments 
 
Dewey [1910] (1957) shows how the conceptual impasses experienced in the 
development of modern science were inextricably linked to the limitations of the ancient 
world-view.   The closed and static world of Plato and Aristotle dictated the framework 
within which all philosophers and scientists tried to make sense of their world.  And as 
Mayr (1959; 1976) has subsequently shown, vestiges of these conceptual constraints 
have continued to hamper progress in the natural sciences.  Dewey (1957), below, sets 
out the contrasting conceptions of the structure and constitution of nature that underpin 
the ancient and modern cosmologies and elegantly highlights the conceptual difficulties 
that Darwin would have experienced (p. 54);   
 
The world in which the philosophers once put their trust was a closed world, a world 
consisting internally of a limited number of fixed forms, and having definite 
boundaries externally.  The world of modern science is an open world, a world 
varying indefinitely without any possible assignable limit in its internal make-up, a 
world stretching beyond any assignable bounds externally. Again, the world in 
which even the most intelligent of men of olden times thought they lived was a fixed 
                                                 
57 Darwin ( [1844] 1996, p. 83)  ‘The greatest merit of the Principles was that it altered the whole tone of 
one's mind, and therefore that, when seeing a thing never seen by Lyell, one yet saw it through his eyes’. 
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world, a realm where changes went on only within immutable limits of rest and 
permanence, and a world where the fixed and unmoving was…higher in quality and 
authority than the moving and altering.   
 
 In other words animate and inanimate beings simply did not change, develop yes, but 
they did not change their fundamental form. Darwin’s speculations about animals 
gradually changing from one form to another were simply impossible within this 
perspective. What was involved here were the pre-Darwinian basic ontological 
assumptions, it essentially concerned fundamental questions about ‘the realm of being, 
or of what it is that exists’ (Meikle, 1995, p. 178).  Significantly, what is observed here 
is contrasting foundational views about the nature of reality, in other words contrasting 
‘metaphysical foundations’ or ‘ontological commitments’ (Quine, 1969). Ultimately it 
was the ontological commitment to the fixity of types that thwarted Darwin’s 
explanation of change and diversity in the natural world and which he ultimately had to 
abandon in favour of his population thinking approach.  
 In the ancient’s perception of reality, was a very specific ontological commitment to 
the idea of change as being ‘transformational’.  What this means is that the only kind of 
change in form that is acknowledged is when an entity ‘matures’ into its predetermined 
type (essentially what we tend to think of as development), for example, an acorn 
transforms into an oak tree, a child into a man, or a substance changes into its alternate 
state, for example, water changes from hot to cold.    
 From Darwin’s point of view, a pertinent and limiting assumption of transformational 
change is that of ‘final’ or ‘formal cause’ (it is important to be aware of the peculiar 
meaning of the word ‘cause’ here).  The final form of an entity is that form which by its 
nature it is destined to become.  For example, ‘the tiger moth larvae will develop into a 
tiger moth, if its development is uninterrupted, and this is its final cause’ (Meikle, 1985, 
p. 177).  Critically, in terms of the unshakable belief system, the final form, in the view 
of the ancients was God’s creation and it was fixed in type.  The only changes, as noted, 
would be limited to the ‘unfolding’ of the entity into this final, eternal form. 
 It is crucial to appreciate the rigidity of these perceptions of entities and change and 
what they suggested about variety.  For example, the ancients did not perceive any 
overlap between forms; there were preset strict demarcations between different kinds of 
things.  The extensive variety of forms that was observed in nature was explained as 
earthly deviations from an ‘ideal’ or ‘perfect’ type.  This view is traced back to Plato 
who believed that the ‘ideal’ form was the only ‘real’ form of an entity and that earthly 
variations of form were mere representations or approximations of this ideal form.  All 
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classes of things were destined to conform to their ideal type and any wild deviations 
were considered accidents and thus discounted. Significantly, then, it was this ideal type 
that was considered ‘eternal’, so that the form or ideal type of all classes of entities were 
unchanging.  What we understand as species, for example, were ‘eternal types’ and they 
simply could not change.  
 
Typological Essentialism 
 
It is now possible to perceive the problem of explaining change beyond a 
transformational or developmental conceptualization of change.  ‘Different types’, like 
Darwin’s turtles, were not ‘changed types’, and variety was merely an expression of the 
incalculable imperfect specimens of the ideal form.  The explanatory problem was 
compounded for Darwin by the Aristotelian desire to classify the inevitable multitude of 
‘types’.  And this is where the notion of ‘typological essentialism’ comes in.  The 
traditional world-view  was not only constrained by fixed and finite types but it was also 
diverted by Aristotle’s focus on ‘essence’, a focus that totally contrasts with that of 
modern science which aims at discovering laws; ‘laws of motion’, ‘of generation’ and 
‘of consequence’.  Dewey draws out this critical difference below, and hints at Darwin’s 
reorientation as he grappled with an explanation for the gradual change in species 
(1957, p. 61. my italics); 
 
[the modern man of science] speaks of law where the ancients spoke of kind and 
essence, because what he wants is a correlation of changes, an ability to detect one 
change occurring in correspondence with another.  He does not try to define and 
delimit something remaining constant in change.  He tries to describe a constant 
order of change.  
 
Typological Essentialism versus Population Thinking 
 
Certainly it would seem that, contrary to his predecessors, Darwin was focused on 
processes. He allowed himself to drop the notion of fixed types and instead turned his 
attention to the significance of the variety of types existing in populations.  And, 
crucially, Darwin perceived that an explanation for change lay beyond the entity itself 
and related to its relationship with the environment.58  So how did he then explain 
                                                 
58 This realization is evident throughout Darwin’s Voyages of The Beagle [1839] (1989) where he 
catalogues at length his observations of ‘different’ species of, for example, mocking birds, finches, turtles, 
ostrich, frogs etc., flourishing in different environments. 
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change in type when he was basically dropping the notion of a fixed type?  What was 
actually changing and how?  This is where Darwin confronted the inherent constraints 
of Aristotle’s ‘classification of forms’ and typological essentialism, and came up with 
his population thinking perspective.   
 To illustrate, as indicated above, Aristotle’s typological essentialism derives from 
Plato’s notion of the ‘ideal form’.   The critical point here being the view that the ‘ideal’ 
form is the only ‘real’ form – and not its various ‘representations’.   Having firmly 
incorporated this ‘unchanging form’ into his understanding of the classifications of 
organic and inorganic things, Aristotle then used it to inform his strict demarcations 
between the numerous classes of things, between, for example, different kinds of plants 
and animals.   And it was in these efforts to clearly mark the boundaries between ‘kinds’ 
or ‘species’ that he applied himself to the task of discovering their ‘essence’.  
 Aristotle sought to identify the main or ‘essential’ characteristics of every form to 
somehow encapsulate exactly what it is that makes something the very thing that it is.  
And it is this, ‘typological essentialism’ that plainly articulates the philosophical 
conundrum that Darwin had to unravel.  With this strict demarcation between species, 
epitomized in the customary Linnaean (1758) classificatory system, Darwin was 
confronted with a compendium of essential types that do not change.  Darwin’s 
incredible and creative insight was to turn away from this one-off fixed type and look to 
the implications of the ‘uniqueness’ that was subsumed in diversity.  Crucially from a 
population thinking perspective focused on variety, Darwin was able to perceive how, 
through selection, change occurred not to individuals in the population in their own 
lifetime but to the species that changed over many generations.  Those individuals of the 
population that were best suited (adapted) to the environment would be the ‘types’ that 
survived and their particular ‘unique’ characteristics being favoured by selection would 
prosper and thus come to ‘redefine’ or represent the change in the species. 
 Although, as noted, the population thinking approach is not something that Darwin 
himself articulated, it is nevertheless the revolutionary and necessary substructure 
formulated by him that facilitates the important and interconnecting aspects of his 
comprehensive theory. Praising Mayr’s recognition and elucidation of this subtle but 
critically important metaphysical foundation to Darwin’s theory, Hull (1990, p. 43), 
below, underlines the import of the former’s insight; 
 
According to Mayr, population thinking requires that we view the living world as consisting 
not of ‘types’ but of variable populations in which each individual is unique 
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 As Mayr makes clear, for the essentialist, entities are grouped according to a fixed 
number of typical traits that describe the ‘essence’ of that entity.  For population 
thinkers, on the other hand, the emphasis is on variable populations of entities in which 
each is unique. Variations from type are perceived by essentialists as being ‘deviations’ 
or ‘irregularities’, whilst critically, for population thinkers variation is the very fuel of 
evolution (Mayr, 1988, p. 224); 
 
The whole concept of competition among individuals would be irrelevant if all these 
individuals were typologically identical - if they all had the same essence.  Variability does 
not become meaningful in an evolutionary sense until a concept has developed that allows 
for differences among individuals of the same population.  According to this concept, each 
individual may differ in the ability to tolerate climate, to find food and a place in which to 
live, to find a mate, and to raise young successfully. 
 
 Through the population thinking approach with its emphasis on the importance of 
variety it is possible to comprehend the explanatory significance of the key 
interweaving processes, and it is to these the analysis now turns; selection, variation and 
inheritance.   
 
The Principles of Selection, Variation and Inheritance 
 
As is now well documented, Darwin observed that it was upon reading Thomas Malthus 
(1798) in 1838 that he hit upon the idea of natural selection.  He was impressed by 
Malthus’ discussion of competition over scarce resources and conclusions about 
population growth and limited food supply.  Malthus argued that, if left unchecked, the 
population would grow geometrically, and because of the law of diminishing returns, 
food would only increase at an arithmetical rate.  Thus he concluded that there would be 
a food shortage and vast numbers of people would starve and die.  Darwin perceived 
that there seemed to be a kind of ‘natural’ selection mechanism in operation here. 
Indeed as he (1958) reports himself, it was through Malthus that he finally found the 
critical missing piece for his evolutionary theory. His incorporation of the concept is 
seen below in his description of evolution by natural selection in The Origins [1859] 
(1975, p. 5); 
 
As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and 
as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that 
any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the 
complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of 
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surviving, and thus be naturally selected.  From the strong principle of inheritance, 
any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form. 
 
 From this description the interconnectedness of Darwin’s core principles of variation, 
selection and inheritance are clear.  The variation discussed in the above section on 
population thinking, is seen here in its causally important role of fuelling evolution.  
The passage clearly articulates what Darwin meant by adaptation and how this was 
related to variation and selection.  Basically variety is assumed to exist from the start, 
and within that variety there will be individuals who, for any manner of reasons, will be 
better adapted to the prevailing environment, and, as a consequence will survive the 
selection process and go on to produce more like themselves. 
 Clearly variety is critical to the selection process and it becomes evident why 
population thinking was so crucial to Darwin’s theory, for amongst other things 
selection logically needs variety upon which to work.   Whilst Darwin found that he was 
unable to explain the source of variation or indeed the mechanism of inheritance he 
nevertheless made it clear that variety was always there and was in abundance.  
 Another very important aspect of selection theory that Darwin did not draw out, but 
which is crucial for a clear understanding of the process, is that of it being a ‘two-step’ 
process. Again it is Mayr who articulates this subtle complexity and in his elucidation of 
this below, he elaborates the intricate nature of the relationship between Darwin’s core 
principles (1988, p. 98); 
 
Natural selection proper is only the second stage of a two step process.  The first 
step consists of the production of variation in every generation, that is, of suitable 
genetic or phenotypic variants that can serve as the material of selection, and this 
will then be exposed to the process of selection.  This first step of variation is 
completely independent of the actual selection process, and yet selection would not 
be possible without the continuous restoration of variability.   
  
 Breaking the process down like this enables a fuller appreciation of the causal 
relationships and it clarifies the significance of the separate strands, such as variety and 
inheritance. Moreover, reflection on subsequent discoveries in biology offers further 
clarification. As indicated above, although ‘the strong principle of inheritance’ was one 
of the core elements of his theory, Darwin struggled to find an inheritance mechanism 
or indeed a heritable entity. And undoubtedly, the juxtaposition of inheritance and the 
‘logically required’ variety in Darwin’s theory does cause a certain amount of confusion 
when; ‘inheritance implies continuity and constancy; [and] variation implies change and 
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divergence’ (Mayr, 1982, p. 681).  This made explanation of the inheritance mechanism 
very difficult for Darwin.  The key to unraveling this, which was obviously not 
available at the time, is clearly genetics.  But, Darwin at least recognised its location in 
the reproductive system and, significantly, though he did not develop an inheritance 
mechanism this did not detract from the logic of his theory. 
 Mayr’s passage above alludes to the clarification that eluded Darwin but which was 
nevertheless finally facilitated in the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics.  Mendel’s 
experiments with peas provided the detail of an inheritance mechanism which was able 
to reconcile variety and inheritance.  Finally biologists had a replicating, heritable entity 
which explained the continuity and replenishment of variety in the system. It was 
identified as the gene. Through sexual reproduction of the organism the gene pool 
recombined to provide a new variety of organisms each generation.  Mayr neatly sums 
up the processes below (p. 163); 
 
New gene pools are generated in every generation, and evolution takes place 
because the successful individual produced by these gene pools give rise to the next 
generation.  Evolution, thus, is merely contingent on certain processes articulated by 
Darwin: variation and selection.  No longer is a fixed object transformed, as in 
transformational evolution, but an entirely new start is made so to speak in every 
generation.   
 
 In summary, the continuous restoration of variability to which Mayr refers in the first 
passage, is facilitated through the heritable replicating gene.  Thus according to Mayr, 
the first step involves a replicating process whilst it is at the second step that the actual 
process of selection is involved.  This is where ‘selection proper’ operates - on the 
individual organism.  It is the second step that acts upon the ‘previously produced 
variation’ and, as Mayr points out, ‘it is not a process which itself produces variation’.   
 The analysis now moves into the realms of genotypic and phenotypic distinctions and 
to the important role of inheritance brought to light in Mayr’s two-step process. These 
will be looked at in more detail below in a review of the important theoretical and 
conceptual clarifications that emerged in evolutionary biology during the 1970s and 
1980s.  
 
Genotype and Phenotype  
 
It is crucial, in understanding the causal ‘direction’ of the evolutionary process, to be 
clear about the distinction between the entities that operate in the two stages of the 
70 
selection process, in other words the ‘dualism’ of the genotype and the phenotype. For 
as Mayr (1976, p. 10) argues, ‘we must fully understand this particular dualism before 
we can hope to understand the process of evolution’. Indeed protracted controversies in 
evolutionary biology over the Lamarckian notion of acquired character inheritance 
(‘soft inheritance’) could not be resolved until this was clarified.  
 Implicit in the above analysis has been the traditional ‘hierarchy’ of organic entities.  
That is, genes are found at the primary ‘generational’ level followed by the organism 
and then the species. Following advances in genetics and molecular biology during the 
1950s  there is now a clear distinction between what are known as the genotype and the 
phenotype59 (corresponding to the first two ‘levels’) and consequentially an advanced 
understanding of both the inheritance mechanism and the selection process. Essentially, 
the genotype and phenotype denote the entities that function in the selection process 
described above. Returning to Mayr’s ‘dualism’, the genotype is defined as ‘the total 
genetic constitution of an organism’, and the phenotype is defined as ‘the totality of 
characteristics of an individual’ (Mayr, 1982, pp. 958-959). He describes the important 
nature of this distinction below (1988, p. 16); 
 
All organisms possess a historically evolved genetic program, coded in the 
DNA…The presence of this program gives organisms a peculiar duality, consisting 
of a genotype and a phenotype.  
 
 It is important to observe that whilst Darwin himself did not have the genotype 
phenotype distinction60  it was nevertheless implicit throughout his writings (Mayr, 
1988, p. 100).  It is clear, for example, that Darwin perceived that the organism as a 
whole (the phenotype) was the unit or ‘target’ of selection (Mayr, 1988; Hull, 1981; 
Lewontin, 1970; Gould and Lloyd, 1999). To reiterate, the genotype is the genetic 
composition of an organism whereas the phenotype is its developed characteristics or 
capacities.  In other words, the phenotype is the physical manifestation of the genotype; 
the physical or behavioural characteristics or capacities such as blue eyes or nest-
                                                 
59 Although the terms were coined as long ago as the beginning of the twentieth century (by the Danish 
geneticist, Wilhelm Johannsen [1909]), it was not until the 1950s that the fundamental difference between 
the genotype and phenotype were fully understood (Mayr, 1982, p. 783)  
60Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b): ‘Neither Lamarck nor Darwin used the terms genotype or phenotype, 
but some such conceptual separation was implicit in their discourse. Writing in a biological context, they 
both assumed that information related to characteristics was transmitted from generation to generation 
through such information-carrying entities as seeds, sperm, ova, pollen, or stigma. When Darwin (1859, 
1868) wrote of the ‘reproductive system’ and of ‘germ cells’ he was referring to the processes of 
genotypic, not phenotypic, replication. Neither writer believed that replication occurred by the direct 
copying of characteristics, so that their writing in the biological context embodied an implicit distinction 
between genotype and phenotype.’  
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building. The phenotype is thus ‘shaped’ by the genotype, the genotype controlling its 
production.  So that a phenotype is what we generally understand as the ‘visible’ 
organism.  
 Thus, in terms of the organizational hierarchy, when evolutionists refer to the 
selection process they are describing what is generally thought of as selection of the 
organism.  In the above terminology then this means selection of the phenotype and, as 
a consequence, selection for the genotype (Sober, 1984). The genotype is only 
indirectly selected. It is very important to stress that in spite of the apparent awareness 
of a genotype-phenotype distinction there was considerable confusion and debate in 
evolutionary biology over the establishment of this hierarchical perspective on selection 
(Brandon, 1999; Gould and Lloyd, 1999). Indeed, the above consensus on the locus and 
causal agency of natural selection was not achieved until the 1980s, after the resolution 
of the infamous ‘unit of selection debate’. As will be shown in Chapter 5, as well as 
confirming the original Darwinian hierarchy this also made the vector of causality much 
easier to perceive.  
 Subsumed within this intricate causal story, however, is another theoretical 
component that has similarly generated a certain amount of confusion and deserves 
special attention here. This is the important notion of adaptation. The next section will 
look at how this is conceptualized in Darwinian evolutionary theory and it will then 
consider the contrasting conceptualization of adaptation in Lamarckian evolutionary 
theory.  
 
Adaptation 
 
Darwin used the term ‘adaptation’ to refer to the remarkable symmetry that he observed 
in nature; organisms appeared to be so perfectly ‘adapted’ to their environments.  His 
early wonderment at this reality made him acutely sensitive to its cause, and adaptation 
and its explanation became a crucial part of his theory of natural selection, or what he 
otherwise called ‘descent with modification’.  He describes the role of adaptation in a 
passage from Origins, below, [1859] (1975, p. 469) where he is extolling the power of 
natural selection; 
 
What limit can be put to this power, acting during long ages and rigidly scrutinising 
the whole constitution, structure, and habits of each creature, - favouring the good 
and rejecting the bad?  I can see no limit to this power, in slowly and beautifully 
adapting each form to the most complex relations of life.   
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 It is important to appreciate exactly what Darwin meant, however, when he talked 
about organisms adapting to or being modified by their environment, since this has 
often been misconceived (Mayr 1982). The population thinking perspective and ‘two-
step’ process of natural selection again offers clarity here. Darwin did not mean, for 
example, that individual organisms were continually adapting to their environments and 
changing as a result (in the Lamarckian sense).  As noted earlier (p. 67), it is the species 
and not the individual organism that changes or ‘evolves’.  In the above, when Darwin 
talks of ‘each creature’ and ‘each form’ he is speaking of the species, not individual 
organisms in their lifetimes.  In other words, adaptation should be recognized as 
happening to the species.    
 To be sure, it is selection that ‘causes’ organisms to be so well-adapted to their 
environment (Mayr, 1982, p. 358).  As Mayr reminds us, ‘for the Darwinian, adaptation 
is the result of natural selection’, selection operates on the existing variety and it is those 
organisms that happen to be better adapted to the particular environment which are 
selected. And through propagation, it is the features of these organisms that will be 
represented in the next generation, so that the species is continually evolving and fine-
tuning its fit with the environment. To repeat, adaptation is a product of selection. This 
Darwinian conceptualization of adaptation leads finally to ‘Lamarckian inheritance’ and 
its contrasting interpretation of adaptation. 
 
Lamarckian Inheritance  
 
Lamarckian inheritance is the evolutionary theory promoted by Jean-Baptiste de 
Lamarck (1809), which proposes the inheritance of ‘acquired’ characteristics.  
According to Lamarck, changes that are acquired during the lifetime of an organism and 
which result from its interaction with the environment can be passed on to the offspring 
of that organism.  In other words phenotypic changes or ‘adaptations’ are somehow 
transmitted to the organism’s genotype and then passed on to the next generation in 
reproduction.  Thus for Lamarck the environment was the driving force of change as 
opposed to any kind of selection process.  Indeed, Lamarck did not have a selection 
theory, so that in contrast to Darwin, he perceived that it was the environment that 
caused adaptational change within individual organisms and in turn explained the 
variation amongst organisms (Mayr, 1982, p. 354). Clearly this reflects fundamentally 
different perceptions of adaptation. 
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 Lamarckism has since been widely discredited in biology, its outright rejection in 
1883 being associated with the selectionist, August Weismann (1893), and its 
‘conclusive refutation’ in the 1950s attributed to discoveries of the molecular biologists 
(Mayr, p. 508).  Weismannism essentially denies the possibility of the inheritance of 
acquired characters. 
 However, there are three important points that have emerged with regard to the notion 
of acquired character inheritance and the relationship between Lamarckism and 
Darwinism.  Firstly, Darwinism and Lamarckism are not mutually exclusive; secondly 
Lamarckism needs Darwinism to work as a theory; and thirdly (particularly relevant to 
socio-cultural theories of evolution), in contrast to Darwinism, there are considerable 
problems in generalizing the Lamarckian position. These issues will be elaborated in 
Chapter 6, which focuses on Lamarckism and the more recent developments of theory, 
but they are briefly summarized below.  
 It is important to stress that Darwin (1859) himself did not discount the possibility of 
the inheritance of acquired characters. Unaware at the time of genetics, his ‘elusive 
inheritance mechanism’, he did not perceive Lamarckian inheritance to be irreconcilable 
with his theory of natural selection. In fact it gained increasing importance in his theory, 
as evidenced in later editions of Origins. However, although the meta-Darwinian 
framework may accommodate Lamarckian inheritance it does not require it, and thus 
stands alone as a theory. But significantly, the reverse is not true. In order for 
Lamarckism to work it requires a selection process and would thus ultimately be 
dependent on the theoretical foundations of Darwinism.  In his exploration of the 
relationship Dawkins (1988, p. 300), below, vividly describes this dependency of 
Lamarckism upon Darwinism and clearly underlines the point that the two are not 
mutually exclusive; 
 
The Darwinian maintains that the only reason even a minority of acquired 
characteristics are improvements is that there is an underpinning of past Darwinian 
selection.  In other words, the Lamarckian theory can explain adaptive improvement 
in evolution only by, as it were, riding on the back of the Darwinian theory. 
 
 Lamarkian acquired character inheritance is an important, if controversial, idea in 
evolutionary biology, and its contrasting conceptualization of adaptation particularly 
important to establish here.  However, when it comes to the generalization of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, it is very important to stress that whilst acquired character 
inheritance has been discounted in biology it is nevertheless not inconsistent with 
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Darwinism.  So that, for our purposes here, at a general level the idea of character 
inheritance is not denied in other evolutionary systems, such as socio-economic 
systems. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In summary, the essential features of Darwin’s theory of evolution have been set out.  
The core principles of variation, inheritance and selection have been explored against 
the backdrop of the population thinking perspective. With this introduction to 
Darwinian theory and its basic concepts we are certainly better equipped to appreciate 
its generic nature. However, before going on to examine the case studies in detail, I 
propose to enhance this understanding and facilitate a much more incisive evaluation by 
bringing the Darwinian explanation right up to date.  In the following Chapters, there 
will be a discussion of the key advances in biology and the philosophy of biology which 
are pertinent to the case studies here under study, as well as to the notion of general 
Darwinism and the general aspiration for a social theory of evolution. Chapter 5 
unpacks the unit of selection debate and introduces the new generalized terminology 
that facilitated its resolution; Chapter 6 deals with Lamarckism and explains its 
important relationship with Darwinism; and Chapter 7 moves on to deal with the 
advances being made towards multilevel selection theory. 
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5    Units of Selection 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This Chapter and the next two Chapters focus on the important theoretical 
developments and conceptual refinements that have recently taken place in biology 
and the philosophy of biology. They deal respectively with, the units of selection 
issue, Lamarckian inheritance, and group and multilevel selection. This is very 
complicated conceptual territory but nevertheless crucially important to a proper 
understanding of generalized Darwinism, so that it is fitting to divide the Chapters in 
this way. However whilst they deal with different themes, these are all nevertheless 
intricately related, and it will be seen that the same concepts and terminology that are 
introduced in this Chapter are also used to clarify the issues of the subsequent 
Chapters.  
 Having set out the modern interpretation and philosophical basis to Darwinian 
theory in the previous Chapter, here the focus is on the little-known but critically 
important theoretical and conceptual clarifications that occurred during the 1970s and 
1980s which established and articulated the general nature of the theory. Accordingly, 
evolutionary theory is brought right up-to-date, and the implications of these 
developments for the social domain are highlighted. The discussion is focused on the 
important developments around selection theory which followed Mayr’s 
conceptualization of selection as a ‘two-step’ process.  Focusing on the unit of 
selection debate and an elucidation of its important resolution, the discussion leads 
inescapably to the role of genotypes and phenotypes, finally unpacking their clarifying 
and generalized reformulation as ‘replicators’ and ‘interactors’ respectively. In 
addition to providing critical clarification of the selection process, the analysis sheds 
further light on the role of variation and makes clear the vector of causality in selection 
processes.    
 This sets the scene for Chapter 6 which focuses on Lamarckian evolution and issues 
pertaining to inheritance and the transmission of information. And the culmination of 
these theoretical refinements is then shown in Chapter 7 where it will be seen that they 
facilitate the conceptualization not only of group-selection, but also multilevel 
 
selection theory (Lewontin, 1970; Brandon, 1986, 1990; Henrich, 2002, 2004; Sober, 
1999; Wilson, 1999), two critical components in the construction of a social theory of 
evolution.  
 
From the Modern Synthesis to Generalized Darwinism 
 
The previous Chapter essentially summarized what biologists have come to understand 
as modern Darwinian evolutionary theory, in other words, the synthesis of Darwinism 
and Mendelian genetics. 61  In this ‘gene-based’ evolutionary story natural selection 
operates upon a population of variable organisms and results in the differential survival 
of those organisms better suited to the common environment, and the inheritance 
mechanism, and important source of continuity and variety, is explained through 
Mendel’s heritable gene.  In this classic Darwinian formulation the organism or 
phenotype is understood to be the ‘unit’ of selection. And indeed for most non-
biologists with an interest in Darwinian theory, this description roughly sums up their 
understanding of evolution by natural selection.  
 Following advances in the fields of genetics, paleontology, zoology and ecology, 
evolutionary theorists have significantly fleshed out the theory and there is much more 
consistency in interpretation across the sciences. By the middle of the twentieth century, 
for example, geneticists had already moved from cryptogenetics (the study of the 
transmission of hereditary characters) to phenogenetics (the concern with the 
manifestation of hereditary characters in the phenotype) to the then expanding field of 
population genetics (Simpson 1944).  Paleontologists, meanwhile, had moved beyond 
their initial concern with the determination and classification of form, to a very real 
interest in the actual causal mechanisms of evolution. They had finally come to realize, 
like the geneticists, the importance, amongst other things, of variation and population 
thinking for the explanation of evolution (p. xvi). 
 What this meant for evolutionary theory was the beginning of a broad synthesis of 
ideas from across the sciences.  Today, the elucidation of evolutionary theory and its 
mechanisms has benefited from research in genetics and molecular biology 
(Dobzhansky, 1970; Monod, 1971; John Maynard Smith, 1975, 1989) and has been 
considerably enhanced by the recent theoretical and conceptual insights achieved in the 
philosophy of biology, as well as by the contributions of evolutionary theorists from an 
                                                 
61 Often referred to in the biological literature as ‘neo-Darwinism’ 
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expanding range of natural and social sciences (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Wilson and 
Sober, 1994; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Plotkin, 1994; Dennett, 1995; Cziko, 1995; 
Gould and Lloyd, 1999; Keller et al, 1999; Henrich, 2000, 2002). Darwin’s theory of 
evolution has essentially been unpacked and made far more meaningful and accessible. 
And, crucially, for the purposes of this study, the outcome of these recent developments 
is that Darwinism has clearly and convincingly been shown to have general application. 
 As noted, the key theoretical developments in the articulation of general Darwinism 
was the crucial unraveling of the ‘unit of selection’ debate (Lewontin, 1970; Hull, 1980, 
1981) and the introduction of generalized terms to describe the evolutionary process 
(Hull, 1988), developments which are notably now being recognized in the 
organizational studies and evolutionary economics literature (Baum and Singh, 1994; 
Aldrich, 1999; Ziman, 2000; Wheeler et al, 2002; Murmann, 2003; Laurent and 
Nightingale, 2001; Hodgson, 2001b, 2002b; Knudsen, 2001). In the discussion of these 
developments below, it will be shown that the Darwinian process of natural selection is 
actually deceptively complex (Mayr, 1976; Dennett, 1995). In addition to revealing its 
relevance for the socio-economic domain, it will also usefully illustrate why there is 
continued confusion about units and levels of selection in the socio-economic domain 
(Galunic and Weeks, 2002; Aldrich, 1999). 
 
Unit of Selection Debate  
 
The issue of the unit of selection, and the level at which selection takes place, presents 
considerable conceptual problems for evolutionary theorists working in the social realm. 
And, significantly, this uncertainty has contributed to the conflicting views about 
adaptation and selection and the vector of causality in evolutionary processes (Murmann 
and Rivkin, 2003). Consequently, its resolution in evolutionary biology has profound 
implications for social scientists, a small number of whom are already beginning to 
explore its potential.   
 The units of selection debate focused attention on a very important aspect of the 
process of selection, and that is the vector of causality. What is the biological entity that 
is being selected in natural selection? What does this say about the cause of 
evolutionary change? And what are the implications for the important notion of group 
selection? As suggested in the previous Chapter, during the 1960s and 1970s the 
traditional Darwinian view of the organism as the unit of selection was seriously 
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challenged.  It became apparent in the biological literature that there were conflicting 
interpretations of the identification of the unit of selection (Brandon, 1990; Lloyd, 
1992). Was it, for example, the gene, favoured by many geneticists (Haldane, 1932; 
Fisher, 1958)? Or the organism, favoured by traditionalists? Or the group, favoured by 
the naturalists? A substantial and protracted controversy ensued which was later 
identified in the literature as the ‘units debate’ (Brandon, 1982, 1999; Brandon and 
Burian, 1984; Reeve and Keller, 1999).  
 It would seem that in spite of the generally agreed Darwinian evolutionary story, 
considerable ontological and conceptual confusion arose as a result of theorists 
disagreeing over the actual unit of selection. In the hierarchically arranged biosphere of 
genes, organisms and species, Dawkins (1976), following Williams (1966), famously 
promoted the gene as the primary unit of selection. Others promoted the group (Wynne-
Edwards, 1962), and even the species (see Vrba, 1984), whilst Mayr (1976, 1997), 
following Darwin, consistently promoted ‘organismic’ selection. Evidently there was 
serious theoretical concern to properly locate the vector of causality and as the 
philosophical debate unfolded the sheer complexity of the selection process itself 
became apparent (Mayr, 1982, p. 595).   
 The selection process appeared to be multifaceted and causally at variance.  It was 
seemingly both deterministic and undirected and appeared to involve much more than 
‘mere’ selection. It did not help matters that the term ‘unit’ had never been properly 
defined (Mayr, 1988, p.100) and that Darwin was unable to be more precise about his 
organism and its heritable entity.  Indeed the debate refocused attention on what Mayr 
(1976, p. 9) calls Darwin’s ‘two factor explanation’ of evolution; of genetic variability 
and natural selection.  It also consequently challenged the intrinsic duality of the 
genotype (the genetic endowment of the individual) and phenotype (the body into which 
this genotype has been transformed during development) (Mayr, 1982, p. 781) and 
caused confusion about the biological hierarchy.   
 Evidently for some evolutionists, the causally implicated unit of evolutionary change 
was the gene since it replicated its structure from generation to generation and spawned 
the successively better-adapted organisms. Whilst for others it was the organism, since 
through its interaction with the environment, where it competed for survival, it caused 
the differential replication of the genes. So was it the gene that determined the path of 
evolutionary change or the organism?   
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General Characteristics of Darwinian Evolutionary Theory 
 
Evolutionary theorists eventually began to perceive that two distinguishable questions 
had become conflated within the units of selection debate (Hull, 1980, 1981; Brandon, 
1982); ‘one has to do with the units of replication, the other with the units of 
interaction’ (Brandon, 1999 p. 617). Specifically, there was confusion over the identity 
of the unit of selection and the level at which selection occurred, with some theorists 
focusing on the ‘unit’ (the gene, the group or the species) for their analysis, while others 
focused on the ‘level’ of the organizational hierarchy for their analysis.  Hull outlines 
his perception of the problem below (1984, p. 145);  
 
The phrase ‘unit of selection’ is inherently ambiguous.  Sometimes it means those 
entities which differentially replicate themselves, sometimes those which interact 
with their environments in ways that are responsible for this replication being 
differential.  Both processes are necessary for evolution to occur. 
 
 Illuminating the nature of this confusion and the key to its resolution, Hull (1981) 
reflects on the approach of the geneticist Richard Lewontin (1970), whose important 
work initiated this theoretical and conceptual shift, observing how the latter begins by 
first characterizing the evolutionary process and then considering evidence for and 
against selection at various levels of organization. Hull then explains his own distinctive 
approach, which in contrast, begins by focusing on the evolutionary process itself, 
investigating its general characteristics, and only then considering which entities have 
the requisite characteristics to function in the evolutionary process. In so doing he not 
only helped resolve the units of selection problem but significantly he illuminated the 
general nature of Darwin’s theory. His reasoning for a more general theory is summed 
up in the following passage where he highlights the new generalized terminology (2001, 
p. 21); 
 
One reason why evolutionary biologists have been unable to discover universal 
regularities in the evolutionary process is that they are not comparing like with like.  
They are dividing up the organizational hierarchy inappropriately.  The appropriate 
levels are not genes, organisms, and species as they are traditionally conceived, but 
replicators, interactors, and lineages. 
 
 The significance of this conceptual insight for the social sciences cannot be 
overstated. Like Lewontin and others, Hull saw that Darwin’s theory could be stated in 
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an abstract and general way, and he thus sought to clarify the evolutionary mechanisms 
in Darwin’s theory and to articulate its general nature.  With his perceptive approach, in 
extricating the analysis away from biological terminology and their attendant 
assumptions, he was able to illuminate the theory and show that evolution is ‘not 
uniquely, or even necessarily, a biological phenomena’ (Potts 2000). As will be 
illustrated below, not only does his work make the theory more accessible and facilitate 
its general application, but it also critically clarifies causality in evolutionary systems 
(nature of variety, selection, adaptation) and ultimately enables the conceptualization of 
group and multilevel selection, as well as the clear articulation of ‘Lamarckian 
inheritance’ within a Darwinian framework. Clearly, as evidenced in earlier Chapters 
above, the notions of group selection, multilevel selection and Lamarckian inheritance 
are all critical components of social theories of evolution, and as will be evidenced in 
the case studies below, their adoption is often confused and tractability uncertain. The 
detailed elucidation of Hull’s conceptual developments will now resume below, while 
their implications for the aforementioned topics will be elaborated over next two 
Chapters.  
 
Selection: a Two-Step Process 
 
A critical factor in Hull’s resolution of the selection debate was Mayr’s (1978) 
insightful recognition of natural selection as a two-step process (Brandon, 1996, p. 124). 
As documented in the previous Chapter (p. 69), Mayr usefully observed that the first 
step involves a replicating process whilst it is the second step where ‘selection proper’ 
operates, on the individual organism interacting with its environment. To reiterate, it is 
the second step that acts upon the previously produced variation and it is not a process 
which itself produces variation. This, according to Mayr (1997, p. 2091), is Darwinian 
selection ‘as it is fully understood by the evolutionists’. However, because of its 
theoretical subtlety it is perhaps not surprising that it has been lost on non-biologists.  
 Essentially in this two-step selection process Hull evidently perceived the organism’s 
‘peculiar duality’ and, most importantly, he observed the functional distinction between 
its genotype and phenotype. Accordingly he decisively shifted the conceptual focus of 
the units of selection debate and speculated about ‘units of replication’ and ‘units of 
interaction’. Marking their crucially important functional distinction, Hull thus proposed 
not units of selection as such, but two interacting ‘sub-processes’, ‘replication’ and 
‘interaction’, operating within a single selection process.   
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 This was a substantial development in the clarification of Darwinian theory.  Hull’s 
conceptual framework, with its articulation of interacting ‘sub-processes’, provides 
greater insight, not only to the deceptively complex selection process, but also to the 
important interconnecting mechanisms of variety formation and inheritance. It describes 
what is understood as the basic ‘single level’ selection process,62 and as indicated, its 
elucidation in his universal ‘revamped ontology’ (Eldredge, 1986) is what ultimately 
facilitates a credible multi-level selection theory (Gould and Lloyd, 1999; Reeve and 
Keller, 1999). But for our immediate purposes here, it illuminates the decisive 
relationship between the genotype and phenotype, crucially demonstrating that it is the 
interactor and not the replicator that is the ‘causal unit of selection’ (Gould and Lloyd 
1999). And it is to the explanation of this finer point that the analysis now returns. 
 
Replicators and Interactors: A Generalized Darwinian Ontology 
 
The replicator concept was adopted from Dawkins (1976) to distinguish the replicating 
function of the first entity in Hull’s conceptual framework from the second. It should be 
noted however that in the establishment of Hull’s generalized ontology he came into 
dispute with Dawkins over the appropriate term for the phenotype (Hull, 2001). 
Dawkins, who notably also extolled the general nature of Darwinism (1976, 1984),63 
promoted the ‘vehicle’ concept which, for several important reasons, Hull rejected. 
These will be examined in subsequent sections but it is important to note here that while 
Dawkins still prefers his vehicle concept he now accepts Hull’s important distinction 
between the replictor and interactor (Hull, 2001 p. 26).   
 Dawkins (1976) introduced the term ‘replicator’ to identify the gene and to highlight 
the nature of its role in evolution.  In so doing he rejected the then prominent ‘group 
selectionist’ view in biology, that evolution was ‘for the good of the species’, and 
famously promoted the gene as the primary unit of selection.  Clearly, although Hull 
was opposed to Dawkins’s gene-selectionist viewpoint, he was nevertheless impressed 
                                                 
62 The relevance and significance of this becomes more apparent in discussions of multiple levels of 
selection, as will be explained in Chapter 7 below. 
63 It is important to point out that unlike most Darwinians, Dawkins adopts a reductionist perspective. His 
notion of ‘universal Darwinism’ embraces genetic determinism, an idea rejected in ‘general Darwinism’, 
which in contrast, is not biologically reductionist. Confusingly, however, many theorists continue to 
identify with ‘universal Darwinism’, for as Hull (Personal Communication, 6th June 2004) observes, one 
can be a universal Darwinist without being a reductionist. 
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by the universal nature of his replicator concept, defined by Dawkins as ‘any entity in 
the universe of which copies are made’ (1984, p. 162).64   
 Hull however refines Dawkins’s idea of a replicator, emphasising the directness of 
replication. Hull’s definition reads ‘an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in 
successive replications’ (1988, p. 408).  He seeks to emphasise the directness of 
replication because this marks a crucial distinction between the replicator and interactor, 
where the later makes inexact copies of itself through reproduction.  
 However, although Hull embraced the replicator term, along with many others 
(Brandon and Burian, 1984; Eldredge and Grene, 1992; Keller and Reeve, 1999), he 
rejected Dawkins’s misleading ‘vehicle’ concept, designed as it was to denote the 
phenotype as ‘the gene-carrying survival machine’. Hull argues that in his overemphasis 
of the role of the replicator Dawkins erroneously downplays the important causal role of 
the organism, suggesting that replication is not just necessary for selection but also 
sufficient (2001, p. 22). Hull shows that on the contrary, replication is not sufficient and 
that another process is also involved which he calls ‘interaction’.  He defines an 
interactor as ‘an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in 
such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential’ (1988, p. 409). 
 Note the careful use of the word ‘causes’ in the above definition.  The biological 
literature shows that there is a general understanding of selection as the mechanism that 
results in the differential survival of ‘fitter’ units; those that are better adapted to the 
common environment. This is coupled with an appreciation that this logically involves, 
and is partly determined by ‘interactions’ with the environment. This process is what 
Hull wished to unpack and to distinguish from the replicating function of the genotype.  
He agrees with Dawkins that the gene is a replicator and he agrees that ‘in a derived 
sense’ it is a unit of selection.  However he also agrees with opponents of gene-
selectionism, such as Sober and Lewontin (1982), who argue that any theory that is 
limited to this single aspect of the evolutionary process is inadequate. Indeed, like Lloyd 
(1988), he believes that the units of selection debate was misguided and should have 
been focused on environmental interaction not replication.65 It is the interactor that is 
‘selected’ in the true Darwinian sense. And this is what needs emphasizing. 
                                                 
64 Indeed Dawkins (1976) famously promoted the ‘meme’ concept to denote cultural replicators.  
65 (Hull 2000,  p. 54) ‘One important difference between Dawkin’s analysis of selection and mine is that 
Dawkin’s (1994) introduced his notion of vehicle only to bury it. I argue that environmental interaction is 
a necessary part of the selection process. It is present at a variety of levels of organizations and cannot be 
eliminated without serious explanatory loss’.  
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 Essentially Hull argues that Dawkins was confusing the functions of his replicator 
and vehicle, and this has important implications for the understanding of causality. 
Justifying his own interactor term, below, and stressing the importance of 
acknowledging the two causally distinct processes, Hull sums up Dawkins apparent 
oversight in the following way (1984, p. 150);  
 
Dawkins is running two powers together – the power to reproduce one’s structure 
and the power to do so differentially.  These powers are sufficiently different to be 
distinguished terminologically.  As Mayr (1978, p. 52) emphasizes, evolution 
through natural selection is a two-step process, ‘(I repeat!), a two-step process.’  
Thus I think Dawkins’s general analysis of replicators needs supplementing with a 
general analysis of the entities that function in this second step.  For want of a better 
term, I suggest ‘interactor’… 
 
 Significantly, in terms of this important clarification of evolutionary theory, Dawkins 
has subsequently acknowledged the import of Hull’s criticism, observing his own 
failure to make a clear distinction between replicators and vehicles, and accepting that 
genes and organisms play quite disparate roles in selection processes (Brandon and 
Burian, 1984, p. 87).  
 
Causal Role of the Interactor 
 
In the light of these clarifications, and others, it is now possible to illustrate exactly 
what is meant when evolutionists talk about the ‘causal role’ of the interactor (Gould 
and Lloyd, 1999),66 and moreover how this might be interpreted in the social domain.  
Although Hull stresses the importance of the interplay between replicators and 
interactors, he is still concerned to stress the traditional Darwinian causal hierarchy, 
with genes which ‘code for’ the characteristics of organisms, decidedly at the bottom of 
that hierarchy. In other words he was keen to point out the ‘indirect’ selection of 
replicators, and the causal role of the interactor. He was greatly assisted in this endeavor 
by Sober’s (1984) timely observation that evolutionists were often confusing the 
distinction between selection of an object and selection for a property. Clearly in Hull’s 
terminology this amounts to the selection of an interactor and the selection for its 
replicator. In the social realm, following, for example, Nelson and Winter (1982), this 
would read as selection of the firm and selection for the routine.  
                                                 
66 Also referred to by Hull as the ‘primary interactor’ (1988, p. 434) 
84 
 In this widely accepted formulation it can now be seen that the replicator is ‘selected’ 
only as a consequence of the interactor being selected. This finally and significantly 
clarifies the vector of causality. Evidently it was this subtle interplay between 
replicators and interactors that caused the protracted confusion about causal direction in 
Darwin’s ‘two factor’ explanation of evolution (Mayr, 1976). It is little wonder, 
therefore, that social scientists remain similarly confused over these issues.67
 To be sure, the resolution of the units debate was a monumental achievement in 
evolutionary biology. Indeed, quite apart from making sense of the selection process, it 
also served to confirm and to clarify many important aspects of Darwin’s theory, 
including, for example, confirmation of the organism as the ‘primary interactor’ and 
unit of selection, and clarification of the Darwinian vector of causality and account of 
variety creation and adaptation. But, significantly, more than this, these theoretical and 
conceptual advances had far-reaching implications, for as demonstrated here, they 
finally confirmed the general nature of Darwinism, and provided the conceptual 
apparatus for its articulation. Here, at last, in the replicator-interactor terminology, were 
the conceptual foundations of the Darwinian meta-theoretical framework. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The implications of these major theoretical and conceptual clarifications for socio-
economic theories of evolution are substantial. Careful analysis of leading works in 
organization studies and evolutionary economics has shown time and again that there is 
deep confusion over units and levels of selection, and at the heart of these confusions is 
an evident need to distinguish between replicating entities and a unit of selection.68 
Furthermore it is equally apparent that scholars seek to articulate group and multilevel 
selection, they intuitively realize that selection occurs at multiple levels but its 
articulation has proven elusive and where it is assumed or implied theories have 
inevitably suffered problems of tractability.  
 Significantly, as indicated here, and will become apparent in Chapter 7, the 
replicator-interactor terminology also enables the articulation of group selection and, 
moreover, facilitates the conceptualization of multilevel selection. Indeed, as will be 
                                                 
67 Indeed this will be demonstrated in the case studies where the significance of the replicator-interactor 
distinction will be seen to impact not only on the selection theories but also upon conceptualizations of 
variety formation and continuity (inheritance). 
68 It is interesting, for example, to observe that Nelson and Winter readily adopt the routines as genes 
analogy and moreover, that like Hannan and Freeman and Aldrich, group selection is immediately 
assumed and multilevel selection is implicit in the theory. 
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demonstrated, there is considerable potential for social scientists to enhance their 
evolutionary theories by engaging with these important developments. Before moving 
on to these topics, however, and in order to ensure their comprehension and illustrate 
their consistency with the Darwinian story, it is important to be clear about the complete 
‘variation, inheritance and selection’ dynamic and thus to similarly consider the modern 
articulation of the inheritance mechanism and variety creation. Accordingly, in the next 
Chapter it will be shown how the replicator-interactor distinction is critical to the 
articulation of both Darwinian inheritance and Lamarckian ‘acquired character’ 
inheritance. In addition, it will also be shown how the Lamarckian inheritance with 
which social scientists are traditionally associated is actually theoretically dependent on 
Darwinism in order to work as a theory.   
 In summary, building on the theoretical clarifications of the selection process 
illustrated here, the following Chapters, on Lamarckism and multilevel selection, will 
essentially show how the same conceptual apparatus facilitates the conceptualization 
and articulation of both Lamarckian inheritance and multilevel selection within a 
Darwinian meta-theoretical framework. And consequently it provides for a 
comprehensive theory of socio-economic evolution.  
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 6    Lamarckism 
 
 
 
The combination of selection and intentional learning from experience provides a vastly 
richer evolutionary framework, than when either is taken in isolation.  In cultural 
evolution, so many mechanisms point to endogenous variation of knowledge that to insist 
on the separation of selection processes from developmental processes is to miss a major 
element in the evolutionary dynamic of modern capitalism. 
J. Stanley Metcalfe (2004) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The selection process, as demonstrated in the previous Chapter, is central to an 
understanding of Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, in order to fully understand 
its subtle complexities, and thereby understand causality in evolutionary theory, it is 
also necessary to have a basic grasp of the interweaving processes of inheritance and 
variety formation. In other words, it is necessary to comprehend the three Darwinian 
principles of variation, inheritance and selection. Only then is it possible to appreciate 
the ‘very different kind of causality’ (Hull, 2001, p. 93) 69  expressed in Darwin’s 
cumulative selection process, and to perceive the important implications of biological 
evolutionary theory for the socio-economic domain. Thus the present Chapter focuses 
on inheritance, and in particular in the comparison between the Lamarckian inheritance 
mechanism and that of Darwinian inheritance mechanism. 
 In the examination of ‘Lamarckism’ and what it represents to scholars in organization 
studies and evolutionary economics, it will be shown here how established assumptions 
associated with a Lamarckian account of evolution actually frustrate a coherent theory 
of socio-economic evolution.  It will be seen here how the theoretical advances and 
conceptual clarifications discussed in the previous Chapter, recently enhanced by the 
work of Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b), have also facilitated greater understanding of 
the inheritance mechanism, particularly the recognition of the ‘peculiar duality’ of the 
organism and conceptualization of selection as a two-step process.  Whilst confusions 
                                                 
69 As Hull (2001, p. 93) stresses, it is a kind of causality ‘very different from our ordinary conceptions of 
causation.’ B. F. Skinner (1974 pp. 40-41) puts it this way, ‘Darwin discovered the role of selection, a 
kind of causality very different from the push-pull mechanisms of science up to that time.’ And Mayr 
(1988, p. 458) elaborates, ‘Natural selection has been particularly puzzling to the physical scientists, 
because it is so different from physical theories and laws.  It is neither strictly deterministic not predictive 
but probabilistic with a strong stochastic element’.  
 
over the Lamarckian perception of adaptation and variety creation are corrected, and the 
Lamarckian notion of acquired character inheritance is shown to be impossible without 
the replicator-interactor distinction, the following discussion will nevertheless also show 
that Lamarckism and Darwinism are not mutually exclusive, and that the important 
notion of acquired character inheritance is accommodated in a general Darwinian 
account; an account which (contrary to widespread misconceptions) also explains 
intentionality, the other critical component of socio-economic theories of evolution.  
 
Lamarckian Inheritance and Socio-Economic Theories of Evolution 
 
The evolutionary label traditionally borrowed from biology by organizational scholars 
and evolutionary economists is that of pre-Darwinian ‘Lamarckism’ 70  (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985; Burgelman, 1985, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982, Singh and 
Lumsden, 1990), or more specifically, the idea of Lamarckian inheritance. Lamarckism 
admits the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, in other words, 
within-generation inheritance, as opposed to intergenerational inheritance. Undoubtedly, 
the process which involves individual organizations adjusting strategy, adapting to the 
prevailing conditions, changing their form, and going on to reproduce that new form, is 
‘Lamarckian’, as the term is generally understood by evolutionists (Mayr, 1976).   
 However, as will be demonstrated here, although the Lamarckian ‘adaptationist’ 
perspective may be a very apt heuristic and particularly relevant to theories of the socio-
cultural realm (McKelvey, 1982 p. 220), whilst employed in isolation from other key 
evolutionary processes, as has been the tradition in much of organization studies (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988), where it is effectively employed as an 
alternative to Darwinian evolutionary theory (Bruderer and Singh, 1996), it nevertheless 
remains a rather limited paradigm (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Metcalfe, 2004). 
Reiterating McKelvey’s criticism of the failure to identify an ‘organizational 
generation,’ for example, or a ‘social vehicle’ for transmitting or inheriting traits, Van 
de Ven and Grazeman (1991, p. 186) argue that ‘the Lamarckian view sidesteps (but 
does not solve) a central impediment to research on organizational evolution.’ 
 Indeed the Lamarckian perspective raises several important conceptual problems for 
an evolutionary theory of organizations. Some of these relate to its loose interpretation 
                                                 
70 A theory attributed to the French evolutionist, Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1809), because of his 
popularization of the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. However, the idea of character 
inheritance, subsequently dubbed ‘Lamarckism’, represented only one aspect of Lamarck’s extensive 
work in the natural sciences.  
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by social scientists, and some relate to its theoretical intractability, and most are derived 
from the widespread but erroneous view in organization science and business 
economics that Darwinism and Lamarckism are mutually exclusive theories. Theorists 
have typically seen these as competing or conflicting perspectives (Bruderer and Singh, 
1996; Levinthal, 1991), and, having opted for Lamarckism because of character 
inheritance, and amongst other things, the mistaken belief that Darwinism does not 
account for intentional behaviour, they have thereby incorporated its conceptual 
limitations (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006b) and inadvertently rendered their own 
theories flawed and incomplete (Metcalfe, 2004).  These conceptual limitations include, 
the lack of a viable inheritance mechanism, with no account of, or distinction between, a 
conceptual genotype and phenotype (for example, a replicator and interactor); the 
failure to explain why acquired injurious characters are not inherited alongside the 
beneficial characters, and; the ultimate, consequential failure to adequately explain 
adaptive improvement. 
    These difficult theoretical and conceptual issues  raised by Lamarckian inheritance 
were not, of course confined to social theories of evolution and they ultimately 
provoked the much needed theory development in evolutionary biology, which had 
important implications for both biology and the social sciences.  Relating to the central 
idea of character inheritance, for example, it has been demonstrated that Lamarckism 
cannot stand alone as an evolutionary theory, and that it needs the Darwinian selection 
process and conceptual framework in order to work (Dawkins, 1983, 1986; Hull, 2001; 
Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001). Furthermore it has been shown that a replicator and 
interactor distinction must be postulated in order to make sense of its defining 
inheritance mechanism (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006b; Aunger, 2002; Hull, 1982).  
Significantly, a close reading of the organization studies literature reveals these 
Lamarckian limitations, and evidently some social scientists have finally begun to 
perceive the incompleteness of the Lamarckian perspective (Astley and Van de Ven, 
1983; Singh, House and Tucker, 1986; Scott, 1987; Levinthal, 1991; Bruderer and 
Singh, 1996). 
 
Theory Development and Research Agendas 
 
Certainly it would seem that the widespread commitment to Lamarckism by social 
scientists has frustrated both theory development and research agendas. According to 
Hannan and Freeman (1989), in organization studies Lamarckism has encouraged a 
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narrow ‘focal organization perspective’ as well as unrealistic assumptions about the 
flexibility of firms and the adaptive capabilities of managers.  On a more general level, 
the Lamarckian commitment also partially explains the very slow and tentative steps 
towards developing the less restrictive and more powerful Darwinian conceptual 
framework (Campbell, 1965; Blute, 1976, 1979; Baum and Singh, 1994; Aldrich, 
1999),71 a framework which would necessarily include the core explanatory principles 
of variation, inheritance and selection.72  
 Part of the problem is that the socio-economic research agenda is vast and complex, 
with inevitable interrelated major foci on entities, processes and events (Baum and 
Singh, 1994). In addition to explanations of individual organizational change, theorists 
typically seek to investigate the mechanisms involved in the creation of new firms 
(Aldrich, 1999) as well as those, like competition, involved in their success or demise 
(Friedman, 1953; Schumpeter, 1934, 1976; Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Levinthal, 
1992). They seek also, increasingly, to understand the role of variety in industry 
(Alchian, 1950; Downie, 1958; Nelson, 1974; Metcalfe, 1987, 1998) and to understand 
particularly the relationships between micro-level phenomena, such as routines and 
firms, and macro-level phenomena, such as the industry, over time (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Singh and Lumsden, 1990; Baum and Singh, 1994; Dosi, Nelson and Winter, 
2000).  As is becoming increasingly apparent this complex configuration of research 
questions is proving to overburden Lamarckian theory. 
  The following sections seek to explain what evolutionists understand by Lamarckism 
and how this compares and relates to Darwin’s theory.  Significantly, in terms of theory 
development, it will be shown how Lamarckism and Darwinism are not mutually 
exclusive, why Lamarckism needs Darwinism to work as a theory, and how the 
genotype-phenotype distinction actually enables both the definition of Lamarckism and 
the articulation of its inheritance mechanism. Through this exploration it is possible to 
better appreciate the attraction of Lamarckism for those seeking to explain the evolution 
of cultural entities like organizations, and furthermore, to revaluate its theoretical 
contribution in this regard. Building on the earlier elucidation of the selection process 
the discussion thus paves the way for an in-depth analysis of the case studies here under 
study, whether they embrace Lamarckism (Nelson and Winter), ignore Lamarckism 
(Hannan and Freeman) or implicitly adopt it (Aldrich).  
                                                 
71 As discussed in Chapter 2, ‘Social Darwinism’ is almost certainly the main reason for this delay.  
72 In economics it was not until Nelson and Winter (1982) that such an attempt was made. They were the 
first economists since Veblen (1898) to actually apply the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance 
and selection to economic phenomena.  
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 Accordingly, the following involves a brief review of the theoretical developments in 
genetics with an illustration of how these have informed understanding in biology of the 
inheritance mechanism, and in turn, the corresponding evolutionary processes of variety 
formation and selection. The analysis will thus revisit the important sub-processes of 
replication and interaction and show how the Lamarckian inheritance process, and 
ultimately the distinction between Darwinian and Lamarckian inheritance, is critically 
dependent upon a genotype-phenotype distinction. 
 
Lamarckism 
 
‘Lamarckism’ is the theory named after the French evolutionist, Jean-Baptiste de 
Lamarck (1809), who is largely remembered for popularising the idea of the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics.  In this view, changes that are acquired during the lifetime of 
an organism and which result from interaction with its environment are changes that can 
be inherited by the offspring of that organism. In other words phenotypic changes or 
‘adaptations’ are somehow transmitted to the organism’s genotype and subsequently 
passed on to the next generation in reproduction.   
 Although Lamarck is widely credited for the notion of acquired character inheritance 
it is worth noting that this was a view held by most evolutionists at the time.  Indeed, 
significantly (contrary to widespread misconceptions) even Darwin himself did not 
discount the possibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics (Mayr, 1976; Hull, 
2001, p. 56; Hodgson, 2001, p. 93). Unaware at the time of genetics or the nature of the 
heritable unit, Darwin did not perceive Lamarckism to be irreconcilable with his theory 
of natural selection, indeed he fully embraced it (1859, pp. 82, 137, 209). As Hodgson 
and Knudsen (2006b, p. 12) observe below; 
 
[Darwin] never denied a limited role for the inheritance of acquired characters and in 
his later life he gave it increasing rather than decreasing attention and approval. 
Hence Lamarckism (in this sense) and Darwin’s doctrine are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. 
 
 Thus, in this sense, one can assert that Lamarckism and Darwinism are not mutually 
exclusive.  Indeed, as will become apparent below, the Lamarckian Darwinian 
relationship is far more involved than even this observation suggests, with the former 
actually being dependent on the later for its theoretical tractability. 
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 However, following experimental work by the biologist August Weismann (1889, 
1893) the notion of acquired character inheritance became discredited in biology.  
Weismann argued that it was not possible for acquired ‘bodily’ or phenotypic changes 
to influence the hereditary material of the genotype or, what biologists call, the ‘germ 
line.’  Weismann was essentially saying that it was impossible for the environment to 
have a direct influence on the genetic material (Mayr, 1976, p. 10), proposing a notional 
‘barrier’ between the organism and its genotype.  The argument was that since only the 
germ plasm or ‘genetic code’ is transmitted in reproduction, Lamarckian inheritance is 
impossible (Hull, 1988, p. 48). 
 
Lamarckian Possibilities 
 
Whilst acknowledging that this remains the predominant view in biology, following 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b) it will be seen here that it assists understanding of 
Lamarckian inheritance in the social sphere to consider that, in principle, there are at 
least three distinct Lamarckian worlds pertaining to character inheritance. Firstly, 
reflecting a minority view in biology, there is the empirical claim that acquired 
properties, such as immune responses, may, after all, be heritable in the biotic domain 
(Steele, 1979, Steele et al, 1998). Secondly, theoretically, we cannot rule out the 
possibility of Lamarckian inheritance occurring in some alien system of life on another 
planet (Dawkins, 1988). And finally, we cannot theoretically rule out the possibility of 
Lamarckian inheritance occurring in the socio-economic sphere (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2006b; Ziman, 2000). Thus we are compelled to explore the question, ‘if Lamarckian 
inheritance occurred, what would the mechanism look like?’ 
 To answer this question the discussion starts by considering the reasons why 
Lamarckism was rejected in the biotic sphere and it begins to unpack what evolutionists 
understand by the term.  It is, of course, important to be aware of the implications of 
Lamarckian inheritance and what it says about causality in evolutionary processes. 
Significantly, it will be seen that ultimately, in contrast to the Darwinian perspective 
which sees selection as the main driving force of evolution, Lamarckism suggests that 
evolution is driven by adaptation. 
 The rediscovery and subsequent advancement of Mendel’s laws of inheritance at the 
beginning of the twentieth Century (De Vries, 1889; Bateson, 1908, 1909) eventually 
led to the validation of Weismann’s theoretical argument, with its ‘conclusive 
refutation’ (Mayr, 1988, p. 508) in the 1950s attributed to the discoveries of molecular 
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biologists.  These scientists evidently demonstrated that Lamarckism could not possibly 
work because it lacked a mechanism to explain how acquired characters could be 
transferred, across the ‘Weismannian barrier’ (1889, 1893), in other words, in the 
opposite direction from the phenotype to the genotype. And in so doing they also clearly 
established the very important distinction between the phenotype and genotype, as Mayr 
(1976, p. 11) explains below; 
 
The way from the DNA [genotype]…to the proteins [phenotype] is a one-way street.  
The environment can influence the developmental process but it cannot affect the 
blueprint that controls it.  Changes in the proteins cannot be translated back into 
nucleic acids [genes].  
 
 Notice how the genotype-phenotype distinction is actually required to explain, and 
indeed to discount the notion of Lamarckian inheritance. Thus Lamarckism is 
discounted in biology.73 But what about the hypothetical cases alluded to above?  In an 
attempt to explore such Lamarckian theoretical possibilities, following Dawkins (1986), 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b), suggest entertaining the thought that on some other 
planet supporting biotic life, Lamarckian inheritance is possible.  How might this work 
as an evolutionary theory? 
 
Lamarckism and the Need for Darwinian Selection 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b) highlight the critical point that even if it were possible 
for the phenotype to influence the genotype, so that phenotypic changes were heritable, 
there remains a fundamental flaw, or missing link in the Lamarckism position.  This is 
because in the Lamarckian story it is assumed that only beneficial traits are inherited 
and not disadvantageous traits; indeed this is how Lamarckian evolutionary progress is 
explained. But, the crucial question is, why should only the beneficial characters be 
inherited?  In the Lamarckian adaptationist explanation of successive change, if 
acquired phenotypic traits are heritable, what is to prevent the inheritance of negative or 
injurious traits?  In other words what is to prevent babies from inheriting their parents’ 
wrinkles, broken limbs or smallpox scars?  Basically there is no discriminating 
mechanism in the Lamarckian model that would ensure that only the beneficial and not 
the disadvantageous traits are inherited.  Consequently, ‘even if acquired characters 
                                                 
73 Notwithstanding a controversial and minority view in biology to the contrary (Steele, 1979; Steel et al, 
1998) which would not, in any case, affect the argument about the validity of Lamarckism in the social 
sphere. 
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could be inherited, the Lamarckian theory would still be incapable of explaining 
adaptive evolution’ (Dawkins, 1986, p. 299). 
 And this is where the discussion comes to the somewhat ironic relationship between 
Lamarckism and Darwinism.  Logically, some kind of selection process would need to 
be assumed to support the Lamarckian assumption of continued improvement.  This is 
the missing mechanism that would ensure that only beneficial characters would be 
inherited.  Without it Lamarckism is unlikely to be efficacious, ‘with successive 
generations becoming more and more decrepit’ (Dawkins, p. 299).   Thus Lamarckism 
would appear to be inextricably tied to its erstwhile ‘rival’ theory, actually dependent 
upon the conceptual structure and support of Darwinism in order to work as a theory.  
As Dawkins (1986, p. 300) vividly describes the relationship;  
 
Lamarckian theory can explain adaptive improvement in evolution, only by, as it 
were, riding on the back of Darwinian theory … we are forced back to Darwinism to 
explain the adaptive aspect of evolution. 
   
 Evidently, Lamarckism cannot stand alone as an evolutionary theory because it 
requires the Darwinian selection process. So having first established that Lamarckism 
and Darwinism are not mutually exclusive, significantly, it is now possible to see that a 
distinct asymmetrical relationship exists between them. This later point is very 
important to emphasize, in that whilst Lamarckism is dependent upon Darwinism, 
effectively ‘nesting’ in Darwinian theory (Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001), the reverse 
is not true.  Darwinism does not need Lamarckian props.  However, with its much 
broader applicability, Darwinism has the advantage of being able to incorporate 
Lamarckian forms of inheritance within its meta-theoretical framework (Hull, 2001, p. 
56).  Thus, to reiterate, Lamarckian inheritance is possible in the social domain but only 
by ‘riding on the back of Darwinian theory’. 
 From a socio-economic perspective this is a very encouraging development.  The 
much-desired accommodation of acquired character inheritance is thus plausible, nested 
in a Darwinian account of socio-economic evolution.  It now remains to establish what 
form this inheritance mechanism would take and this is where the conceptual genotype 
and phenotype come into play. 
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Conceptual Genotypes and Phenotypes 
 
In spite of its widespread adoption,74 recent explorations of the viability of Lamarckism 
in the social domain have revealed even deeper conceptual problems with the 
tractability of the Lamarckian inheritance mechanism. Hull (1982, p. 309) indicates the 
source of the problem below; 
 
In order for sociocultural evolution to be Lamarckian in a metaphorical sense, 
conceptual genotypes must be distinguishable from conceptual phenotypes and the 
two must be related in appropriate ways’ (Hull, 1982, p. 309). 
 
 To illustrate, returning to the theme of the previous Chapter, it has been shown that 
the selection process is comprised of two sub-processes identified as replication and 
interaction and furthermore that selection acts directly upon the interacting entity and 
only indirectly on the replicating entity. This was a very important stage in the 
development of evolutionary theory, establishing the important functional distinction 
between the genotype and phenotype,75 and it is this distinction and its explanatory 
significance for the notion of inheritance or continuity, to which the analysis now turns. 
 Inspired by Hull above, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b) take these critical 
components and examine the logical requirements for each step of a Lamarckian 
inheritance process.  They demonstrate the ultimate dependency of Lamarckism on the 
genotype-phenotype distinction. And, somewhat paradoxically, they thereby also show 
that the genotype-phenotype distinction serves to both define and undermine 
Lamarckian inheritance, whilst at the same time it distinguishes Lamarckian from 
Darwinian inheritance. 
 Essentially, a genotype-phenotype distinction must first be established before it is 
possible to even identify Lamarckian transmission or begin to formulate a plausible 
evolutionary theory that might accommodate acquired character inheritance. As Hull 
(2004) explains, ‘in order for any process to be considered Lamarckian, we need a 
genotype-phenotype distinction. Of course in order for a process to count as Darwinian, 
                                                 
74 Examination of the use of Lamarckism in the social domain interestingly reveals that in most cases a 
Darwinian selection process is implicitly assumed. 
75 Whilst neither Darwin nor Lamarck used these modern terms, it is evident in their writings that they 
had perceived some kind of distinction.  As Hodgson and Knudsen (p. 4) point out; ‘they both assumed 
that information related to characteristics was transmitted from generation to generation through such 
information-carrying entities as seeds, sperm, ova, pollen, or stigma. Neither writer believed that 
replication occurred by the direct copying of characteristics, so that their writing in the biological context 
embodied an implicit distinction between genotype and phenotype’. 
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we also need the genotype phenotype distinction’.  In other words, in any evolutionary 
account of inheritance or replication there needs to be a distinction between the 
information required to produce the entity (genotype) and the entity itself (phenotype).  
This is a logical necessity.76
 
Replicators Interactors and the Lamarckian Inheritance Mechanism 
 
Indeed, according to Mayr it was ‘a failure to make a distinction between genotype and 
phenotype [that] was at the bottom of many of the great controversies in the history of 
evolutionary biology’ (1982, p. 783).  And, as discussed in the previous Chapter, it was 
Hull and others who eventually untangled these problems and, indeed, Hull (1988) who 
provided the generalized terminology which facilitated, amongst other things, the 
clarification and articulation of the inheritance mechanism. 
 To recap, the genotype is the organism’s historically evolved genetic program, 
encoded in the DNA, and this is the durable replicating entity. This was identified by 
Hull as the ‘replicator’, and defined as ‘an entity that passes on its structure largely 
intact in successive replications’ (1988, p. 408). The phenotype, on the other hand, is 
the manifested attributes of the organism, or more specifically, ‘the joint product of its 
genes and their environment during ontogeny’ (Dawkins, 1982, p. 292). This entity was 
identified as the ‘interactor’, and defined by Hull as ‘an entity that directly interacts as a 
cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes 
replication to be differential’ (1988, p. 409). To be sure, this is the entity that interacts 
with its environment, and upon which selection operates; this is the ‘causal interactor’.   
 Bearing these distinctions in mind, and what they suggest about selection and causal 
direction, in the discussion of inheritance it is also important to recall the Weismannian 
barrier, which established in biology that whilst genes may control and influence the 
development of the phenotype, the reverse is not true. The phenotype cannot impact on 
its own genotype and pass on phenotypic changes to its offspring. It will be seen below 
that this has significant consequences for the articulation of Lamarckian inheritance. 
 
No Replicator-Interactor Distinction: Then No Lamarckian Inheritance 
 
The very subtle but nevertheless hugely significant theoretical point that Hodgson and 
Knudsen (2006b) demonstrate, made earlier by Hull (1982), is that without the 
                                                 
76 Knudsen (Personal Communication, 31st May 2004) 
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distinction between a replicator and interactor it is simply not possible to articulate the 
supposed breech of the Weismannian barrier in Lamarckian inheritance, and thus 
explain the notion of acquired character inheritance.   If acquired characteristics are 
going to be inherited, how is this to be explained without a genotype-phenotype 
distinction?  Clearly there is a conceptual need to speak of information passing from 
the phenotype to its genotype in effecting subsequent generations of that phenotype.  
For as Hull (2000, p. 55-56, my emphasis) explains, ‘Lamarckian inheritance is the 
literal inheritance of acquired characteristics. The transmission must be genetic, and 
the relevant effect must be phenotypic’. Hodgson and Knudsen show that without the 
conceptual distinction the functional roles of the genotype and phenotype become 
conflated and the characteristically Lamarckian process is ejected from the picture.  
 Thus the distinction is necessary to explain Lamarckian inheritance and, as a 
consequence, to distinguish it ultimately from Darwinian inheritance.  This is a 
technical point that impacts on the logic of the theory wherever it might be applied, in 
other words, as Hodgson and Knudsen (p.18) explain, it impacts on Lamarckian theory 
as it is applied in the socio-economic domain; 
 
In order to demonstrate Lamarckian inheritance, a phenotype-genotype distinction 
must first be established. Adaptations acquired at the phenotypic level must be 
encoded at the genotypic level and then passed on to new generations. 
Unfortunately, in the literature on economic and organizational evolution there is no 
clear conceptualisation of the phenotype-genotype distinction. Without this 
conceptualisation there is no basis on which to adjudicate whether economic and 
organizational evolution is Lamarckian or Darwinian. 
 
 This is an important and rather ironic point given the observed justifications for 
allegiances to Lamarckian (acquired character inheritance, ‘adaptationism’) or 
Darwinian (selectionist) perspectives. However, although ‘no clear conceptualisation’ of 
the phenotype-genotype distinction is articulated, in other words, as rigorous as that 
outlined above, there are, nevertheless, positive indications in the organization studies 
and evolutionary economics literature of a movement in this direction. Some of this is 
explicit whilst much of it is implicit. Certainly there is recognition of a genotype-
phenotype distinction, and significantly, it is a functional distinction.  
 Indeed what the literature reveals is that, as well as implicitly adopting the Darwinian 
selection process to ‘prop up’ their Lamarckian accounts, some evolutionary scholars in 
the socio-economic domain have evidently gone that critical step further in 
acknowledging the genotype-phenotype distinction and indeed they are already 
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incorporating it into their analysis (Baum and Singh, 1994; Aldrich, 1999; Ziman, 2000; 
Murmann, 2003). To illustrate the point, Baum and Singh, are cited at length below, 
describing their understanding of the distinction and its application, and it is instructive 
to note their sources of inspiration (1994, p. 4); 
 
We conceptualize organizational evolution as the complex interplays between two 
kinds of processes, interaction and replication (Hull 1980, 1988), acting on two 
kinds of entities, ecological and genealogical (Eldredge, 1985, 1989), at a variety of 
levels of organization  
 
… We characterize the world of organizations as composed of two hierarchies of 
entities, one ecological (e.g., jobs, work groups, organizations, populations, and 
communities), … and the other genealogical (e.g., routines, comps, species, and 
polyphyletic groupings) … Organizational evolution is the result of genealogical 
entities replicating, ecological entities interacting, the net effect of these interactions 
being the differential population persistence of the genealogical entities that 
produced them. 
 
A theory of organizational evolution – indeed, any evolutionary system – minimally 
requires these two kinds of processes (i.e., interaction and replication) and two kinds 
of entities (i.e., ecological and genealogical) (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Eldredge, 
1985, 1989; Eldredge and Salthe, 1984; Hull, 1980, 1988; Salthe, 1985) 
 
 These are promising developments both for the illumination of organizational 
problems and for the acknowledgment and development of a generalized Darwinian 
theory. As noted, more scholars, by varying degrees, are now recognizing the replicator-
interactor distinction. With acknowledgement that the distinction is now ‘standard in 
philosophical discussions of the evolutionary process’ (Aunger, 2001 p. 9), its 
exploration is evidently being urged and acted upon by organization scientists and 
evolutionary economists alike (Baum and Singh, 1994; Aldrich, 1999; Galunic, 2002; 
Murmann, 2003; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a, 2006b). Moreover, reinforcing the 
argument made in Chapter 3, regarding the inevitability of Darwinism for socio-
economic theories of evolution, it is significant that a replicator-interactor distinction is 
also implicit in many of the evolutionary approaches surveyed here. This is illustrated, 
for example, in the widespread acknowledgement of some kind of stable information 
unit (organizational routines, technologies, competencies) and the distinct roles that this 
plays in the continuity of form.  
 However, in spite of these developments and the intuitive acceptance of this 
important distinction, it is apparent that considerable confusion nevertheless remains in 
its conceptualization and application. Investigation of the issue shows that the confusion 
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is traced both to this important duality and to the ‘units of selection’ problem 
reminiscent of evolutionary biology. As noted in Chapter 5, evolutionary scholars in the 
social domain are still debating the identity of the unit of selection and the level at 
which selection takes place, with some, for example, promoting the organizational 
routine or competence (Burgelman and Mittman, 1994), and others promoting the firm 
or organization (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Clearly, in 
opting for either this then contradicts the promotion of separate functional roles for 
these entities in the organizational hierarchy. Indeed this problem is clearly illustrated 
here in Chapter 8, in Nelson and Winter’s theory of evolutionary economics where the 
authors adopt a ‘routine-as-gene’ analogy. With the benefit of these recent theoretical 
developments and conceptual refinements it will be shown how, in Nelson and Winter’s 
attempt to articulate Lamarckian adaptive change at the level of the routine, the units 
and levels of selection become confused, the replicator-interactor distinction conflated, 
and the vector of causality ultimately inconclusive.   
 Undoubtedly the important advances in evolutionary theory that have been discussed 
in the present and previous two Chapters are key to unravelling the theoretical and 
conceptual problems that persist in the social domain. However, a survey of the 
literature in organization studies and evolutionary economics confirms that these 
developments have not been widely disseminated. Hence it is not surprising that such 
theoretical conundrums are so widespread. The next few sections expand on the other 
misunderstandings associated with Lamarckian inheritance. The remaining issues which 
derive from this and which command attention in socio-economic accounts of evolution 
are those of adaptation, variety-creation and intentionality. The first two are very closely 
linked. It will be seen how assumptions about these have similarly had a dramatic 
impact on perceptions of causality and explanations of evolutionary change. 
  
Adaptation  
 
It is quite clear why organization theorists and business economists are attracted to 
Lamarckism. In their respective spheres they observe individual organizations 
responding to the constraints of their environments and adjusting strategy in order to 
compete and survive.  Such changes that occur during the lifetime of an organization are 
then perceived as being ‘inherited’ by subsequent generations of the organization 
through, for example, durable, replicating ‘organizational routines’. Replication, or 
inheritance, is articulated through the Lamarckian interpretation of adaptation to the 
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environment, which ultimately perceives the changes that occur at the individual level 
as being the pivotal changes that drive the evolution of the industry. 
 Such accounts are often referred to in the literature as ‘adaptationist’ (Bruderer and 
Singh, 1996), and they are distinguished from what have recently been termed 
‘selectionist’ or selection-based explanations (Nelson and Winter, 1982;77 Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977, 1989). Significantly, this division reflects, amongst other things, a 
difference in the perceived location of causality of industry-level change. Whilst 
selectionists tend to view organizations as being largely inert and explain evolution 
through macro-level selection processes, adaptationists instead stress the adaptive 
capabilities of organizations (Kanter, 1984; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997) and thus 
promote adaptation as the main force of evolutionary change. This has been the subject 
of much debate amongst evolutionary theorists in the social sciences, and, as noted 
earlier has resulted in the effective polarization of evolutionary theories into two camps 
and culminated in the ‘adaptation versus selection’ debate. 
 However, clarifications are again found in evolutionary biology, where it becomes 
clear that both adaptation and selection are essential components of the evolutionary 
explanation. As discussed in Chapter 4 above, the problem lies in the misunderstanding 
of their relationship and the proper location of causality. 
 The point is, as Darwin shows, adaptation is a product of natural selection (Mayr, 
1982, p. 96), and it refers to the species and not the individual organism. Selection 
operates on the existing variety; so that those individuals that are best adapted to the 
prevailing environment are the ones that survive and go on to reproduce their form in 
subsequent generations. Should the environment change then individuals in the species 
with different characteristics that are better suited to the changed environment will then 
be the ones that survive the selection process and this new form will then come to 
characterize the species. Thus it is the selection process that ultimately ‘causes’ 
individuals to be so well adapted to their environment (Mayr, 1982, p. 358).  
 Significantly, as illustrated in the discussion of the Darwinian population thinking 
perspective in Chapter 4, it is the species and not the individual organism that changes 
or ‘evolves’, and this view  clearly contrasts with the Lamarckian perspective which 
focuses on the individual and its adaptation to the environment, perceiving this to be the 
locus of change. As will be shown below, however, whilst individual adaptations do 
occur, they do not ultimately explain evolutionary change. 
                                                 
77 Although described by the authors as Lamarckian, Nelson and Winter’s account implicitly adopts the 
Darwinian selection mechanism and indeed the theory is typically described by commentators as a 
selection- based model (Murmann et al, 2003)  
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Variety Creation and Causality 
 
A critical implication of Lamarckism is that it essentially amounts to a reversal in the 
causal direction of evolution. Lamarckism holds that the environment is the driving 
force of change (as opposed to any kind of selection process); basically meaning that 
change and variety formation are the direct result of individual phenotypic adaptations 
to the environment.  And this, argues Mayr (1982, p. 354), is the crucial difference 
between Darwin and Lamarck’s mechanisms of evolution, where; 
 
for Lamarck the environment and its changes had priority. They produced needs and 
activities in the organism and these, in turn, caused adaptational variation.  
[Whereas] for Darwin random variation was present first, and the ordering activity 
of the environment (“natural selection”) followed afterwards. 
 
 Clearly this is a fundamental difference in explanations of evolutionary change and 
variety formation, and significantly, this difference is clearly reflected in the 
organizations and business economics literature. Traditionally, as noted, organization 
scholars have seen change as being directed by the ever-resourceful innovating firms 
who adapt to the prevailing environment (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and March, 
1988; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Child, 1972). Successful innovations, whether 
technical or organizational, are copied and multiplied and it is these that are perceived 
as bringing about the observable changes at the industry level. 
 Thus, the Lamarckian reversal of causality, which earlier manifested itself in the 
phenotypic encoding of the genotype, is played out in a different sense at this higher 
level of causal explanation; in the assertion that adaptive changes induced by 
environmental stimuli are both the source of variety and the source of adaptive 
complexity and progress. In their perception of adaptive change, these theorists have 
evidently perceived the Lamarckian explanation as being the one that most closely maps 
onto organizational phenomena, and consequently the Lamarckian perspective tends to 
dominate the literature. Before summarizing the implications of this for a socio-
economic theory of evolution the discussion resumes here with the issue of 
intentionality, another misguided reason why social scientists have rejected Darwinism 
and opted for the Lamarckian explanation.  
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Intentionality 
 
Naturally, for social scientists, human volition or conscious intention is a central 
explanatory concept for any account of social evolution. Since it is widely believed that 
conscious, intentional behaviour is dismissed in Darwin’s evolutionary theory, 
Lamarckism, with its explicit notions of adaptive, purposeful behaviour, is, again, the 
preferred explanatory schema.  However, this reasoning misrepresents the Darwinian 
position, which, on the contrary, does not overlook intentionality. Because 
fundamentally, as Hodgson (2004, p.55) explains below, Darwinism holds that there is 
no such thing as an ‘uncaused cause’;   
 
It is part and parcel of Darwin’s underlying philosophy that all intention has itself to 
be explained by a causal process.  This causal explanation has to show how the 
capacity to form intentions has itself gradually evolved in the human species, and 
also how individual intentions are formed in the psyche.  For Darwin, natural 
selection is part of these causal explanations. 
 
 Significantly, as Hodgson goes on to stress, intentionality does remain meaningful in 
Darwinism, but it too must submit to evolutionary explanation since ‘it too has evolved 
over millions of years’. In other words, human cognition itself has a causal story, it is 
both the product of natural selection and it operates on selectionist principles (Edelman, 
1992; Plotkin, 1994). Essentially, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, intentionality in the 
social domain is accommodated in the Darwinian conceptual framework, but, as an 
‘auxiliary explanation’. The critical point is that it definitely remains a part of the story. 
 The challenge for social scientists, perhaps, is to acknowledge (what they might 
perceive as) the seeming relegation of intentionality in the Darwinian explanation of 
social evolution and to allow the more realistic portrayal of cause and effect sequences 
therein.  This is certainly not to deny the significance of intention in social evolution but 
to appropriately assign its casual impact.  To illustrate, in addressing Witt’s (2004) 
concerns about giving human intentionality and insight their due role, Vromen (2004) 
makes the point that Darwin’s so-called ‘blind’ or ‘randomly selected’ variation does 
not discount or misrepresent phenomena in the social sphere.  Referring to Nelson and 
Winter’s concept of ‘search’, which denotes deliberative behaviour on the part of 
managers searching for new and better ways of seeking profits, he explains (p. 223); 
 
Search does not become less blind if firms only start searching if their profits 
threaten to fall below some critical threshold value.  Variation would only not be 
blind if firms were endowed with providence or perfect foresight so that success 
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were guaranteed … [I]t seems, as we just saw, that unless we equate intentional and 
insightful human behaviour with infallible behaviour displayed with perfect 
foresight, Universal Darwinism can account for this. 
 
 The critical point is that Darwinian selection works on the variation however this 
might have been produced. As Vromen goes on to clarify; 
 
When applied to individual human behaviour, ‘(cumulative) blind variation and 
selective retention’ does not imply that search for better ‘variants’ is conducted 
unintentionally, without any conscious thinking or thought, or whatever.   
 
 Indeed, as indicated earlier, this subtle theoretical point is born out by empirical 
observation where researchers stress the relative powerlessness of managers to control 
the organization’s destiny (Arrow, 1974; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). With reference to 
epistemological evolution, Hull (2001, p.123) below makes the exact same point; 
 
Once one looks at science as a whole … the effects of intentionality do not look so 
massive … All scientists are constantly trying to solve problems. Few do. Of those 
who do, only a very few are noticed.  There may well be a difference in kind between 
intentional and non-intentional behavior, but it is not a difference in kind that results 
in much of a difference in degree. 
 
 In summary, the issue of intentionality is undeniably an important one for the socio-
economic domain. And, because like adaptation, variety-formation and acquired 
character inheritance, its sociological interpretation is not associated with Darwinism, it 
is easy to see why social scientists have adopted and continue to use the Lamarckian 
perspective in their evolutionary theories. However, as outlined above, such usage 
presents conceptual limitations and significant tractability problems, all of which are 
becoming increasingly evident in the literature. Essentially, the misconceptions 
surrounding each of these processes have needlessly tied scholars into the Lamarckian 
perspective, and, a consequential theoretical cul-de-sac. The full implications of the 
Lamarckian commitment are summarized below. 
 
Implications of Lamarckism for Socio-Economic Evolutionary Theory  
 
A cross disciplinary survey of the literature shows that there is a clear polarization of 
evolutionary perspectives in the business economics and organizations studies literature. 
Various selection type approaches have tended to characterize much of the evolutionary 
economics literature (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953; Winter, 1964; Mokyr, 1990, 
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2000) reaching a conceptual zenith in the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1982), 
and these are complemented by an increasing number of ‘ecological’ or ‘selectionist’ 
type perspectives in organizations studies (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Burgelman, 
1991, 1994; Weick, 1979; Aldrich, 1972, 1979, 1999; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; 
McKelvey, 1982). However, the dominant approach in organizations studies shows a 
decidedly ‘prescriptive adaptive orientation’ (Burgelman, 1994), with few theorists 
giving much more than token consideration to the environmental context of 
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Why this important difference in emphasis 
by economists and organization scientists? Why the apparent choice in these 
evolutionary explanations between adaptation and selection, and why not an 
accommodation of both interconnected strands of evolutionary theory? 
 As has been glimpsed from the above overview of evolutionary theory, and how 
interpretations of Lamarckism compare to those of Darwinism, it would appear that 
there are a number of important reasons why theorists have expressed a preference one 
way or the other. With the organizations literature steeped in the behavioural theory of 
the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) and its notions of innovative, flexible organizations 
and purposive behaviour, Lamarckism, with its acquired character inheritance and 
notion of adaptation, clearly appears to present as the obvious model here. Whereas for 
business economists and some organizations scholars who prefer the more traditional 
emphasis on competition and macro-economic phenomena, it is the selection type 
explanations that have appeared better suited.   
 Evidently, however, scholars are now recognising problems and limitations with the 
Lamarckian model, and these have been triggered by empirical as well as theoretical 
observations. Reflecting the comments of Hodgson, Vromen and Hull above, for 
example, there appears to be a growing realization that much organizational change is 
largely uncontrolled and difficult to anticipate (Hannan, 1989 p.23; Murmann et al, 
2003). Hannan and Freeman thus led the way in organizations studies with their 
‘organizational ecology’ theory by downplaying the adaptationist perspective in favour 
of Darwinian selection processes. It was wrong, in their view, to suggest that major 
changes in organizational form were primarily the result of learning and imitation (p. 
22). Fellow sympathiser, Rindos (1985 p.65) goes one step further declaring that; 
 
The mode of transmission of cultural characteristics (“the inheritance of acquired 
traits”) is irrelevant to the applicability of a selectionist model for evolutionary 
change. 
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 However, whilst it is quite correct to argue, as Knudsen (2004, p. 160) has 
acknowledged, that it is possible to have selection without inheritance, the fact remains 
that the overarching theory is not so good. In fostering the narrower selectionist 
perspective and focusing only on macro-level phenomena, Hannan and Freeman end up 
ignoring the inheritance issue altogether and leave their theory impoverished as a 
result.78 As Baum and Singh (1994 p. 5) counter, selection is not the whole story, and 
indeed new studies are providing evidence that organizations can and do change 
(Amburgey et al, 1993; Baum, 1990; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Delacroix and 
Swaminathan, 1991). Inevitably such selectionist accounts exclude an important part of 
the evolutionary story by discounting micro-phenomena.  
 The question is does either approach offer the potential for a complete evolutionary 
theory of socio-economic change? The simple answer is no. As outlined in this and 
previous Chapters, Lamarckism is incomplete as an evolutionary theory, it needs the 
selection process and conceptual apparatus of Darwinism in order to work. And 
selection theory on its own is not able to explain change over time without some notion 
of continuity or conceptualization of an inheritance mechanism. Indeed the literature 
documents widespread dissatisfaction amongst theorists regarding this issue, with 
recognition that Lamarckism and strictly ‘selectionist’ interpretations of Darwinism 
represent only partial perspectives (Baum and Singh, 1994, Baum and McKelvey, 1999; 
Metcalfe, 2004; Ziman, 2002). Notably, in spite of their deliberate movement away 
from the Lamarckian adaptationist perspective towards the selectionist perspective, 
Hannan and Freeman do acknowledge the latter’s important limitations (1989, p. 20); 
 
We do not have anything resembling a fully developed evolutionary theory of 
organizational change.  Although we have learned a good deal about selection 
processes, we still know very little about the other side of the evolutionary process, 
the structures of inheritance and transmission. 
 
 Indeed, as indicated, the need to explain the mechanisms of transmission is a concern 
expressed by others who recognise both the limitations of the traditional Lamarckian 
perspective as well as those of the recent population ecology approach (Baum and 
Singh, 1994 p. 8);  
 
                                                 
78 Tellingly, however, Hannan and Freeman appear to believe that the two perspectives cannot be 
reconciled, (1989, p. 69) ‘The selection and adaptation perspectives are so different that it is hard to 
believe they are talking about the same things’. 
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by and large organizational ecologists have not attempted to link ecological 
processes of interaction and genealogical processes of replication.  Consequently we 
still know very little about the other side of the evolutionary process – the structures 
of organizational inheritance and transmission. How are organizational structures 
and practices perpetuated through time? What is inherited and how?   
 
 
 As illustrated here and in previous Chapters, resolution of these issues is to be found 
in a generalized Darwinism informed by developments in evolutionary biology.  
Significantly, the literature suggests that some social scientists are already moving in 
this direction.  
 
Towards a Unified Theory of Socio-Economic Evolution  
 
Evidently, inheritance or the transmission process, previous justification for opting for 
Lamarckian explanation in the social sphere, remains conceptually difficult for socio-
economic theories of evolution. A selection process is required as is a conceptual 
genotype and phenotype. The assumed tension between Lamarckism and Darwinism 
and erroneous view that Darwinism discounts intentionality, continue to thwart scholars 
who feel they must choose between ‘competing’ theories. And the Lamarckian 
conceptualization of adaptation misrepresents causal direction in evolution as well as 
the source of variety. Thus the challenge for social scientists, it would seem, is to revisit 
evolutionary biology, become acquainted with the recent developments in evolutionary 
theory, and explore the possibility of a Lamarckian explanation nesting in Darwinian 
theory.   
 There are important indications that this exploration has already begun. The explicit 
and implicit incorporation and development of the replicator-interactor distinction has 
already been noted, as has the widespread and implicit adoption of the Darwinian 
selection process in Lamarckian accounts. But there are also other significant 
developments, particularly in the organizations literature, which demonstrate an 
awareness of the explanatory potential of generalized Darwinism. Indeed, as indicated 
above, several authors are beginning to speak of Darwinian processes in terms of a 
general theory which accommodates Lamarckian inheritance mechanisms.  
 Other movements in this direction are seen in the theoretical and empirical works of 
scholars who argue that reconciliation of Lamarckism and Darwinism is the only way 
forward for socio-economic accounts of evolution.  For example, some argue that these 
are not conflicting perspectives but ‘complimentary’ (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983; 
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Scott, 1987; Singh et al, 1986). Whilst others venture that they are not ‘simply 
complementary’ but are in fact fundamentally interrelated processes of change 
(Levinthal, 1991, p. 144). Indeed, some see the adaptation versus selection debate as 
being about their ‘relative importance’ in explaining organizational change and survival 
(Miles and Cameron, 1982; Singh et al, 1986). And finally, in another synthesis 
Bruderer and Singh (1996, p. 1324) go as far as constructing a simple computational 
model to ‘argue theoretically that organizational learning (adaptation) guides 
environmental selection in a Darwinian framework of evolution’. Evidently for a small, 
but increasing, number of scholars the perception is that ‘a fruitful integration of these 
ideas is possible in some ways’ (Burgelman 1991).    
 Whilst there are differences in the detail and again in the interpretation of 
evolutionary theory, clearly the hypothesis of these authors is that Lamarckian 
inheritance may be accommodated in a Darwinian framework. And, as has been 
observed here, this is certainly possible within general Darwinism, although its 
realization and successful articulation is dependent upon the theoretical clarifications 
and conceptual refinements set out here and in previous Chapters.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
As noted at the beginning of Chapter 5, the theoretical advances and clarifications that 
emerged out of the units of selection debate have served to clarify, not only what is 
understood as a unit of selection and the important functional roles of replicators and 
interactors, but they have also served to clarify the vector of causality in evolutionary 
theory and the important interrelationships between the Darwinian principles of 
variation, inheritance and selection.  
 Having used these insights here to demonstrate the impoverishment of a strictly 
Lamarckian account of evolution it will now been shown in the following Chapter how 
they have also resolved the issue of group selection and paved the way for the 
conceptualization of multilevel selection theory. This is a significant development for 
socio-cultural theories of evolution, where scholars seek to conceptualize groups as 
units of selection and where there is evident confusion around the existence and 
articulation of multiple levels of analysis. Essentially it will be seen that clarification 
about the unit of selection simultaneously offers clarification about levels of selection. 
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 7     Group Selection and Multilevel Selection Theory 
 
 
 
There was a time when individualism reigned supreme both in evolutionary biology and 
in the human social sciences, creating an image of the individual as the only adaptive unit 
(or rational actor) in nature and of the group as merely a byproduct of what individuals do 
to each other.  Those days are over… 
 
Evolutionary biology is settling into a middle position that acknowledges the potential for 
adaptation and natural selection at all levels of the biological hierarchy, especially in the 
case of human evolution.  Group level adaptation is here to stay in evolutionary biology, 
and the human social sciences must follow suit to remain true to first principles.   
David Sloan Wilson (2002)  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the discussion here of multilevel selection theory and its relevance for the social 
domain, this Chapter brings evolutionary theory right to the cutting edge of its 
development. Essentially it shows that whilst the group selection issue has long since 
been resolved and its spin-off idea of multilevel selection thinking is quite well 
established in both the biotic (Gould and Lloyd, 1999; Keller et al, 1999; Eldredge, 
1985)  and the social spheres (Baum, 2002), the latter nevertheless remains conceptually 
underdeveloped. Evolutionary theorists are yet to fully understand the mechanisms 
involved when selection is working simultaneously at different hierarchical levels. Thus 
in the coverage here of the latest explorations of theory, the key issues pertaining to 
multilevel selection theory are highlighted. 
 It will be seen that at the centre of these developments are the recent clarifications 
about the conditions under which genetic group selection can occur, in other words 
when between-group selection dominates over within group selection. Theorists have 
been speculating about the mechanisms involved in sustaining intergroup variation, and 
posit that there must be some kind of structural constraints that militate against 
intragroup variation and which thus enable group variation to prevail. And from this 
emerges the notion of a higher level social replicator. Thus it quickly becomes apparent 
that group selection provides the important bridge to the conceptualization of multilevel 
selection theory, and that the replicator-interactor distinction is also key to this 
development, with the group, for example, being conceptualized as an interactor and 
higher level unit of selection in a hierarchy of multiple levels of interactors. 
 
 
From Group Selection to Multilevel Selection Theory 
 
The importance of this continuing theoretical and conceptual work for the socio-
economic domain cannot be overstated, for in the organization studies and evolutionary 
economics literature it is very apparent that group selection is assumed and that there is 
a fervent need to theorize about multiple levels of selection.79 Indeed the notion of 
group selection is of particular importance for theories of socio-cultural evolution where 
there is a patent desire to explain change in collective entities like organizations, firms 
and social groups. However, despite been variously invoked by biologists ever since 
Darwin (Sober and Wilson, 1998), as a result of William’s (1966) infamous 
condemnation of group selection in the 1960s the idea was then derided by biologists 
who perceived group selection as being unviable or of no consequence to biological 
evolution. Needless to say, this hampered the development of group selection in the 
cultural domain, where evolutionary theorists (Campbell, 1958; Heylighen and 
Campbell, 1995) were dissuaded from its serious contemplation, and where 
methodological individualism reigned supreme.  
 Today, however, the situation is quite different. The last fifteen years has witnessed 
the successful resurrection of the idea of genetic group selection in evolutionary theory, 
with Elliot Sober (1984, 1985; 1998), David Sloan Wilson (1994; 2002), Richard Boyd 
(1985; 1990) and Peter Richerson (1990) frequently cited as key architects of the group-
selection framework, and David Hull (1988) widely praised for the ontological work 
that enhanced its articulation. Although, as we are frequently reminded (Dennett, 1994; 
Reeve and Keller, 1999), group selection nevertheless continues to be misunderstood, it 
must be stressed that it is now broadly accepted by evolutionary scholars, and even 
biologists now permit the theoretical possibility of group-level selection in biotic life 
(Brandon, 1996; Field, 2002; Henrich, 2004). Indeed a significant number of natural 
scientists have been using group-selection as a working assumption for many years 
(Keller et al, 1999; Michod, 2000).   
 And, significantly, in terms of theory development in the social realm, it was 
assuredly this acknowledgement of group selection that facilitated the movement 
towards multilevel selection theory, and indeed it resulted in a theoretically productive 
period in which multilevel thinking became much ‘more catholic’ (Field, 2002 p. 47). 
Undoubtedly this is because implicit in the notion of group or higher levels of selection 
is the idea of selection occurring at multiple levels of the organizational hierarchy. 
                                                 
79 Indeed this is demonstrated in each of the case studies. 
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 However, as noted at the outset, whilst multilevel selection is recognized as the 
ultimate consequence of group selection and is increasingly being proffered in 
evolutionary explanations in both the biotic (Keller, 1999) and the social domains 
(Baum, 2002; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Aldrich, 1999; Field 2002, 2004), in contrast 
to group selection, it nevertheless remains underdeveloped as a theory (Hull, 2001) thus 
leaving scholars with major confusions over evolutionary theory. Some organization 
scholars, for example, investigate ‘intraorganizational’ selection, positing selection at 
the level of the routine or competence (Weick, 1979; McKelvey, 1982; Burgelman, 
1991, 1994; Miner, 1991, 1994), others investigate ‘interorganizational’ selection, 
positing selection at the level of the organization (Nelson and Winter, 1982), or even 
higher, at the level of the population and community (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; 
Baum and Singh, 1994; Aldrich, 1999). But although there is increasing 
acknowledgement of the hierarchical nature of these levels and recognition that these 
are somehow causally related (Baum and Singh, 1994; Baum, 2002), theorists continue 
to puzzle over how these causal relationships might be explained (Winter, 2003), and 
indeed for some these uncertainties continue to provoke disagreement over the ‘proper’ 
unit of selection and the true level at which selection takes place. 
 Certainly in organization studies and evolutionary economics, most empirical and 
theoretical investigations seem to point to multiple levels of selection, indeed the 
growing sympathy for multilevel selection thinking is implicit in the widespread 
adoption of the Campbellian BVRS model,80 with its acknowledgement of a social 
replicator, and moreover it is even implicit in the confusions that arise over units, levels 
and the replicator-interactor distinction (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Thus in recognition 
of the underdevelopment of multilevel selection theory and the obvious need for 
clarification, the present Chapter surveys the latest developments in evolutionary theory 
and the contributions from both the biotic and the social spheres to the construction of 
multilevel selection theory. 
 Whilst it is acknowledged here that multilevel selection theory is still very much at an 
exploratory stage, the following discussion will nevertheless demonstrate that important 
progress has been made. The Chapter will thus begin by drawing attention to the 
important interactor concept to signal its pivotal role in the conceptualization of both 
group and multilevel selection theory. This will be followed by a brief introduction to 
the logical possibilities for multilevel selection the details of which are explored later in 
                                                 
80 Campbell’s (1965) Darwinian ‘Blind-Variation Selective Retention’ model, the generic model which, 
‘opened the possibility of a theory of evolution of human systems freed from the constraining 
assumptions that genes are the only replicators’ (Galunic and Weeks, 2002).  
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the Chapter. And to pave the way for this analysis there will first be a brief summary of 
the group-selection debate where it will become apparent that this was fuelled by both 
the ‘units debate’ and by the related controversy concerning the evolution of altruism. 
And this will then lead into the important discussion of genetic group selection and its 
implications for multilevel selection theory and socio-cultural theories of evolution.  
 
The Interactor Concept and Multilevel Selection 
 
There is clearly a growing awareness that implicit in the notion of genetic group 
selection is selection at higher levels, and that implicit in the notion of multilevel 
selection is an ascending hierarchy of selectable entities. In the wake of the ‘units 
debate’ and resolution of the group selection issue, evolutionary biologists have 
acknowledged that it was Hull’s interactor concept and revamped ontology that at last 
enabled the formal articulation of the group as a higher level unit of selection, and thus 
facilitated the conceptualization of a multilevel selection framework (Brandon, 1990, p. 
78; Keller, 1999; Eldredge, 1985, 1986). Gould and Lloyd (1999, p. 11904) describe the 
import of this contribution in the following way; 
 
Two major clarifications have greatly abetted the understanding and fruitful 
expansion of the theory of natural selection in recent years: the acknowledgment that 
interactors, not replicators, constitute the causal unit of selection; and the recognition 
that interactors are Darwinian individuals, and that such individuals exist with 
potency at several levels of organization (genes, organisms, demes, and species in 
particular), thus engendering a rich hierarchical theory of selection in contrast with 
Darwin’s own emphasis on the organismic level. 
 
 This was undoubtedly a critical turning point in the development and articulation of 
evolutionary theory. As well as clarifying the selection process and the nature of the 
entity being selected, Hull provided a generalized terminology and an accessible way of 
thinking about these complex conceptual issues. It is clear, for example, that group 
selection does not deny individual selection, but merely expands the roster of interacting 
entities that qualify as ‘individuals’ (Gould and Lloyd, 1999). We recall that in Hull’s 
definition he described an interactor as an ‘entity that directly interacts as a cohesive 
whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be 
differential’ (1988, p. 408). Clearly this could be envisaged as applying to a wide range 
of collective entities. With the replicator, ‘an entity that passes on its structure largely 
intact in successive replications’, and following Sober (1984), in a multileveled scenario 
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where various species are interacting with their environment, there could be, for 
example, selection of a particular species, selection of a particular group within that 
species, selection of its corresponding organisms and, consequently, selection for its 
corresponding genes. 
 Indeed it becomes clear in Hull’s schema that in order to make any sense of multiple 
levels of selection it is crucial to embrace the replicator-interactor dynamic. Selection 
was defined by Hull as ‘a process in which the differential extinction and proliferation 
of interactors cause the differential perpetuation of the relevant replicators’ (p. 409) and 
evidently this process works at multiple levels. As Hull goes on to explain (my 
emphasis);  
 
Selection results from the interplay of these two subprocesses. Genes are certainly 
the primary (possibly sole) units of replication, whereas interaction can occur at a 
variety of levels from genes and cells through organisms to colonies, demes, and 
possibly entire species.  The units-of-selection controversy concerns levels of 
interaction, not levels of replication. 
 
 Undoubtedly, conceptualizing the ‘unit of selection’ in terms of interaction with the 
environment was a crucial stage in the conceptualization of the group as a unit of 
selection. And, as can be seen in the above passage, together with the replicator concept 
it clearly enables evolutionists to speculate about the formulation of multilevel selection 
theory, and indeed in the above Hull effectively outlines his own perception of how this 
might be construed. It is noted here that in Hull’s multilevel schema he was careful to 
point out that selection can occur at any level of the organizational hierarchy whereas 
replication tended to be concentrated at the primary or genetic level, ‘sometimes at the 
level of the organisms and possibly colonies, but rarely higher’ (1980, p. 324).  He did 
not, however, discount the possibility of replication at higher levels, but observed that 
the relationship was essentially a ‘one and many relationship’ (Brandon, 1990, p. 98) 
with one level of replication and several ascending levels of interaction.81  
 This formulation is, in fact, the one that is currently taken as given by evolutionary 
biologists in their empirical work (Reeve and Keller, 1999, pp. 3-5), but, as will be 
demonstrated in later sections it is not the only one currently being explored. Indeed it is 
suggested here that there are five logical possibilities for multilevel selection theory, 
                                                 
81 As Brandon (1996, p. 127) counsels however, ‘nothing in the definitions [of replicators and interactors] 
precludes one and the same entity from being both an interactor and a replicator’. 
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and in order to distinguish between them, these are presented below in table (1) in 
Hull’s generalized terminology.  
 
I Single level of replicators / Single level of interactors 
 
 
‘Traditional’, Single level 
theory 
II Single level of replicators / Multiple levels of interactors 
 
CONTINUUM BETWEEN BIOTIC AND SOCIAL 
Hull, Brandon, Mayr, Lewontin, 
Gould, Lloyd, Dawkins, Boyd, 
Richerson, Field, Henrich, 
Keller et al.   
III Single level of replicators / Multiple levels of interactors 
 
SEPARATE SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
For example, Ziman (2000) and 
co-authors were ‘divided’ over 
continuum between biotic and 
social realms. 
IV Multiple levels of replicators / Single level of interactors 
 
 
NOT VIABLE: NO 
ADHERENTS 
V Multiple levels of replicators / Multiple levels of interactors 
 
CONTINUUM BETWEEN BIOTIC AND SOCIAL 
Hull, Brandon, Hodgson, 
Knudsen, Campbell, Nelson and 
Winter, Boyd, Richerson, 
Henrich, Aldrich.  
 
Table 1 Logical possibilities of multilevel selection 
 
 The five possible positions of ‘multiplicity’ are identified as, I, the traditional single 
level of replicators and single level of interactors position; II, a single level of 
replicators with multiple levels of interactors position, as discussed above in relation to 
biotic evolution. This is where the social group is conceived as an additional level of 
interactor above the organism; III, this is exactly the same as position II except that it is 
perceived as applying ‘separately’ to the social domain;82 IV, this suggests a multiple 
level of replicators and single level of interactor position which is probably not viable; 
and, finally V is a position of multiplicity at both the replicator and interactor levels. 
 As illustrated in the table, position I is essentially the traditional Darwinian single 
level evolutionary theory from which all the others are derived. Position II is the single 
level replicator and multilevel interactor position described by Hull above, and is the 
one assumed by evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and indeed most other 
                                                 
82 In other words not in a continuum from the biotic to the social domain. 
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Darwinians. Position IV is logically not viable and thus has no adherents. And, finally 
positions III and V are the most interesting and relevant in terms of the social realm. 
Essentially whilst position III represents the expressed stance of some general 
Darwinists, position V more accurately represents their implicit position, and indeed the 
implicit position of most Darwinian accounts in organization studies and evolutionary 
economics, and indeed this is where the most promising research is currently taking 
place. 
 These configurations need a little unpacking but they will certainly become clearer in 
the discussion about group selection and social replicators. Essentially the difference 
between III and V highlights a very subtle distinction between interpretations of a 
generalized Darwinian position.  Basically, while some in position III see Darwinian 
multilevel selection, like variation, inheritance and selection, as ontologically grounded, 
in the sense that there are Darwinian entities and processes at multiple levels of the 
social hierarchy, they stop short of seeing them in an ascending continuum from the 
biotic to the social domain. As Ziman (2002, p. 312) and his co-authors explain ‘we 
were divided amongst ourselves on the fundamental issue of whether or not it is proper 
to see cultural evolution as a human extension of biological evolution, or as an entirely 
different type of process’. 
 In position V, on the other hand, which is essentially an ‘extension’ of position II, 
scholars are clear that there is a continuum between the two spheres, and that, as a result 
of recent theoretical work on group selection (Henrich, 2002, 2004) this is now clearly 
demonstrable. Indeed this position is most relevant to the thesis case studies and is thus 
the focus of the remainder of the Chapter. Position V basically suggests multiple levels 
of replication as well as interaction. It is endorsed by Hull (1980, 1981) and Brandon 
(1996), is implicit in much of the organization studies and evolutionary economics 
literature, and is currently being explored by Hodgson and Knudsen (2004a, 2004b, 
2004c, 2006a, 2006b) in their work on higher levels of replicators in the social domain.  
Crucially, the conceptualization and articulation of any multilevel account turns on the 
critical notion of group selection, and it is to this that the discussion now turns. The 
following sections trace the important developments in group selection theory and 
thereby usefully illustrate how it is possible to conceive of the notion of social 
replicators, and thus demonstrate position V above, and the conceptualization of a 
hierarchy of multiple replicators and interactors. The significance of this exploration for 
social theories of evolution will be highlighted, paving the way for a demonstration of 
the import of these clarifications in the case studies. 
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Units Debate, Group Selection and Altruism 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the units debate was born out of speculation amongst 
theorists about the locus of causality in evolution and identification of the true unit of 
selection. In the hierarchically organised biosphere evolutionists saw that natural 
selection could be applied to entities other than the organism, with some arguing that 
the gene was the unit of selection, others arguing that it was the organism and others 
suggesting that it was the group. Hull, untangled the units and levels confusion at the 
centre of the controversy, and presented the generalised terminology which ultimately 
clarified the roles of entities operating in selection processes.  
 Hull demonstrated how Dawkins and others were merging two quite distinct sub-
processes into one in the selection process, that of replication and interaction, and in this 
way confusing the role of the individual. Thus, where Dawkins misunderstood and 
diminished the role of the individual, as seen in his dismissive treatment of the vehicle 
and prioritization of the gene, Hull, in contrast, emphasized its critical role as an 
interactor and unit of selection.83 And, moreover, he also proposed multiple levels of 
interactors. 
 To be sure, in evolutionary biology the units debate is now a very stale argument, 
having long since been satisfactorily resolved. Indeed even Dawkins recognizes the 
significance of Hull’s replicator-interactor distinction and has changed his position on 
the interactor (phenotype) and its role in the selection process. And for scholars who 
deploy this perspective in their empirical work there is a perceptible irritation with those 
who continue to suggest otherwise, as illustrated in Keller and Reeve’s (1999, p. 3) 
remarks below; 
 
This issue emerges in cyclic debates about (a) whether genes or individuals are best 
seen as the true units of selection, and (b) whether groups of individuals can be units 
of selection. In our opinion, these questions have been satisfactorily answered 
repeatedly, only to reappear subsequently with naïve ferocity in new biological 
subdisciplines … The particularly frustrating aspect of these constantly renewed 
debates is that, even though they seem to be sparked by rival theories about how 
evolution works, in fact, they often involve only rival metaphors for the very same 
evolutionary logic and thus are empirically empty. 
 
                                                 
83 See Hull (2001, pp. 13-45) ‘Interactors versus Vehicles’, for an extended critique of the vehicle 
concept.  
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Altruism 
 
The conundrum at the heart of the debate about group selection was altruism and the 
apparent contradiction that this raised between individual and group level selection. 
Thus whilst theorists might agree about groups being interactors, and therefore units of 
selection, the issue of reconciling selection processes at different levels in a hierarchy 
still remains problematic.  Critics find it difficult to conceive of selection processes 
operating at two levels simultaneously. However, this possibility has also been 
convincingly demonstrated by several evolutionary scholars.  
 Wynne-Edwards (1962) famously provoked the controversy in evolutionary biology 
with the suggestion that natural selection was ‘for the good of the group’ or the species. 
Through his empirical studies of avian bird species, he demonstrated how behaviour 
considered detrimental to the individual had evolved to benefit the species.  So that for 
Wynne-Edwards and others (Allee, 1951; Emerson, 1960) altruistic behaviour clearly 
demonstrated that natural selection operated at the level of the group. 
 However, group selection was attacked by Williams (1966) who argued that the gene 
was the primary unit of selection and that selection did not occur above the level of the 
individual, since individual selection would always militate against any possible group 
selection force. Moreover, when confronted with the conundrum of cooperative or 
‘unselfish’ behaviour on the part of individuals he argued that a gene-selectionist 
account could also explain altruism. In what became a widely accepted explanation he 
proposed ‘kin selection’ to explain the selflessness observed among family members. In 
this view selfless acts were attributed to individual selection because individual 
sacrifices which were made for the welfare of family members ultimately translate to 
looking after ones own interests by securing the fate of the genetic endowment for 
future generations. Notably, Williams did not actually deny the theoretical possibility of 
group selection, however, he saw it as a cultural phenomenon, with no explanatory 
validity in biology.84   
 In summary, defined as ‘behaviours that decrease relative fitness within groups but 
increase the fitness of groups’ (Sober and Wilson, 1999 p. 99), altruism basically 
alludes to the idea of group-level adaptation or fitness, the idea that groups as individual 
wholes are differentially adapted to a common environment.  And this idea was 
countered by opponents who believed that the Darwinian explanation was limited to 
                                                 
84 Significantly, especially given the huge impact he has had on this debate, Williams has since renounced 
this position in a little known and infrequently cited publication (1992).  
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explaining behaviour that promotes the adaptive success of individuals only. 
Accordingly it was argued that cooperative group behaviour could not be reconciled by 
selection at the biological level where ‘within group’ or individual level selection 
pressures would always dominate.  Essentially, following William’s original position, it 
was widely believed that there was no continuity between the biological and the social 
realm.   
 
Genetic Group Selection and ‘Trait Group Selection’ 
 
However, as suggested earlier, faced with the theoretical challenge of explaining the 
coexistence of competition and cooperation, scholars came up with a variety of 
alternative explanations for altruistic behaviour. These included the theory of ‘inclusive 
fitness’ (Hamilton, 1964) or ‘kin selection’ (Maynard Smith, 1964), evolutionary game 
theory (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard Smith, 1982), otherwise known as 
evolutionary stable strategy, and selfish gene theory (Dawkins, 1976, 1982). However, 
as critics continue to point out, while such models may explain cooperation amongst 
small groups, none were able to explain altruistic behaviour among large groups of 
unrelated individuals in one-off encounters (Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Sober, 1999; 
Field, 2002, 2004; Henrich 2004). It has since been recognized that altruistic behaviour 
could only really be satisfactorily explained by genetic group selection. And this is 
where the analysis begins to more explicitly address the notions of social replicators and 
social interactors, and, to address the broader question of multilevel selection and how 
this relates to the socio-cultural realm. 
 Significantly, the aforementioned scholars and others (Wilson, 1975; Leigh, 1977, 
1983, 1991; Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Skyrms, 1998) have developed models which 
have consistently shown that there are conditions under which genetic group selection 
can occur, which would explain, for example, the evolution of altruistic behaviour, or 
‘pro-social’ behaviour. In a recent paper Henrich (2004) offers a very clear statement of 
these conditions. Using the Price (1970, 1972) equation, which partitions natural 
selection into individual and group level components, Henrich develops a multi-group 
model which emphasizes the difference between intergroup and intragroup variation and 
clearly illustrates how the evolution of ‘pro-sociality’ can be explained through genetic 
group selection.  He describes his ‘culture-gene coevolutionary’ approach below (2004, 
p. 12-15); 
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This perspective contrasts within-group selection, which acts against altruists who 
are exploited by free riders from their groups, to between-group selection that favors 
groups with more prosocial individuals because such groups can outcompete groups 
dominated by free riders … 
 
 Group selection or, more accurately, ‘genetic group selection’ occurs when the 
between-group component of natural selection acting on gene frequencies overcomes 
the within-group forces to favor an equilibrium different from that which would be 
favored by the within-group component acting alone. 
 Elegantly reiterating the argument of the aforementioned authors, Henrich essentially 
shows, through the logic of multilevel selection and Price’s partitioned selection forces, 
how the variation between groups can become more important than the variation within 
groups.  And, with his example of the evolution of pro-sociality, he demonstrates the 
evolution of group-traits and altruism, and thereby underscores the case for genetic 
group selection. Otherwise known as ‘new group selection’, ‘intrademic group 
selection’ or ‘trait-group’ selection, these types of models simply partition ordinary 
individual fitness into within and between group components (Reeve and Keller, 1999, 
p. 6).85
 What is noticeable about these models is that there is a focus on the cooperative 
aspect of evolution as opposed to the competitive (another one of Darwin’s 
‘dualisms’).86 And, notably, according to Henrich, it would seem that compared to other 
species, the extensive capacity of humans for social learning and cooperative behaviour 
is what largely explains cultural evolution. Alluding to the mechanisms that bind groups 
together (ultimately encapsulated in ‘group traits’ or social replicators) and increase 
their adaptive fitness, Henrich below, highlights the significance of this cooperative and 
imitative behaviour for maintaining intergroup variety whilst at the same time limiting 
intragroup variety; 
 
I argue that the nature of our cultural transmission capacities, and of human 
psychology more generally, creates stable equilibria consisting of combinations of 
cooperation and punishment that are not available to genetic evolutionary processes 
in acultural species. The existence of these additional, culturally evolved, 
behavioural equilibria make the group selection component of cultural evolutionary 
processes much more powerful relative to the within-group component than can 
occur in genetic evolution.  
                                                 
85 Reeve and Keller (1999, p. 6) and others point out that these models are mathematically equivalent to 
individual-selection (i.e., inclusive fitness) models and therefore do not point to a fundamentally different 
kind of evolution (e.g. Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Bourke and Franks, 1995). 
86 Mayr (1976) 
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 Thus, significantly, for evolutionary theory, the two strands of the group selection 
debate,  units of selection and altruism, have both been firmly resolved. The literature 
reveals that these ‘now stale’ debates (Reeve and Keller, 1999) have cleared the ground 
for further research into the relationships between the different levels of the 
organizational hierarchy. Indeed with this broad consensus amongst evolutionists on 
genetic group selection, and because its viability is now so easily demonstrable, it is not 
surprising that multilevel selection is increasingly being invoked in evolutionary 
explanations (Keller 1999).  
 To be sure, the above represents significant developments for social scientists 
working on socio-economic theories of evolution, where individual, as well as group 
level phenomena, are vital to their analysis and where meaningful explanations of the 
impact of micro-level phenomena on macro-level outcomes are sought. Indeed, as the 
remainder of this Chapter will now attempt to demonstrate, these theoretical advances in 
group selection are key to the conceptualization and development of general multilevel 
selection theory.  With the support of the conceptual apparatus associated with the 
interactor concept, a multilevel selection framework now becomes much more 
meaningful.   
 
The Adoption and Development of Multilevel Selection Theory 
 
So what is currently understood about multilevel selection theory and how is it being 
used?  As implied in the above discussion, multilevel selection theory tends to be 
thought of as an advanced articulation of Darwin’s original, ‘single-level’ theory.  Put 
simply, it is ‘the operation of natural selection - the motor of evolutionary history - at 
more than one level’ (Field, 2004, p. 2). The multilevel structure is now widely assumed 
and is evidently being adopted by evolutionists across the sciences. In evolutionary 
biology, for example, as Nunney (1998) has recently claimed,  
 
Such theory is already extensively applied in ways that enhance our understanding 
of gene frequency change; kin selection and gametic selection are examples that 
have been recognised for many years. 
 
 Indeed, scholars from several disciplines, who are working with the theory, have 
recently become aware of and are actively seeking to characterise one particularly 
important type of mechanism. In a recent work (Keller, ed. 1999) leading researchers 
from the fields of biology, genetics, ecology and psychology explore the juxtaposition 
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of competition and cooperation at multiple levels and investigating the impact of this on 
higher and lower levels. And the text is replete with citations of other scholars adopting 
the same approach.  Significantly, what is common to all these accounts, as well as 
those emanating from the social sciences, is the desire to uncover the mechanisms that 
sustain the intergroup differences; whether this is at the molecular or the cultural level. 
This is a critical question for the development of multilevel selection theory, and it is 
basically the question about social replicators. Crucially it is now acknowledged that at 
several levels of the biological hierarchy, mechanisms have evolved to prevent potential 
conflict between the different levels in natural selection (Keller, 1999), and scholars are 
now focusing on this dynamic. 
 Similarly it can be seen that the multilevel account is already being pursued by 
scholars in the social domain. Unsurprisingly Hull (1998) was one of the early 
investigators, with a convincing account of science as a selection process.  David Sloan 
Wilson (2002) produced a stimulating text on the evolution of religion, treating 
religious groups, like Hull’s scientific concepts, as selectable units.  Meanwhile, Landa 
(2004), with her case studies of businessmen in China, offers empirical evidence of 
social groups operating as adaptive units, through what she calls ‘homogeneous 
middleman groups’. And, Boyd and Richerson (2005), who continue to contribute to the 
field, recently published a book-length account of the evolution of culture. 
 It is demonstrated here that group selection theory provides the vital conceptual 
apparatus to explore such questions. In other words, group selection, via the replicator-
interactor distinction, not only provides the bridge to multilevel selection theory but also 
the crucial key to its further development. This becomes clear on reading Henrich and 
other theorists, where they underline the point, that for group selection to occur there 
must be some kind of mechanism that engenders or sustains the difference between the 
groups, such as the separate development of the groups, or some kind of ‘barrier’ to 
migration between the groups.  
 Thus what group selection theory suggests is that there must be some kind of 
structure which operates to constrain the variation within groups and at the same time 
maintain the variation between groups.  Clearly, so long as such a mechanism exists 
then group selection will occur.  Accordingly, as is being argued here, establishing the 
existence of such a mechanism facilitates the assertion of group and multiple levels of 
selection. The replicator and interactor concepts then guide the exploration of 
functionality at and between each level. 
120 
 In the following passage Field (2002) illustrates the same point for the social 
scientists, showing the link between group and multilevel selection theory, and 
expressing confidence in the leverage that a multilevel framework offers for the 
exploration of these evolved mechanisms. Here, for example, he refers to the ‘restraints 
on defection’ that will act to maintain variation between groups (p. 46);  
 
When one recognises in the context of multilevel models, that natural selection can 
sometimes favor behavioral predispositions not in the interest of the individual 
organism manifesting them, provided such predispositions give the gene(s) inducing 
them a fitness advantage, it becomes possible to tell a coherent story about the origin 
of restraints on defection and other behavioural tendencies essential to the 
emergence of complex social organization … Multilevel selection models provide a 
plausible explanation of key human behavioral propensities, an explanation that has 
proved maddeningly difficult within evolutionary frameworks allowing selection 
only at the level of the individual organism. 
 
 Significantly ‘group selectionists’ appear uniformly to propose some kind of 
mechanism that holds the group together and maintains the difference between it and 
other groups. And significantly, what this suggests is some kind of social replicator. 
Identify the social replicator and it is possible to identify what is being selected for in 
that particular group; what is the adaptive trait that favours this particular group over 
others? What binds it together? The mechanism is evident in Keller and Reeve’s (1999, 
p. 154) observation relating to social insect colonies; ‘the multilevel approach is useful 
because it is well-designed for the analysis of how socially mediated mechanisms that 
restrain within-group selfishness may evolve and remain stable.’  And, as Nunney notes, 
‘because cheats, by definition, are not following rules, we expect group-selected 
systems to evolve policing mechanisms’ (1990, p. 240).  And, in the early days of the 
revival of group selection theory, Boyd and Richerson (1985), proposed ‘conformist 
transmission’ (copy the majority) to describe the elusive stabilizing mechanism of the 
social world, a popular term which continues to be used in the literature (Heylighen and 
Cambell, 1995; Henrich and Boyd, 1998, 2000).   
 
Current Developments in Multilevel Selection Theory 
 
Linking these insights to the logical possibilities of multilevel selection theory it is now 
possible to at least categorize the developing formulations. Position II could be used to 
describe the work of Keller and his colleagues in the natural sciences, where following 
Hull they acknowledge that ‘entities from molecules of DNA, cells, and organisms to 
121 
colonies, demes, and possibly entire species interact with ever more inclusive 
environments in ways that bias replication’ (Hull, 2001, p. 61). It could also be used to 
describe the perspective adopted by Field and Henrich whose work on genetic group 
selection clearly demonstrates the continuity between the biological substrate and 
groups at the cultural level. Both theorists talk about the evolution of ‘prosociality’, 
perceiving cultural group selection as being instructive in bringing this into existence, 
and this position admits a single level of replicators, which in their case would be the 
biological gene, and a multiple level of interactors, which would include their individual 
organism and the cultural group. Significantly, this is the position that was originally 
denied by Williams but then later accepted. And notably, its perception of the group in a 
multileveled account is as an interactor.   
 Interestingly, however, Henrich’s perspective, as well as that of most other theorists 
commenting on socio-cultural evolution, is probably best described as position V.  We 
recall that Henrich explored the conditions under which between-group selection 
prevailed over within-group selection, the classic tension between individual selection 
and group selection. And, with regard to social groups he considered immigrating and 
emigrating ‘free riders’ and wondered why more variety was not occurring within the 
groups as a result.  He supposed that there must be something that militated against free 
riders in social groups and concluded that there had to be some kind of cultural structure 
that maintained the group within its boundaries.  Essentially, once it is established that 
such a structure exists and that it is somehow being maintained, the notion of a cultural 
group replicator emerges. And this begs the question, are there replicators as well as 
interactors in the social realm?  
 It is suggested here that this is indeed the case and moreover that this is what is 
implied in many socio-cultural evolutionary accounts.  In Science as a Process (1988), 
Hull observes that the replicators in scientific change are not genes and he posits instead 
things like, ‘beliefs about the goals of science, proper ways to go about realizing these 
goals, problems and their possible solutions, modes of representation and accumulated 
data’ (p. 434). He goes on to suggest that ‘scientists in their conversations, publications, 
and classroom lectures broach all these topics’ and that ‘these are the entities that get 
passed on in replication sequences’. Indeed the idea of a social replicator has been 
endorsed by several others (Brandon, 1996; Landa, 2004; Wilson, 2002), it was  
proposed in the ‘meme’ concept (Dawkins, 1976; Blackmore, 1999) and, as noted 
earlier, its conceptual viability is currently being explored by Hodgson and Knudsen in 
their work on ‘habits’ and ‘routines’.  
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 Certainly it would appear that position V is the most logical and promising 
multileveled framework given current development of theory. Indeed the exploratory 
work of Hodgson and Knudsen is demonstrative of its potential.  Building on Hull’s 
definitions and drawing on the important work of Henrich, they first suggest the firm as 
an interactor and clearly illustrate how we might conceive of a social group as a 
interactor and unit of selection (2004a, p. 298); 
 
Group selection occurs under specific conditions only.  The group itself has to be 
sufficiently cohesive and influential to overcome the adverse effects of immigration 
and emigration, thus minimizing the possibility of altruistic and other group-oriented 
behaviours being diluted and undermined by free-riders. There must be differential 
success of groups, that is due in part to the properties of groups, not merely to their 
components. In general, a significant degree of group structure and cohesion are 
required to make group selection meaningful (Henrich, forthcoming). In short, group 
selection operates when the individuals in the group are bound together in a 
sufficiently cohesive manner to share a mostly common fate. 
 
 It is in a follow-up paper on the replication of habits that Hodgson and Knudsen 
(2004b) then effectively propose extending the roster of entities that count as 
replicators, by positing individual habits and organizational routines as social 
replicators.  The justification for this follows from the above logic.  Where there is some 
kind of structure which persists and acts as a restraint on variation within the group, 
then the structural constraints or factors become the factors that are being selected for.  
The structures are effectively being selected because these are the things that cause the 
groups to vary between themselves rather than within themselves.    
 Significantly, for the purposes of this study, in addition to these explicit endorsements 
of position (V) and its notion of multiple replicators and interactors, there is the implicit 
acknowledgement of such a position in many of the evolutionary theories in 
organization studies and evolutionary economics.  Indeed it is apparent in two of the 
case studies here, in the work of Nelson and Winter and Aldrich.  Both theories assume 
group selection, they invoke the replicator-interactor distinction and they involve a 
multileveled selection account which mirrors the critical ‘one and many’ replicator-
interactor dynamic that ascends from a social replicator (organizational routine). 
Furthermore, there are increasing numbers of scholars in these disciplines who are 
recognizing the replicator interactor distinction (Baum and Singh, 1994) and are 
promoting the idea of multilevel selection (Baum, 2002).   
 As suggested earlier, however, whilst it is the view here that such accounts implicitly 
map on to position V, their authors, for the most part, would probably identify more 
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with position III. That is, with a separate ‘one and many’ replicator-interactor hierarchy 
which does not run in a continuum from the biotic to the social sphere (Ziman, 2000). In 
other words, even for Darwinians who acknowledge Darwinian entities and processes in 
the social world they still see conceptual separation between the two spheres. 
 In summary, although still very much at an exploratory stage, multilevel selection 
theory has significant implications for social theories of evolution, where group 
selection is assumed and multilevel selection is increasingly invoked. Significantly, as 
well as presenting the possibility of a more advanced and coherent evolutionary account 
of the socio-economic realm, position V multilevel selection theory and its central 
notion of group selection  is consistent with a raft of work already accomplished in the 
social sciences.  This is because position V essentially postulates ‘social structure’, but 
in addition, through the replicator-interactor concepts it also provides the tools to 
articulate change and continuity in such social structures.    
 
Implications for Evolutionary Theories of Socio-Economic Change  
 
A more inclusive theory of evolution which embraces multilevel as well as group 
selection would certainly have much to offer social scientists. Indeed evidence suggests 
a pressing need for the conceptualization and articulation of multilevel selection theory 
and certainly the need exists in the social sciences for its further development. In the 
case of Nelson and Winter, for example, it could help unravel some of the conceptual 
confusions around their unit of selection. The role of the firm is unclear in their theory, 
and further scrutiny suggests that they appear to be inadvertently promoting at least two 
levels of selection, in the shape of ‘organizational routines’ at one level, and the firm at 
another level. Following position II, multilevel selection theory would enable them to 
accommodate selection at the level of organizational routines as well as the firm.  
Alternatively, following position V, their ‘routines as genes’ analogy could become 
more ontologically grounded by asserting a higher level replicator at the organizational 
routine level.   
 Similarly for organization theorists like Aldrich and others, the multilevel approach 
and replicator-interactor dynamic, also appears to have a great deal to offer. While a 
replicator-interactor distinction is implicit in his account and Aldrich clearly assumes 
multilevel selection, his analysis nevertheless suggests that he is unaware of the most 
recent developments of theory. Undoubtedly, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 10, 
these insights would provide him with a much more incisive analysis. 
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 With Hannan and Freeman and the organizational ecologists, there was a decisive 
movement away from firm-level ‘adaptationist’ explanations of change towards the 
development of a population-thinking perspective which instead promotes a 
‘selectionist’ explanation of ‘adapting industries’. However, the problem with this 
perspective is that it is destined to tell only one part of the evolutionary story. Multilevel 
selection theory, however, would allow organizational ecologists to reinstate the firm in 
organization theory to a central position, and speak not only of adaptation of the 
industry but also of adaptation of the firm. Moreover, for the more traditional 
‘organization-level adaptationists’, multilevel selection theory permits a richer 
explanation of phenomena because, as indicated in the last section, they can hold on to 
Lamarckian explanations of change within a Darwinian multilayered selection 
framework.  Significantly, multilevel selection theory appears to dismiss the need for 
analysts to choose between adaptationist theories and selectionist accounts, enabling 
them seemingly to have both.  
 As suggested earlier, multilevel selection theory remains conceptually 
underdeveloped and indeed it is still very much at the exploratory stage. Nevertheless it 
is clear from the above discussion that considerable empirical, theoretical and 
conceptual progress has already been made and that multilevel selection theory has a 
great deal to offer evolutionary theorists in the social sciences. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The primary purpose of this Chapter and the preceding Chapters on the units debate and 
Lamarckism has been to bring evolutionary theory right up to date and to unpack the 
theoretical developments and conceptual refinements that demonstrate and articulate the 
general nature of Darwinian theory.  The secondary purpose has been to prepare the 
way for an incisive evaluation of the case studies featured in part III of the study. 
Equipped with a clear and modern understanding of Darwinism it becomes possible 
here to make the first in-depth and comparative analysis of the use of Darwinian ideas 
in the influential evolutionary theories of Nelson and Winter, Hannan and Freeman, and 
Howard Aldrich. 
 Through this modern Darwinian perspective, not only is it easier to perceive the 
implicit adoption of Darwinian ideas in these seminal accounts and interpret the nature 
of their use, but it is also easier to see where and how the theoretical developments offer 
important clarifications, plug gaps and enhance the theories. Indeed significantly, for 
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these particular socio-economic theories, what modern Darwinian theory has helped to 
reveal is that social evolution is both Lamarckian and Darwinian, and moreover that 
these apparently disparate theoretical perspectives, each with their own rich and vital 
contributions, may eventually be reconciled in the meta-theoretical framework of 
generalized Darwinism. Finally, as the following Chapters will continue to demonstrate, 
the Darwinian perspective has also helped to reveal the important signs throughout the 
literature that this ‘reconciliation’ is already underway, even witnessed, for example, in 
Nelson and Winter’s ‘Lamarckian’ account, which is shown here to be Darwinian.   
 Thus, it is to the case studies that we now turn and we begin with Nelson and 
Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of Evolution Change. 
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 Part III 
Case Studies in Evolutionary Economics and 
Organization Studies 
 
 
In sum, natural selection and evolution should not be viewed as concepts developed for 
the specific purposes of biology and possibly appropriable for the specific purposes of 
economics, but rather as elements of the framework of a new conceptual structure that 
biology, economics and other social sciences can comfortably share. 
Sidney Winter (1987) 
 
 
 
 8     Nelson and Winter's Evolutionary Theory of Economic  
Change: Hidden Darwinism 
 
 
 
No account of modern evolutionary economics can fail to relate to the authoritative and 
original work of Nelson and Winter (1982). It is they who provided the catalyst for the 
subsequent flowering of work in the area: the emphasis on routines, non-maximizing 
behaviour and the individuality of firms, the central role of markets as selection 
processes, and the resort to the computational simulation of evolutionary economics has 
defined the new paradigm framework for many.   
J. Stanley Metcalfe (1998)  
 
 
Introduction: The Darwinian Analysis 
 
Equipped with the necessary insights into Darwinian evolutionary theory, particularly in 
its formulation updated by recent insights, it is now possible in Part III of this study to 
focus on the case studies of Nelson and Winter, Hannan and Freeman, and Howard 
Aldrich, and to conduct an in-depth evaluation of their respective evolutionary theories. 
Accordingly, over this and the next two Chapters these seminal works will be compared 
and contrasted in their use of evolutionary theory and attention will be drawn to the 
Darwinian thread that unites them. Through this generalized Darwinian lens it now 
becomes much easier, not only to identify the Darwinian assumptions and theoretical 
underpinnings that are frequently just implied by the authors, but also to perceive the 
extent of the Darwinian contribution and to illuminate the precise nature of its adoption 
in their respective theories. Ultimately this perspective permits the incisive appraisal of 
the validity and potential of these evolutionary theories of socio-economic change by 
untangling confusions, revealing limiting assumptions, exposing gaps and 
inconsistencies and pointing the way to their resolution in the meta-Darwinian 
framework. 
 Thus through the ensuing analyses the relevance of the previously discussed 
theoretical and conceptual advances in Darwinian evolutionary theory will be 
demonstrated. It is shown how this abstract formulation makes sense of the entities, 
processes and events that these various authors seek to explain and offers solutions to 
their respective theoretical conundrums. In the unpacking of these case studies, it will 
be demonstrated, for example, how the resolution of the infamous ‘units debate’ and all 
the clarifications that subsequently followed, all have a critical bearing on the 
 
articulation, facilitation and enhancement of their theories of socio-economic evolution. 
It will be shown, for instance, how the ‘two-step’ selection process and corresponding 
replicator-interactor duality, provide critical clarifications about the type of entity that 
counts as a ‘unit of selection’ in the social arena (organizational routine, group, firm, 
organization, industry) and at what level, and indeed, at how many levels the process of 
selection can take place. It is also shown how the same developments address another 
common stumbling block for these scholars and permit the conceptualization of 
Lamarckian inheritance within the traditional Darwinian framework. Thus, in the case 
of Nelson and Winter, and to which the discussion now turns, after establishing its 
‘hidden’ Darwinian credentials, the Chapter proceeds by identifying the inconsistencies 
at the heart of the theory, and shows how these are manifested out of confusions over 
the selection process and the handling of Lamarckian inheritance.  
 
The Case of Nelson and Winter 
 
The first case study in evolutionary theory is from the field of business economics 
where the focus is on the celebrated Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), 
the seminal work of industrial economists Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter.  This 
evolutionary account shows Nelson and Winter to be amongst the very few economists 
since Veblen (1899) and Hayek (1967, 1982, 1988) to use the Darwinian principles of 
variation, inheritance and selection in an analysis of economic phenomena. Indeed 
Nelson and Winter’s authoritative tome represents a dramatic move forward in this 
regard and has served as a catalyst for the ‘flowering field’ of evolutionary economics.  
 Nelson and Winter’s remarkable achievement was to construct for the field of 
economics a dynamic theory which notably directly applies Darwin’s core principles of 
variation, inheritance and selection. In seeking to explain technological and economic 
change, they skilfully identified parallels between key entities and processes in the 
complex systems of economics and biology. For example, they equate organizational 
routines with genes, firms with organisms and the industry with species, and, central to 
the theory is an economic selection process described as resulting in the differential 
survival of firms within an industry. Significantly Nelson and Winter have effectively 
constructed for the economic domain a cumulative causal theory of evolutionary change 
that mimics the complex interweaving Darwinian processes of variety formation, 
character inheritance and natural selection. And, of equal significance, implicit in the 
theory is the replicator-interactor distinction and corresponding notions of a ‘social 
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replicator’ and ascending levels of interactors. Certainly, as shall be argued here, the 
theory meets the criteria set down by Dawkins (1983) and others (Plotkin, 1994; 
Dennett, 1995; Cziko, 1995) for ‘universal Darwinism’, and what is more it critically 
offers a dramatic illustration of the feasibility and potential of a general Darwinian 
theory (Hull, 1980, 1981; Brandon, 1990, 1996, 1999; Hodgson, 2005; Hodgson and 
Knudsen, 2006b). 
 Significantly however, in spite of these obvious Darwinian credentials, Nelson and 
Winter demonstrate a curious reluctance to claim their Darwinian heritage. The name of 
Darwin is mentioned only once in the text (p. 9) and this is more for the purpose of 
underlining Darwin’s earlier inspiration from the economist Thomas Malthus (1798) 
and the latter’s work on the problems of population growth and scarcity, than it is to 
acknowledge Darwin’s influence on their own thinking. Indeed, it is within this context, 
of the cross-fertilization of ideas, that Nelson and Winter explain their respective 
borrowing of evolutionary ideas from the sphere of biology, and where they 
emphatically state that their own theory is ‘unabashedly  Lamarckian’ (p. 11).   
 This evident reluctance to adopt a Darwinian label causes a certain amount of 
confusion however, not only in terms of the characterization of the theory, but also 
because of important issues it raises regarding the tractability of the theory. Moreover, 
at a general level it is demonstrative of the widespread tendency of evolutionary 
scholars in the social sciences to erroneously assume a mutually exclusive relationship 
between Darwinism and Lamarckism. This misapprehension, discussed at length in 
Chapter 6 above, has undoubtedly influenced the polarization of evolutionary 
approaches in the social sciences, where scholars have tended to identify either with 
Lamarck or with Darwin. As argued there, and will be now be demonstrated through the 
exploration of Nelson and Winter’s approach, Darwinism and Lamarckism are not 
mutually exclusive theories, and, furthermore, Lamarckian accounts are totally 
dependent on the Darwinian structure for their theoretical viability (Hodgson, 2001b; 
Knudsen, 2001).  
 In this Chapter the key strands of Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary framework are 
set out, highlighting both its explicit as well as its implicit assumptions.  By focusing on 
puzzling ambiguities in their use of evolutionary ideas and on a particular confusion 
around the selection process, it will be demonstrated here that these ambiguities are 
linked, both to their resistance to the ‘Darwinian’ label, and to an underestimation of the 
nature and scope of Darwinism in modern evolutionary theory.  In the light of the major 
clarifications achieved in evolutionary theory in recent years, it will be shown here that 
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not only is there a ‘hidden Darwinism’ in Nelson and Winter’s theory, but also that it is 
‘Darwinism’ that actually facilitates and enhances their theory.  
 Following Baum and Singh’s (1994) usefully observed categories, the main body of 
the Chapter will proceed by carefully examining the entities, processes and events that 
Nelson and Winter seek to explain. And in accordance with the central objectives of the 
thesis, an evaluation of these will be made from the modern Darwinian perspective, as 
outlined in the preceding four Chapters. A brief overview of the modes of evolutionary 
thinking in economics will first set the scene for Nelson and Winter’s contribution, and 
the Chapter will conclude with a reflection on the implications of their work for the 
further development of an evolutionary theory of socio-economic change.  
 
Evolutionary Economics 
 
Evolutionary economics is a small but expanding field.  In its various manifestations, 
including those strains inspired by the Darwinian evolutionary framework and self-
organization theory, it attempts to address the shortcomings of mainstream economics, 
and to frame a dynamic theory that facilitates analysis of the development of firms and 
industries as they interact and impact upon each other over time. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 above, the roots of the Darwinian perspective in economics can be traced 
back to Veblen (1898). Whilst Veblen promoted the Darwinian variation, inheritance 
and selection approach from which he derived the notion of ‘cumulative causation’ (p. 
387), others such as Marshall, instead favored a Spencerian and Lamarckian 
evolutionary approach where he emphasized the adaptive capabilities of the firm. 
 A significant turning point in the development of evolutionary economics is marked 
by the important later contributions of Alchian (1950), Downie (1958) and Winter 
(1964), which highlighted the importance of variety in explanations of change. Their 
work ultimately informed a different view of selection processes which critically 
acknowledged that variety drives change87 and with their shift to a population level 
analysis and focus on frequencies this opened up a novel way of thinking about 
competition, firm behaviour and market mechanisms. With the consequent movement 
towards a distributional view of variation, these scholars rejected the ‘typological 
essentialism’88  that was imbedded in the thinking up until that time and critically 
                                                 
87 Subsequently known as ‘Fisher’s Principle’ (1958) 
88 See Chapter 4 above for a discussion on the distinction between typological essentialism and 
population thinking. 
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effectively ushered into economics the same revolutionary population thinking 
perspective that was foundational to Darwinian selection theory.89 Marshall’s (1920) 
focus on ‘representative types’ and his dismissal of variety as unimportant was shown to 
be woefully misguided and a very limiting assumption. 
 However, the appeal to Darwinian evolutionary selection was heavily criticized, most  
notably by Penrose (1952) who famously dismissed the use of biological analogies in 
economics. And while others, such as Schumpeter and Hayek, subsequently developed 
‘evolutionary’ accounts of economics it is important to note that these were not in the 
Darwinian mode (Hodgson, 1993). Schumpeter (1976), for example, explicitly rejected 
the use of biological analogy (1954) and instead talked about an evolutionary process in 
the Marxian (1867) sense of ‘development’, in the sense, for example, of the unfolding 
of a predetermined process. And Hayek (1988), building on the concept of group 
selection, proposed another evolutionary approach based on the concept of ‘spontaneous 
order’. Such approaches are seen to have influenced the evolutionary perspectives of 
Witt (1997, 2004) and Foster (1997) who are similarly critical of the Darwinian 
biological analogy, and who build their evolutionary approaches around the concepts of 
self-organization, novelty, discontinuity and change. Resistance to the idea of using 
biological metaphors in economics and post-war concerns about Social Darwinism90 
continue to influence the variation in theory. However, as demonstrated here through 
the analysis of Nelson and Winter’s theory, recent efforts by evolutionists to clarify 
Darwin’s deceptively complex selection process and its attendant mechanisms of variety 
formation and inheritance, have paved the way for more tractable socio-cultural theories 
of evolution.   
 Indeed, as discussed in earlier Chapters, Darwinism has been promoted by some 
evolutionary economists as the only general evolutionary theory which comprises a 
conceptual framework that is easily transferable to the complex socio-economic 
domains. It enables in economics, for example, the abandonment of orthodox 
equilibrium and maximization assumptions and the adoption instead of a dynamic 
approach that embraces more realistic (‘routinized’) behavioural assumptions. As 
Hodgson (2004, p. 8) explains, ‘Darwinism provides a specific framework for 
understanding the evolution of all open, complex systems, that have varied and 
replicating elements with different capacities to survive’. To be sure, the literature 
                                                 
89 See Metcalfe (1987), who presents a detailed review of the development of thinking that led to its 
eventual adoption in evolutionary economics.  
90 See Chapter 2 above for detailed discussion of objections to Darwinism in the social sciences 
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suggests that it is the Veblenian strand of evolutionary economics that is now being 
most vigorously pursued by evolutionary economists, explicitly by some and implicitly, 
as argued in Chapter 1, by most other authors. 
 The impetus behind the above developments is undoubtedly partly due to advances in 
biological evolutionary theory and its improved articulation and accessibility both 
within and outside biology. It is also worth underlining the point that economists, 
including Nelson and Winter who notably inspired this recent flourishing of 
evolutionary economics, were working in milieu where Darwinian ideas were becoming 
a frequent part of academic discourse (Laurent, 2001), they were inevitably absorbing 
the language as well as the value of the biological metaphors and analogies, particularly 
in relation to adaptation and the selection process. With the population thinking 
perspective already imbibed, scholars were more receptive to the Darwinian treatment 
of variation, continuity and change, and it is clear that the notion of group selection was 
quickly assumed.  
 Nonetheless, in spite of this and the early Darwinian influences in economics 
(Veblen, 1898; Campbell, 1965), the development towards a full Darwinian account has 
been thwarted by confused interpretations, and the varying assimilation of Darwinian 
ideas often within Lamarkian interpretations of evolutionary change. Adaptationist 
thinking and Lamarckian explanations of causality appear to have presented certain 
theoretical obstacles and where the Darwinian perspective has been adopted these have 
tended to be only partial ‘selectionist’ accounts.  
 Consequently Nelson and Winter’s work represents a very significant development in 
evolutionary economics. These scholars were the first economists since Veblen to 
actually apply the three core Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection 
to economic phenomena. With the firm at the centre of the analysis Nelson and Winter 
constructed a comprehensive evolutionary explanation of change which portrayed a 
plausible micro-to-macro level causal story. They had the critical Darwinian selection 
process as the dominant evolutionary force and yet, significantly, they also 
acknowledged purposive behaviour and firm-level adaptation as being causally 
significant through their adoption of the Lamarckian inheritance mechanism. The 
detailed investigation of this remarkable work will now follow. 
 The aim here is to evaluate Nelson and Winter’s use of biological evolutionary 
theory, to illustrate the parities that they draw between the spheres of biology and 
economics, and to ultimately call attention to the hidden Darwinism in their 
evolutionary theory of economic change. Beginning with an outline of their theoretical 
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framework and moving on to an examination of their handling of their key entities and 
processes, the analysis highlights the ontological similarities that Nelson and Winter 
identify between the biotic and social spheres, and draws attention to the implicit 
Darwinism in their theory. Observing the Lamarckian dimension it then goes on to 
illustrate problems with the theoretical tractability of the theory and to indicate their 
resolution in modern general Darwinism. It becomes apparent that a replicator-
interactor distinction is implied, that Nelson and Winter clearly posit the notion of 
‘social replicators’, and that ambiguities around their selection process are rooted in a 
confused but implicit multi-level selection theory. The upshot is that as well as 
demonstrating that the social sphere is both Darwinian and Lamarckian the theory 
reveals how it is general Darwinism, in its modern formulation, that both facilitates and 
indeed enhances their theory.91
 
Theoretical Framework of an Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
 
Nelson and Winter’s underlying objective was to achieve improved understanding of 
technological change and the dynamics of the competitive process (1982, p. viii).  An 
interest in the processes of long-run economic development combined with 
dissatisfaction with standard views of economic behaviour led them to explore the 
potential of the evolutionary viewpoint. For Nelson and Winter this pointed towards a 
‘more realistic economic theory’ which was capable of accommodating important 
insights from other disciplines on firm behaviour. 
 The main problems with orthodox economic theory for Nelson and Winter are the 
maximization and equilibrium assumptions. That is, maximizing behaviour on the part 
of firms, and equilibrium outcomes at the industry level.  In contrast, what they choose 
to emphasize, through a dynamic evolutionary perspective, is ‘routine’ behaviour on the 
part of firms, and the ‘development’ of industries over time (pp. 4-5). What they sought 
to highlight through this approach, in contrast to the prevailing view, was the relative 
inflexibility of individual firms in the face of changing economic environments.  In an 
approach that nevertheless does not discount the import of firm level activity, they 
basically assume a population level perspective which promotes an ‘economic natural 
selection’ process that moulds the industry over time. 
                                                 
91 See Chapters 2 and 3 above where it is shown how general Darwinism accommodates the Lamarckian 
inheritance mechanism. 
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 Through their implicit population thinking perspective, Nelson and Winter clearly 
place the firm at the centre of their analysis and portray it as the unit of selection. Thus 
there is the immediate acknowledgement of the conceptualization of the group as an 
‘individual’ in the selection process. And in a reflection of the genotype-phenotype 
distinction, this firm is simultaneously portrayed as being comprised of a host of 
‘organizational routines’ which determine its nature and characteristics. And again, in 
their insightful analysis of the evolutionary paradox of continuity and change, in a 
representation of the Darwinian model (Mayr, 1976), they identify this organizational 
routine as being a source of both inertia and innovation for the firm. Clearly, on the face 
of it, what is being observed here is the classic Darwinian ‘single level’ selection 
process.92
 
Organizational Routines 
 
In terms of the construction of their evolutionary account, the organizational routine is 
highlighted by Nelson and Winter as one of the three ‘basic concepts’ of their 
evolutionary theory (p. 400). It is defined by Nelson and Winter below (p.14); 
 
Our general term for all regular and predictable behavioural patterns of firms is 
‘routine’.  We use this term to include characteristics of firms that range from well-
specified technical routines for producing things, through procedures for hiring and 
firing, ordering new inventory, or stepping up production of items in high demand, 
to policies regarding investment, research and development (R&D), or advertising, 
and business strategies about product diversification and overseas investment.  
 
 Evidently, and significantly, Nelson and Winter’s concept of an organizational 
routine covers a whole variety of firm level activities. And, as indicated above it is these 
that define the characteristics of individual firms. Indeed through their courageous and 
enlightened use of analogy Nelson and Winter explicitly liken the organizational routine 
to the biological gene in the way that it functions in evolutionary selection processes. 
The genotype-phenotype duality is clearly implied. As illustrated in the following 
passage, the routine plays an important role both in the continuity or persistence of 
traits, as well as in their decisive development or change; 
 
                                                 
92  For the purpose of clarity, in the context of this thesis, the description, ‘single level’, is used to denote 
the classic Darwinian process of natural selection merely in order to distinguish it from the notion of 
multi-level selection. See Chapter 7 above. 
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In our evolutionary theory, these routines play the role that genes play in biological 
evolutionary theory.  They are a persistent feature of the organism and determine its 
possible behaviour (though actual behaviour is determined also by the 
environment); they are heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s organisms generated 
from today’s (for example, by building a new plant) have many of the same 
characteristics, and they are selectable in the sense that organisms with certain 
routines may do better than others, and, if so, their relative importance in the 
population (industry) is augmented over time.  
 
 It is understandable from this detailed definition why Nelson and Winter identify the 
organizational routine as being one of their key concepts.  It elegantly permits a micro 
to macro causal explanation which acknowledges firm-level activity but nevertheless 
privileges selection processes. Indeed from the above it is clearly possible to discern the 
coming together of their evolutionary story, one which, it cannot be denied, looks 
remarkably similar to the neo-Darwinian synthesis (Darwinism and Mendelian 
genetics),93 with the key evolutionary elements of variety, inheritance and selection also 
being indicated in the last, long sentence. Significantly, the treatment of the 
organizational routine also appears to anticipate the more recent developments within 
general Darwinism, specifically multilevel evolutionary theory, which is indicated in 
their suggestion of multiple social replicators and interactors. Before exploring this 
point further, however, the analysis will consider what Nelson and Winter identify as 
the two other defining features of their evolutionary theory, that is the ‘search’ process 
and the ‘selection environment’.  Together with the organizational routine, these 
usefully serve to indicate the full flavour and scope of the theory. 
 
Search 
 
Nelson and Winter’s second basic concept is labelled ‘search’. Search refers to all the 
organizational activities ‘which are associated with the evaluation of current routines 
and which may lead to their modification, to more drastic change, or to their 
replacement’ (p. 400).  Search, via the activities of ‘higher level’ routines, is portrayed 
as a firm level process that essentially covers the various ways that firms respond to 
their environments. As Nelson and Winter explain; 
 
We have stressed that these kinds of activities are themselves partly routinized and 
predictable, but that they also have a stochastic character both from the point of view 
                                                 
93 ‘Neo-Darwinism’ is often used in the biological literature to denote the synthesis in the 1950s of 
Darwinian evolutionary theory with Mendelian genetics.  However, confusingly, it is also sometimes used 
to refer to the reductionist approach of ‘ultra-Darwinists’. 
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of the modeler and the point of view of the organization that undertakes them.  
Routines in general play the role of genes in our evolutionary theory.  Search 
routines stochastically generate mutations. 
  
 In other words, ‘search’ is how Nelson and Winter describe firm-level adaptation, it 
refers to a sort of selection process, in the sense of choice, a shifting through 
alternatives on the part of decision makers.94 It should be noted, however, that the 
concept of search is key to the theory in another important respect which is not 
immediately apparent in the above. This is with regard to Nelson and Winter’s 
inheritance mechanism.  As indicated in the preceding paragraph, search activities are 
firm level activities, and they illustrate the various ways that firms change in response to 
their environment.  Through this feedback activity, search thus indicates a Lamarckian 
inheritance mechanism, or the notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.  In 
other words by changing in response to environmental stimuli, Nelson and Winter’s 
firms are essentially changing their routines in the process, routines that will then be 
passed down to ‘tomorrow’s organizations’. By analogy the organism is effectively 
changing its genetic makeup and passing on acquired changes to its offspring; thus this 
is clearly Lamarckian inheritance and indicates why Nelson and Winter describe 
themselves as Lamarckian. 
 
Selection Environment 
 
Nelson and Winter’s third basic concept is the ‘selection environment’ and this refers to 
their selection process.  They describe the selection environment of a firm or 
organization as being (p. 400); 
 
The ensemble of considerations which affects its well-being and hence the extent to 
which it expands or contracts.  The selection environment is determined partly by 
conditions outside the firms in the industry or sector being considered – product 
demand and factor supply conditions, for example – but also by the characteristics 
and behaviour of the other firms in the sector. 
 
 Again the biological analogy is clearly called upon as Nelson and Winter go on to 
explain that differential growth plays much the same role in their theory as it does in 
biological theory.  Again revealing an uncanny resemblance to the Darwinian 
                                                 
94 This ‘selection’ is separate to and different from the selection process that takes place at the level of the 
organization, and, as will be discussed in later sections, it is key to the ambiguities that arise around 
Nelson and Winter’s elucidation of the selection process.  
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exposition, an astute awareness of causality in evolution, and thus the framing of their 
own theory, Nelson and Winter explain that ‘it is important to remember that it is 
ultimately the fates of populations or genotypes (routines) that are the focus of concern, 
not the fates of individuals (firms)’. 
 
Entities, Processes and Events, and Implicit Darwinism 
 
The above outline of Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of economic change has 
essentially identified its key entities, processes and events as the authors themselves 
prioritise and summarize them. In an attempt at further clarification and to assist the 
evaluation of the theory from a Darwinian perspective, these are here briefly 
summarized and contextualized. The main entities that Nelson and Winter seek to 
explain are organizational routines, firms and industries. The processes they seek to 
explain are variety creation, continuity or inheritance processes, and competition or 
selection processes. And the broad events they seek to explain are change in 
organizational form and change in industry over time.  In summary, these relate to each 
other in a theory which is structured in a hierarchical fashion, with the organizational 
routines at the primary level, then the firm and then the industry. Accordingly it can be 
described as a ‘bottom-up’ theory, in the sense that Nelson and Winter attempt to 
explain macroeconomic phenomena in terms of the effects of microeconomic 
phenomena.  In other words, technological change, at the level of the routine, explains 
economic, or industrial-level, growth. 
 In this section Nelson and Winter’s entities, processes and events will be examined 
through a modern Darwinian lens to evaluate how they work together as an evolutionary 
theory. With reference to the theoretical and conceptual insights explored above, in Part 
II, it will be shown here how such excursions into evolutionary biology undeniably 
enhances understanding of the peculiarities of evolutionary theorizing (Vromen, 1995). 
Moreover, they also provide a vantage point that decisively uncovers the hidden 
Darwinism in Nelson and Winter’s theory. 
 Thus, through a careful analysis of Nelson and Winter’s work the intention here is to 
underline the implicit adoption of Darwinian ideas in their theory and thus reinforce the 
general nature of Darwin’s theory, and by implication, the ontological similarities 
between the biotic and social domains. However, as noted, because of the authors’ 
explicit and insistent identification with Lamarckism, and because of the consequential 
ambiguities in their use of evolutionary ideas, this assertion and its clarification has not 
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been without its problems.  Indeed the uncovering of a particular confusion with regard 
to the selection process is to be my case in point here.   
 Significantly, while Darwin’s core principles of variation, inheritance and selection 
may all be discerned in their theory, Nelson and Winter avoid identifying these as 
Darwinian.  A close reading of the text, however, shows that the authors nonetheless 
implicitly assume the ‘generalizability’ of these adopted Darwinian principles.  
Evidently they recognized in biology a general theory that could help them understand 
the specificities of the social world.  
 The important thing to emphasize here is Nelson and Winter’s ground-breaking 
achievement in the application of Darwinian principles to economic phenomena, and 
furthermore, that this accomplishment presents an incredible irony, given that Darwin is 
mentioned only once in the text.  As will be shown below in the unpacking of the 
theory, in spite of the confusing rhetoric associated with the attachment to Lamarckism, 
this theory really has moved beyond mere analogies, it is evolutionary, and it is 
Darwinian.  And so the analysis now turns to the Darwinian analysis of its construction 
and demonstration therein of the decisive movement from analogy to ontology 
(Hodgson, 2002b). 
 
Darwinian Entities: Firms and Organizational Routines 
 
It has been asserted above that Nelson and Winter have constructed a cumulative causal 
theory of economic change that mimics the complex interweaving Darwinian processes 
of variety formation, character inheritance and natural selection. We will begin to 
explore how they achieve this by examining their elementary unit of analysis, the firm, 
looking at the nature of its construction and its destiny as it functions within these 
evolutionary processes.  Significantly, from a modern Darwinian perspective, in Nelson 
and Winter’s description, below, of the firm, the Darwinian interactor and replicator 
entities are immediately discernable (p.4); 
 
Our firms are modeled as simply having, at any given time, certain capabilities and 
decision rules.  Over time these capabilities and rules are modified as a result of both 
the deliberate problem-solving efforts and random events.  And over time, the 
economic analogue of natural selection operates as the market determines which 
firms are profitable and which are unprofitable, and tends to winnow out the latter. 
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 In terms of the distinguishable entities that operate in evolutionary processes, the 
firm, in the above, is likened to the individual organism or ‘phenotype’ in the biotic 
sphere.  And this is the entity which interacts with the environment and upon which 
selection operates.  In other words this is Nelson and Winter’s ‘interactor’. The 
interactor, as discussed in previous Chapters, was defined as ‘an entity that directly 
interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction 
causes replication to be differential’. Throughout the text Nelson and Winter’s treatment 
of the firm is consistent with this definition, as indeed it is with the definition of the 
corresponding replicating entities. In a recent article, which builds on Nelson and 
Winter’s work in this area, as well as that of other scholars on the concepts of replicator, 
interactor and selection, Hodgson and Knudsen (2003) demonstrate that there is indeed 
a case for regarding firms (and similarly cohesive institutions) as interactors. 
 It is important to note here that in the above passage Nelson and Winter’s merging of 
Lamarckism with Darwinism is both very typical and very clear. The ‘deliberate 
problem-solving efforts’, for example, refers to feedback from the market upon which 
firms act. They respond to market stimuli and change strategy accordingly. This clearly 
refers to the Lamarckian inheritance mechanism, and indeed ‘Lamarckian’ is how 
Nelson and Winter describe their theory. However, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 
above, Lamarck did not develop a selection process, or a way of explaining why some 
adaptations survived whilst others did not, thus Nelson and Winter deploy the 
Darwinian selection mechanism. 
 Returning to the Darwinian entities, the authors notably describe the firm as having 
certain capabilities and decision rules, by which they mean ‘behaviours’ that are 
comprised of and partly determined by gene-like entities. And this alludes to their 
second important evolutionary entity, identified by Nelson and Winter as 
‘organizational routines’, likened by them to the genotype, and again easily 
recognisable as Hull’s replicating entity. The replicator, we recall, is defined as ‘an 
entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications,’ and from the 
earlier introduction to the organizational routine, which, for explanatory purposes, is 
repeated below, the consistency with modern Darwinian evolutionary theory is similarly 
apparent (p. 14).  
   
In our evolutionary theory, these routines play the role that genes play in biological 
evolutionary theory.  They are a persistent feature of the organism and determine its 
possible behaviour (though actual behaviour is determined also by the 
environment); they are heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s organisms generated 
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from today’s (for example, by building a new plant) have many of the same 
characteristics, and they are selectable in the sense that organisms with certain 
routines may do better than others, and, if so, their relative importance in the 
population (industry) is augmented over time.  
  
 In the exploration of how Nelson and Winter handle the firm and the organizational 
routine of which it is comprised, it is then possible to perceive the corresponding 
Darwinian processes of variation, inheritance and selection. For Nelson and Winter 
evidently the routines act like genes in biotic life; they replicate, mutate and are 
inherited, differentially, by the next generation.  Those routines or capabilities that 
render the firm best adapted to its environment will be the routines that survive through 
the selection process into the next generation. In their characterization of the firm they 
are clearly alluding to the modern Darwinian perception of the organism, as advanced in 
genetics and molecular biology, and articulated in the generalized replicator and 
interactor concepts.  As discussed in Chapter 4, Mayr (1988) refers to this as the 
‘peculiar dualism’ of the organism, where the organism possesses a historically evolved 
genetic program which is coded in the DNA. 
 Thus to reiterate the explanations of earlier Chapters, the genotype (replicator) is the 
genetic composition of an organism whereas the phenotype (interactor) is its developed 
characteristics or capacities. In other words, the phenotype is the physical manifestation 
of the genotype; the physical or behavioural characteristics or capacities. The phenotype 
is what is generally understood as the actual organism. Undoubtedly Nelson and 
Winter’s description of routines and their relationship with the firm approximates to this 
understanding of the organism’s duality. The firm is effectively ‘shaped’ or 
characterized by the routines which in turn represent the firm’s replicating heritable 
entity. 
 Accordingly, to summarize the biological parities in terms of entities, the firm is the 
variable interactor that competes with other organisms in a selection process, routines 
are the replicators, the heritable entities that sometimes make imperfect copies of 
themselves and are equivalent to the gene, and the industry is clearly the species that 
evolves over time. To complete the parities and generalized terminology here, the 
species, denoted as ‘lineage’, are those entities that do not function in selection but 
which ‘result from successive replication’ (Hull, p. 409), and they are implicated by 
Nelson and Winter in their conceptualization of the industry. Lineage is defined by Hull 
as ‘an entity that persists indefinitely through time either in the same or an altered state 
as a result of replication’.  There are evidently clear parallels in the use of the terms with 
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regard to the entities and, as a result, also it would seem, with the processes.  But what 
specifically do Nelson and Winter say about the nature of their evolutionary processes?   
 
Darwinian Processes: Variation, Inheritance and Selection 
 
Although Nelson and Winter are not explicit about it, variation is clearly assumed as 
part of their evolutionary story, with, in the above quotation (p. 8), for example, 
differential survival suggested in the reference to the selection of ‘organisms with 
certain routines’.  Variety is plainly assumed throughout the text, indeed without variety 
there would be no selection; variety is implied. As suggested above, they are more 
explicit, on the other hand, about the existence of an inheritance mechanism when they 
talk, for example, about routines being inherited and routines influencing the behaviour 
of organisms.  Routines are described, for example, as being persistent, durable, copied, 
imitated and ‘passed on’ to tomorrow’s firms. So an inheritance mechanism is also 
plainly assumed as part of the theory.    
 Nelson and Winter are similarly much more explicit about the selection process, one 
of their ‘basic concepts’, and again, it is emphatically a Darwinian selection process 
clearly rooted in a distributional mode of analysis or, in other words, the population 
thinking perspective. Indeed, having described the process by which the operating 
characteristics of the more successful firms come to define an industry, they describe 
the mechanism as being ‘analogous to the natural selection of genotypes with 
differential net reproduction rates in biological evolutionary theory’ (p. 17).   
 
Darwinian Events: Change and Causality 
 
It would appear then that there are parities with generalized Darwinism both with 
entities and with processes. But what about causality and the overall structure of Nelson 
and Winter’s theory? Through their assumptions about these entities and their 
interpretations of the core processes, can it be said that there are parities in their 
explanations of change?  Certainly it is clear from the quotations above that Nelson and 
Winter perceive the Darwinian ‘derived’ sense of selection applying to the routines, and 
thus, by implication, the Darwinian explanation of causal direction. Significantly 
Nelson and Winter are plainly describing the economic equivalent of genes being 
selected as a consequence of the organism being selected.   
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 As discussed in Chapter 5 above, conceptual clarification of this ‘indirect selection’ 
of genes, with the properly apportioned location of causality, was greatly assisted by 
Sober’s (1984) observation that there was ‘selection of’ an object and ‘selection for’ a 
property. In the generalized Darwinian terminology this amounts to ‘selection of’ an 
interactor and the ‘selection for’ its replicator. Thus Nelson and Winter also appear to 
demonstrate parity with the Darwinian evolutionary account in the overall structure of 
their theory, and, importantly therefore, with its explanation of change at the firm and 
industry level.  
 Nelson and Winter’s theoretical framework evidently mirrors the classic hierarchical 
organization of gene-based biological evolution which has genes at the bottom of the 
hierarchy followed by the organism and then the species. And, significantly, central to 
this explanatory formulation is the critically important Darwinian conceptualizations of 
a replicating and interacting entity.  They may not acknowledge that they are 
generalising Darwinism, but in their use of biological analogies this is undeniably what 
they have achieved. 
 Thus, whether implicit or explicit, Nelson and Winter’s use of evolutionary concepts 
is Darwinian. As indicated above, and will be elaborated below, through Nelson and 
Winter’s use of evolutionary ideas, Darwinian entities and their corresponding 
processes can be perceived. Nelson and Winter implicitly assume the generalizability of 
Darwin’s core principles. To be sure, they actually apply the general principles, and in 
so doing crucially confirm the ontological similarities between the biological and social 
domains and demonstrate the significant theoretical shift from analogy to ontology 
(Hodgson, 2002). 
 
The Lamarckian Dimension 
 
Demonstrating the true Darwinian pedigree of Nelson and Winter’s theory, however, 
presents certain challenges, not least of which is the authors’ explicit allegiance to 
Lamarckism and the confusion that this generates for the articulation of their theory.  
Before moving on to these tractability problems the analysis looks first at the 
implications of one important aspect of Nelson and Winter’s Lamarckian association 
that appears to be based on a rather narrow reading of Darwinian theory. It will be 
shown how the widespread misapprehension about the relationship between Darwinism 
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and Lamarckism may have contributed to the confusion.95
 In a rare articulation of their process of variety formation Nelson and Winter suggest 
that its source and perpetuation is due to the ‘Lamarckian’ adaptive behaviour of firms. 
Indeed they describe their theory as being Lamarckian for two important reasons, 
namely, ‘the “inheritance” of acquired characteristics and the timely appearance of 
variation under the stimulus of adversity’ (p. 11). However, significantly, although they 
appear to have, what they perceive to be an alternative explanation for variety formation 
(i.e., innovation, imitation, mutation of firms) and evolutionary change, in other words 
Lamarckism, this does not render their theory non-Darwinian (Vromen, 2004). The 
point is, as explained at length in Chapter 6 above; Darwinism and Lamarckism are not 
mutually exclusive theories. 
 The implications of the Lamarckian explanation is that it essentially amounts to a 
reversal in the causal direction of evolution, where in the absence of selection it is the 
environment that is perceived as the driving force of change (Mayr, 1982); effectively 
meaning that variations and evolutionary change are the result of phenotypic (firm-
level) adaptations to the environment.  However, whilst the notion of acquired character 
inheritance has become discredited in biology, and it will be seen that the Lamarckian 
dimension presents certain theoretical problems for Nelson and Winter’s theory, the 
important point is that Lamarckian character inheritance can be accommodated within 
the meta-theoretical framework of Darwinism to present a tractable evolutionary theory 
for the social domain. 
 Evidently for Nelson and Winter, it is Lamarckism that best explains the processes of 
variety formation and inheritance in the social domain. And indeed it must be 
acknowledged that they are certainly not alone in this view. The causal explanation 
traditionally borrowed from evolutionary biology by social scientists is overwhelmingly 
that of Lamarckism (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Burgelman, 1991; Singh and Lumsden, 
1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1990). The process of individual firms adjusting strategy, 
adapting to the prevailing conditions and thereby changing their form and then 
reproducing that new form, undoubtedly reflects Lamarckian ‘within-generation’ 
inheritance as opposed to Darwinian intergenerational inheritance. 
 However, as discussed earlier, although organization theorists and others have tended 
to perceive Lamarckism as an ‘alternative’ to Darwinism (Bruderer and Singh, 1996), 
Darwin himself did not perceive the notion of acquired character inheritance to be 
irreconcilable with his theory of natural selection. Moreover it was clearly shown in 
                                                 
95 Discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 above. 
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Chapter 6 that Darwinism and Lamarckism are not mutually exclusive, but that 
Lamarckism is ultimately dependent on the theoretical foundations of Darwinism.  
Thus, significantly, for the social domain, whilst Lamarckism cannot stand alone as an 
evolutionary theory, acquired character inheritance can be ‘nested’ in Darwinian theory 
(Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001). And this is especially clear in the modern 
articulation of Darwinism, where ‘alternate’ inheritance mechanisms, or domain-
specific mechanisms, are easily accommodated within a meta-theoretical Darwinian 
framework.96
 Thus, it would appear again that Darwinism can be demonstrated in Nelson and 
Winter’s theory.  Although they identify their processes of inheritance and variety 
formation as Lamarckian, the theory is nevertheless Darwinian. Lamarckism essentially 
‘nests’ in Darwinism as an auxiliary explanation. Can it therefore be argued 
unequivocally that Nelson and Winter’s theory is Darwinian?  In other words do the 
mechanisms and processes function in the same Darwinian way?  As suggested above, 
this is where it becomes more complex.  
 
Theoretical Tractability 
 
Having set out all the important parities that Nelson and Winter posit with Darwinian 
ideas (notably mostly implicit), it is now time to turn attention to their interpretation of 
these, and ultimately to the theoretical tractability of the theory. Indeed, a closer look at 
Nelson and Winter’s selection process, and at how they interpret inheritance and variety 
creation reveals significant ambiguities and it becomes much harder to discern the 
degree of equivalence with Darwinian evolutionary theory, much less its tractability. 
Three interrelated problems become apparent. Firstly, there is a distorted portrayal of 
the ‘organizational hierarchy’, secondly there is confusion surrounding the ‘level of 
selection’ and thirdly there is the misapprehension about Lamarckian inheritance.  Three 
propositions emerge from this configuration of problems. The first is to suggest that 
Nelson and Winter’s theory is at least a dual level selection theory; the second is to 
suggest that as a consequence they mistakenly identify it with Lamarck, and the third is 
to suggest that it is in fact a multilevel selection theory.   
 These propositions and their implications for a Darwinian analysis will be explored 
by focusing on Nelson and Winter’s process of selection. This appears to be the root of 
                                                 
96 See Chapters 2 and 3 above where it is made clear that general Darwinism does not claim to be a 
complete theory, and is dependent on the peculiarities of the mechanisms in the particular domain under 
study. 
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the problem for the theoretical tractability of their theory and it generates the three-fold 
problem referred to above. It is important to be clear about the unit of selection, the 
selection environment and the level of selection assumed, and to consider whether these 
correspond with the organizational hierarchy and causal mechanisms of Darwinian 
evolution. Significantly, as we proceed with this and untangle the problems with the 
selection process, it will become even more apparent why the theory logically implies a 
Darwinian framework. And furthermore, it will also be shown that resolution of these 
theoretical problems resides in the theoretical advances and conceptual refinements 
achieved in modern general Darwinism. A brief look at Nelson and Winter’s own 
comments on their use of evolutionary ideas will serve as a useful backdrop to these 
propositions.  
 
Biological Influences 
 
Nelson and Winter openly acknowledge the ‘borrowing of basic ideas from biology’ (p. 
9). Indeed they declare the right of economists ‘in perpetuity’ to do so, given that 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection was itself inspired by the economist,  Thomas 
Malthus. However, and this point is worth bearing in mind with regard to theoretical 
coherence, they stress that theirs is a ‘flexible’ use of biological ideas, which they will 
adopt and amend to suit their own purposes ‘depending on the purpose of the particular 
inquiry’ (p. 11);  
 
We are pleased to exploit any idea from biology that seems helpful in the 
understanding of economic problems, but we are equally prepared to pass over 
anything that seems awkward, or to modify accepted biological theories radically in 
the interests of getting better economic theory.  
 
 As already noted, if Nelson and Winter align themselves with any name from biology 
it is with that of Lamarck, who is mentioned on numerous occasions in the text. 
Although it has already been established that this does not render their theory non-
Darwinian, it would seem that the ‘flexible’ perspective, adopted through the limited 
lens of the Lamarckian inheritance mechanism, raises other conceptual problems for the 
theory. It is argued here that the resulting ambiguities relating to the selection process 
are the reasons why, on closer inspection, Nelson and Winter’s important parities begin 
to break down. 
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The Selection Process: Ambiguities 
 
The point is that on the face of it Nelson and Winter’s theory hangs together; there is a 
Darwinian story going on - in terms of entities and processes as well as cause and effect 
relationships. However there is confusion around the use and meaning of the terms.  For 
example, they are ambiguous about what they identify as the ‘unit of selection’ and, at 
what level the selection process is supposed to operate. In the quotation below, for 
instance, Nelson and Winter clearly identify the firm as the unit of selection and they 
seem to be fairly consistent with this throughout the text (p. 17);   
 
Profitable firms will grow and unprofitable ones will contract, and the operating 
characteristics of the more profitable firms therefore will account for a growing 
share of the industry’s activity. 
 
The selection mechanism here clearly is analogous to the natural selection of 
genotypes with differential net reproduction rates in biological evolutionary theory.  
And, as in biological theory, in our economic evolutionary theory the sensitivity of a 
firm’s growth rate to prosperity or adversity is itself a reflection of its ‘genes’ 
 
 In the above, Nelson and Winter clearly indicate a Darwinian selection process, 
suggesting, as they do, the firm’s replicator-interactor duality by equating the routines 
(operating characteristics) with the genotype and the firm with the phenotype. And, 
moreover, they correctly imply selection of the firm and selection for the routines.  
 However, and here we raise the important problem around selection, whilst Nelson 
and Winter explicitly identify the firm as the unit of selection they also confusingly, 
elsewhere, seem to be suggesting the routines as units of selection (as opposed to being 
a property of the interactor which is ‘selected for’ (Sober, 1984).  It is important to note 
that within their extensive range of routines Nelson and Winter distinguish among three 
broad classes of routines. These are arranged in an operational hierarchy which they 
describe below (pp. 16-18); 
 
We assume a hierarchy of decision rules with higher-order procedures (for example, 
scrutiny of the currently employed production technique …) which act occasionally 
to modify lower-order ones (the techniques used to make a particular part …).  And 
there may even be procedures of a still higher order, such as occasional deliberations 
regarding the adequacy of present research and development policy … 
 
 Evidently all of the above firm behaviours come under the general term, ‘routine’.  
And significantly under this umbrella term we can see that Nelson and Winter seek to 
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embrace techniques and operating characteristics as well as a hierarchy of decision 
rules. For our purposes here it is important to note that decision rules in Nelson and 
Winter’s theory essentially allude to ‘choice’ or ‘choosing’.  It is thus significant that 
different types of routines appear to play subtly different roles in Nelson and Winter’s 
evolutionary theory.  For example, they expressly want to distinguish between 
techniques and the choosing of techniques as well as to distinguish between ‘low order’ 
decision rules and ‘high order’ decision rules.   Clearly some of Nelson and Winter’s 
routines are ‘selectors’ in the sense that they choose amongst a range of other routines.  
This effectively means that the firm is doing the selecting and crucially, that routines are 
thereby also units of selection.  It is implied that routines are being selected by the firm 
in the process they describe as ‘search’, outlined above.  Searching for new and better 
routines is likened, by Nelson and Winter, to the process of ‘mutation’ in the biotic 
sphere, the process of change at the genetic level. But search, as indicated, is 
simultaneously portrayed as a selection process.  Accordingly, does this therefore mean 
that Nelson and Winter are proposing an additional level of selection? 
 
Additional Levels of Selection? 
 
To what extent then could Nelson and Winter’s theory be described as a dual or 
multilevel selection theory?  It is suggested here that they unwittingly end up 
developing, at the very least, a dual-level selection theory. That is, with selection 
operating at the level of the firm, and of the routine, and possibly at several additional 
levels of routine.  Dual level selection can certainly be discerned, it is implicit and, 
indeed, as we shall come to see, it makes sense of their theory.  This proposition will be 
examined by looking at how Nelson and Winter explain their ‘search process’, their 
economic equivalent of genetic mutation (p. 18);   
 
These routine-guided, routine-changing processes are modeled as ‘searches’ in the 
following sense.  There will be a characterization of a population of routine 
modifications or new routines that can be found by search.  A firm’s search policy 
will be characterized as determining the probability distribution of what will be 
found through search, as a function of the number of variables … 
 
A few lines later;  
 
Our concept of search obviously is the counterpart of that of mutation in biological 
evolutionary theory.  And our treatment of search as partly determined by the 
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routines of the firm parallels the treatment in biological theory of mutation as being 
determined in part by the genetic makeup of the organism. 
  
 In the above passages, Nelson and Winter seem to want to claim two roles for their 
‘search’ process, one being ‘change’ and the other, ‘selection’.   It is true that genetic 
mutation in biological theory is partly determined by its genetic environment, and genes 
do interact with each other in a process described as epitasis.  But the critical point is 
that genetic mutation, or change, occurs at the level of the gene prior to the selection 
process which happens at the level of the phenotype and not as a result of the phenotype 
acting on the genotype.  This is effectively what Nelson and Winter are suggesting. 
 In the first passage above, as elsewhere in the text, we are told that the ‘the firm’ has 
a search policy.   The firm’s search policy is activated through the firm’s ‘higher level 
routines’ which act upon the lower level routines.  Although they evidently talk about 
routines effecting the change, what Nelson and Winter are also actually saying is that 
the firm is doing the selecting.  In other words there is a selection process operating at 
the level of the routines as well as at the level of the firm. 
 
Selection Process: Confused Causality 
 
The direction of causality clearly seems to be confused here and this has very important 
implications for Nelson and Winter’s explanation of evolutionary change. With regard 
to the ultimate explanation of cumulative change, on the face of it, the ‘routine-guided, 
routine-changing processes’ suggests gene-based causality, with the genotype (partly) 
determining the phenotype and the selection process operating directly upon the 
phenotype. But then the ‘firm’s search policy’ suggests the opposite, that change is 
effected by a selection process activated by the firm, in other words, with the phenotype 
determining the genotype. They talk, for instance, about a class of routine, notably 
‘higher level routines’, which make the ‘search- type’, strategic decisions about change 
in the firm.  Nelson and Winter clearly specified a distinction between ‘choosing’ type 
routines and other routines, with the former being at a higher level than other routines. 
In other words, some routines are seeking out other, ‘better’ routines. Thus there 
appears to be a blurring of boundaries between the interacting entity and the replicating 
entity because of the way that the ‘firm’ and the ‘routine’ have been conceptualized in 
Nelson and Winter’s search process.  Is it therefore the case that Nelson and Winter are 
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introducing additional levels of selection in the organizational hierarchy?  If they are, 
then this is certainly not being articulated. 
 Confusingly, as suggested, Nelson and Winter explain their search process as though 
the firm is selecting the routines.  In other words, the firm seeks to change in order to 
improve its performance in the market so it adopts or ‘selects’ better routines, these 
become incorporated into its portfolio of organizational routines which are then passed 
on to the next generation. Clearly, in biological terms this amounts to Lamarckism – the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics – where changes that occur to the organism 
during its lifetime are somehow translated back to the genetic material and are then 
passed on to the next generation. 
 The critical technical point here, which can again be illustrated through the biological 
analogy, is that whilst mutation in biological theory is partly determined by the 
organism’s genetic makeup, mutation or ‘change’ is not simultaneously ‘selected’ by 
the organism. This would appear to reverse or certainly confuse the causal direction of 
evolutionary theory. Thus there is confusion about exactly what entity is being selected 
which generates further confusion about explanations of change in the firm. As Sober 
(1984) made clear, the overall structure of evolutionary selection theory dictates that 
selection happens at the level of the phenotype; there is selection of phenotypes, and 
genotypes are selected for as a consequence of the organism being selected. The 
organism itself does not do the selecting. 
 The confusion is brought about by the apparent double-meaning of Nelson and 
Winter’s term, ‘search’.  Search, as demonstrated above, implies both ‘change’ 
(mutation) in the Lamarckian sense of variety formation, and ‘selection’ in the sense of 
choosing, which is a very different form of selection from the traditional evolutionary 
sense of selection (Knudsen 2004).  Nelson and Winter conflate the two meanings in 
their term ‘search’, and then describe this ‘process of search’ as happening 
simultaneously with a second higher level of selection, i.e., selection of the firm.  In 
other words, when we consider Nelson and Winter’s description of the hierarchy of 
routines there is at the very least an implied second level of selection, internal to the 
firm, which is then coupled with the ‘traditional’ selection process. In fact, as indicated 
above, it could be argued that they suggest several levels of selection, given that there 
are several levels of routines that are being selected. As a consequence, does this mean 
that Nelson and Winter’s theory is a multilevel selection theory?  Or is it best described 
as Lamarckian?   
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The Lamarckian Assertion  
 
In a later passage where Nelson and Winter are discussing the search process, the 
Lamarckian conclusion is perceptible and it again indicates why Nelson and Winter call 
themselves Lamarckian, because essentially, in biological terms, what they are 
describing here is the inheritance of acquired characteristics.  Note the relevant passage 
below and bear in mind that in the above analysis ‘search’ refers to selection of the 
routines (a firm activity), and that below the word ‘selection’ is referring to the selection 
of firms (p. 19);  
 
Search and selection are simultaneous, interacting aspects of the evolutionary 
process: the same prices [routines] that provide selection feedback [to the firm] also 
influence the directions of search [routine]. 
 
 In the above, firms are essentially described as responding to the competitive 
environment of ‘other firms’ in the industry and changing their operational routines as a 
result.  In other words, they ‘acquire’ phenotypic changes and these become part of the 
genotype, the genetic make-up; thus Lamarckian inheritance. 
 It is argued here that because Nelson and Winter found the theory logically implying 
that the organism is effectively changing the genes, they didn’t recognize this as 
Darwinian and thus labeled it Lamarckian. Because they perceived that theirs is not 
‘Darwinian inheritance’ it had to be Lamarckian inheritance. However, as has been 
shown in this analysis, they nevertheless also realized that they needed the Darwinian 
framework, with its selection process, for their evolutionary theory to work. It is thus 
suggested that this seeming theoretical inconsistency is the root of the problem in the 
construction of their theory and it explains why multilevel selection processes are 
implicit in the theory.   
 Before moving on to speculate about additional levels of selection it is important to 
be clear about the Lamarckian component of Nelson and Winter’s theory and the 
implications of this for its theoretical tractability. The most important thing to reiterate 
is that Darwinism and Lamarckism are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the incorporation 
of Lamarckian inheritance does not detract from their theory. Moreover, in the 
justifiable effort to put the firm at the centre of their theory and to incorporate ‘bottom-
up’ explanations of change, as characterized in the traditional Lamarckian adaptationist 
formulation, Nelson and Winter have created a comprehensive evolutionary theory that 
nevertheless still mimics the explanatory scope of Darwinism. Significantly, the 
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critically important replicator and interactor entities are present and these not only 
indicate modern Darwinian evolutionary theory, but they also crucially facilitate the 
articulation and inclusion of the Lamarckian inheritance mechanism that is central to 
Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006b).97  In the 
following section the discussion recalls the other developments in Darwinian 
evolutionary theory which similarly facilitate a clearer understanding of the 
evolutionary processes and which ultimately provide reconciliation of Nelson and 
Winter’s theoretical conundrums and enhancement of their theory within the meta-
theoretical framework of general Darwinism. 
 
Generalised Darwinism and Multilevel Selection Theory 
 
If, as has been argued above, Nelson and Winter’s theory has selection occurring at 
more than one level, what does this mean for the theory?  Can it still be viable? And can 
it still be Darwinian?  The answer to both is a resounding ‘yes’.  Modern Darwinism 
now acknowledges that selection can happen at multiple ascending levels of the 
evolutionary hierarchy. Indeed as demonstrated in Chapter 7, multilevel selection theory 
is now widely respected in evolutionary biology (Nunney, 1998; Keller, 1999), where 
Hull’s (1988) generalized terminology has greatly assisted its conceptualization and 
articulation. The relevance of this for Nelson and Winter’s theory, as Hodgson and 
Knudsen, (2006a) have demonstrated, is that it permits the notion of selection 
happening simultaneously at ascending levels of the organizational hierarchy.  
 The notion of multilevel selection theory was very much dependent upon the 
important theoretical leap, in the philosophy of biology, from the traditional single 
level, to multiple level selection theory, a development which was dependent on the 
important notion of group selection.  As discussed in Chapter 7, this was crucial in 
terms of the relevance of evolutionary theory to the cultural domain. In the wake of an 
apparent dearth of inquiry in the 1970s and 1980s into the possibility of group level 
selection, eclipsed by the then influential gene-centred approaches of Williams (1966) 
and Dawkins (1976), there finally followed a productive period in which multilevel 
thinking became more accepted (Field, 2002).  
 This important development, which facilitated the conceptualization of the selection 
of groups by thinking of them in terms of cohesive units, was preceded by Hull’s 
                                                 
97 Hodgson and Knudsen (2006b) demonstrate how the genotype-phenotype distinction is critical to the 
articulation of both Lamarckian as well as Darwinian evolution. See Chapter 6 above. 
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aforementioned modification of ontology in the philosophy of biology; an ontology that 
emerged out of the considerable debate and confusion within biology in the 1960s and 
1970s surrounding the ‘unit of selection problem’ (Lewontin, 1970). As noted, it 
eventually became apparent to evolutionists that two distinguishable questions had 
become conflated in the units of selection debate; ‘one has to do with the units of 
replication, the other with the units of interaction’ (Brandon, 1999 p. 617). There was 
confusion over the identity of the ‘unit of selection’ and the level at which selection 
occurred, with some theorists focusing on the ‘unit’ (the gene, the group or the species) 
for their analysis, while others focused on the ‘level’ of organization for their analysis.   
 It is perhaps, therefore, unsurprising that such ambiguities as have been discussed 
here in relation to Nelson and Winter should have arisen. Certainly there is confusion 
surrounding the unit of selection and the level at which selection operates in their 
theory.  As illustrated above Nelson and Winter’s search process is conflated with their 
selection process. Evidently an imperative exists to identify only one unit of selection, 
which they identify as the firm, but the tension becomes apparent when one explores the 
search process and finds a second level of selection emerging at the level of the 
organizational routine.  
 As indicated above and elaborated in Chapter 7, the ultimate outcome of the ‘units’ 
debate in biology was ‘multilevel selection theory’ which acknowledges, amongst other 
things, ‘groups’ as Darwinian entities and, in the biotic sphere that selection occurs at 
more than one level. We recall that an early critical stage in this theoretical direction 
was recognition of natural selection as a two-step process, where the first step involves 
a replicating process and the second step is where the actual process of selection is 
involved. This is where ‘selection proper’ operates, on the individual organism 
interacting with its environment. As Mayr explained, it is the second step that acts upon 
the previously produced variation and it is not a process which itself produces variation. 
I would suggest that in Nelson and Winter’s quotation above about search and selection 
they are unknowingly attempting to articulate Mayr’s two-step process. There seems to 
be an intuitive understanding on their part of this curiously confusing process of natural 
selection. 
 
Generalized Darwinism 
 
Having unpacked Nelson and Winter’s comprehensive evolutionary theory, illustrated 
its hidden Darwinian heritage, and revealed its complex theoretical challenges, it now 
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remains to demonstrate resolution of the later and further advancement of the theory 
through the general Darwinian perspective. Here we revisit the key developments 
discussed in Part II and show their relevance for the clarification and enhancement of 
Nelson and Winter’s theory. 
 Following Mayr, it has been shown that the next crucial stage in the development of 
Darwinian theory was the further refinement of terms, and as will be demonstrated here, 
this bodes well for Nelson and Winter’s theory. It has now become much clearer to 
evolutionists what happens with the entities at each level of the evolutionary hierarchy. 
Hull (1981) essentially set out a more accessible general hierarchy, indeed, a much 
needed ‘revamped ontology’ (Eldredge, 1986). As noted, his distinctive approach to 
evolutionary theory was to focus on the evolutionary process itself, to investigate its 
general characteristics and then to consider which entities had the requisite 
characteristics to function in the evolutionary process. In an important passage (repeated 
from Chapter 5 above) Hull points to the source of the confusion, and in his reference to 
the generalized evolutionary terminology, he shows how an abstract general theory of 
evolution is released from the constraints of biological assumptions (2001, p. 21); 
 
One reason why evolutionary biologists have been unable to discover universal 
regularities in the evolutionary process is that they are not comparing like with like.  
They are dividing up the organizational hierarchy inappropriately. The appropriate 
levels are not genes, organisms, and species as they are traditionally conceived, but 
replicators, interactors, and lineages. 
 
 This approach enabled Hull to endorse Mayr’s interpretation of the selection process 
as being a two-step process and then to skilfully take the analysis further, by marking a 
functional distinction between the two steps. Hull perceived not units of selection as 
such but two different entities with different roles within a single selection process. He 
basically identified the causally significant distinction between a replicating entity and 
an interacting entity and, with the focus on functionality, as opposed to any 
predetermined view of organizational hierarchy, he demonstrated their relevance to a 
general evolutionary selection theory.  
 Hull’s carefully constructed conceptual framework admirably addresses the question 
of causality in the selection process and evidently resolved some of the anomalies that 
precipitated the unit of selection debate, all of which have an important bearing on the 
conceptualization of selection processes in the social domain. Ultimately, as elaborated 
in Chapter 7, through the conceptualization of the group as a unit of selection, it also 
facilitated multilevel selection theory. Specifying, the nature and role of entities in a 
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selection process enabled speculation about their operation at ascending levels of the 
organizational hierarchy. Hull proposed, for example, the idea of a single level of 
replicators with multiple ascending levels of interactors. Indeed, as noted, this is a 
position ‘taken as given’ by many evolutionary biologists in their empirical work 
(Keller, 1999). And, significantly, this would certainly give plausible expression to 
Nelson and Winter’s firms (interactors), their implicit foundational level of replicating 
routines (replicators) and, their ascending levels of interacting, ‘higher order’, routines 
(interactors).  
 Thus, it would appear that advances in evolutionary theory, and multilevel selection 
theory, have the potential to both clarify and extend Nelson and Winter’s theory. 
Darwinian individuals can certainly be perceived in their theory; it is easy to conceive 
of their firms as interactors and the routines as replicators. It is then also possible to 
conceive of a hierarchy of interactors with individual agents at one level, firms at 
another and additional institutions at other higher levels. Indeed, with the aid of a 
multilevel perspective and the clarifying functional roles of replicators and interactors it 
may be more appropriate, as indicated above, to conceive of Nelson and Winter’s 
‘higher level’ ‘search’ routines as an additional level of interactors, operating between 
the foundational level routines (replicators) and the higher level firm (interactor). They 
clearly want to include the activity of ‘choice’ in their range of routines and this, as we 
have seen, causes problems for their (single-level) selection theory. Thus, in terms of 
evolutionary causality, following Sober (1984), this translates Nelson and Winter’s 
position as, selection of a particular firm and in consequence selection of a particular set 
of higher order (strategic) routines, and in consequence the selection of another set of 
lower order (operational) routines, and in consequence the selection for a particular set 
of foundational organizational routines. In other words, a multilevel position that 
identifies with position III on the table of logical possibilities, above in Chapter 7 (p. 
113), that is, a single level of replicators and multiple levels of interactors. 
 Alternatively, as suggested in Chapter 7, in a slightly different formulation, it also 
permits speculation of Nelson and Winter’s schema in terms of multiple levels of 
replicators as well as multiple levels of interactors. In other words, position V on the 
table. Their proposed additional levels of routines could be perceived as multiple levels 
of replicators in a framework which again posits individuals, firms and other higher 
level institutions as interactors, but significantly, this is in a continuum from the biotic 
to the social level. This position has recently been explored by Hodgson and Knudsen 
(2004a) in a conceptual refinement of Nelson and Winter’s approach, where they 
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observe that in addition to genes, both individual habits and organizational routines can 
be regarded as replicators. They describe this scenario below (p. 299); 
 
Selection of firms in a competitive environment results in the selection for some of 
the replicators associated with the involved firms. The selection of firm-interactors 
leads to replicators, such as routines and habits, being selected for.  That is, the 
current properties of the firm determine whether its routines, and possibly the habits 
of its individual members, will be more common or more rare in the next time 
period. If we further acknowledge that, at an intermediate level, teams are 
replicators, the selection of firms can help explain the selection for the generative 
structure that gives rise to the attributes of alternative professional teams.98  
 
 The significance of these developments for Nelson and Winter in particular, and the 
social sciences in general, cannot be overstated. Certainly the interactor and replicator 
concepts clarify causal direction and, with the notion of group selection and the 
possibility of interaction going on up and down the organizational hierarchy (Hull, 
2001), it becomes theoretically possible to accommodate selection at multiple levels. 
However, as observed by Hodgson and Knudsen, the development of such a multiple 
level evolutionary theory is the critical keystone of a non-reductionist evolutionary 
economics (2004). Evidently, through Hull’s generalized terms, critically associated 
more with the function of the entity as opposed to that of the entity’s first biotic 
namesake, Hull and others have demonstrated the general character of Darwin’s theory.  
And clearly, as evidenced in this analysis, such refinement of theory and clarification of 
definitions crucially facilitates understanding and application beyond the biotic sphere 
(Brandon, 2001).    
 Indeed the implications of a modern general Darwinism for Nelson and Winter have 
been clearly demonstrated here, where the confusion over units and levels of selection 
and the replicator-interactor distinction undermine its theoretical tractability. Evidently 
their ‘flexibility’ with evolutionary ideas from biology seems to have involved an over-
emphasis on Lamarck, but, as suggested here, the theory arguably has much greater 
potential in explicitly and wholly adopting general Darwinism, where it is now 
                                                 
98 Hodgson and Knudsen (2004, p. 19) also usefully go on to observe the continuity of this schema with 
the biotic domain. In order to prevent misunderstandings and charges of ‘greedy reductionism’, given the 
implied continuity in the above between the biotic and the cultural spheres (which incidentally most 
group/multilevel selection theorists acknowledge) it is worth repeating this in full (my italics & 
emboldening in last two sentences); ‘In addition, descending the hierarchy, the selection of firms can also 
have a slight effect in the selection for human genes, given that employment opportunities in the firm can 
have an effect on the survival opportunities for human individuals. The selection of firms has effects that 
cascade down to the selection of individuals, and in turn to selection for genes. But selection for these 
lower-level, biological replicators can be ignored for purposes of analysing economic evolution.  It is too 
slight to be of significance, given the much slower evolutionary processes involved.’ 
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theoretically possible to accommodate interactors and selection at multiple ascending 
levels (and moreover to accommodate Lamarckian inheritance).  
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been my intention here to draw attention to the ‘hidden’ Darwinism in Nelson and 
Winter’s theory, and show how, through their use of Darwinian ideas they confirm key 
ontological similarities between the biotic and social spheres and demonstrate the 
general application of Darwinian theory. Through the detailed analysis of their 
theoretical framework and explanatory mechanisms it has been shown here that from 
their foundational assumptions (i.e., population thinking, group selection) to their 
deployment of Darwin’s core principles of variation, inheritance and selection, to their 
subtle recognition of the replicator-interactor distinction, Nelson and Winter’s theory is 
decidedly Darwinian.  
 Without speculating on the reasons for their apparent hostility towards Darwinism, I 
have demonstrated here how their resistance to Darwinism is ill-founded and that 
Lamarckian inheritance is nevertheless accommodated within general Darwinism as an 
auxiliary assumption. Indeed in this and other important ways it has been shown here 
how modern Darwinism, in fact, resides in (social replicator, group selection, replicator-
interactor distinction), facilitates, and enhances their theory (clarification on, units of 
selection; the replicator-interactor distinction; multilevel selection theory). Indeed, in 
spite of their reluctance to claim a Darwinian heritage I have illustrated how Nelson and 
Winter implicitly assume the generalizability of Darwin’s core principles. Thus, to 
suggest, as I have done here, that Nelson and Winter’s theory is Darwinian is to 
acknowledge that it is Darwinian at its most general level.   
 Indeed, significantly, through the evaluation of this important case study via a modern 
Darwinian perspective, it has also been shown here that Darwinism is unquestionably a 
general theory. Through the exploration of Nelson and Winter’s core and implicit 
assumptions, its generic quality and explanatory range have clearly been demonstrated. 
And through examination of their tractability problems it has also been shown how 
clarification and resolution is logically implied in the recent theoretical and conceptual 
advances in Darwinian theory. Certainly, paradoxically, one of the subtle, but 
nevertheless critically important, messages to emerge from the study of Nelson and 
Winter’s work is the inevitability of Darwinism for the socio-economic realm. It would 
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seem that in spite of themselves, Nelson and Winter have intuitively imbibed the 
inevitable logic of Darwinism. 
 Darwinian theory clearly has extensive and powerful explanatory potential with the 
capacity, particularly in its modern generalized formulation, to explain complexity, 
diversity and change in the social domain. However, as Nelson and Winter’s work has 
also crucially highlighted, Darwinian theory has the seductive appeal of a beguilingly 
simple theory when it is, in fact, deceptively complex (Dennett, 1995). Thus, although a 
valuable heuristic device, it must be used with caution. With this thought in mind we 
now turn our attention to the subject of the next Chapter and follow the Darwinian 
thread to Hannan and Freeman. Interestingly, whilst it will be seen that, in contrast to 
Nelson and Winter, these authors explicitly identify with Darwinism, it will also be seen 
how, for different reasons, their ecological perspective is similarly compromised by the 
seeming lack of engagement with modern Darwinian theory. 
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 9    Hannan and Freeman’s Organizational Ecology: 
      A Partial Darwinian Theory 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The second case study in this work features the sociologists Michael T Hannan and John 
Freeman and their widely acclaimed treatise Organizational Ecology (1989).  This 
influential work offers an important and interesting comparison with Nelson and 
Winter’s evolutionary theory of economic change, representing for the field of 
organization studies a similarly prominent contribution on the evolution of 
organizations (Singh, 1990; Burt, 1992; Zald, 1994; Baum and Singh, 1994). Unlike 
Nelson and Winter, Hannan and Freeman explicitly claim their Darwinian heritage 
asserting that ‘the view that selection processes govern the dynamics of organizational 
diversity shades naturally into a Darwinian evolutionary position’ (p.17).  Whilst from a 
Darwinian perspective they have much in common with Nelson and Winter’s position, 
for example, their population thinking perspective and Darwinian selection dynamic, in 
one important respect, regarding inheritance and transmission, Hannan and Freeman’s 
work marks a significant departure from the formers theoretical approach, arguably 
rendering it only a ‘partial’ evolutionary theory (Metcalfe, 1987; Levinthal, 1991; 
Bruderer and Singh, 1996). This has important implications for the development of 
evolutionary theory in the socio-economic domain, with many scholars now concerned 
about the chasm that has emerged between such prominent evolutionary accounts.  
 
The Case of Hannan and Freeman 
 
The point of departure centers on Hannan and Freeman’s treatment of organizational 
‘inertia’ and the associated rejection of adaptational explanations of change. As they 
explain, ‘the issue of structural inertia is central to the choice between adaptation and 
selection models’ (1977, p. 931). Significantly, this translates as the theoretical assertion 
that selection is the primary force of organizational change and not adaptation, and this 
issue lies at the heart of the perennial debate in organization science, the ‘adaptation 
versus selection’ debate (Murmann, 2004). 
 
  Here I shall examine Hannan and Freeman’s evolutionary influences and draw 
attention to the Darwinian ideas that they adopt as well as the important ones they 
eschew.  I show how the authors, by accentuating one particular strand of evolutionary 
theory, population ecology, inevitably end up presenting a rather distorted view of 
organizational phenomena (Baum and Singh, 1994).  I illustrate how their shift in focus, 
away from the individual organization in its local environment to their ‘population of 
organizations’ level of analysis, neglects the important causal story generating from the 
lower level of the individual. In the light of theoretical advances in evolutionary theory, 
particularly recent ones around the selection process (Knudsen, 2001, 2002, 2004), as 
well as empirical and theoretical developments in business economics (Teece et al, 
1997;  Dosi, 2000; Metcalfe, 1987, 1998; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1991; Hodgson, 2001b, 
2002b; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, 2006a, 2006b) and organization studies (Astely 
and Van de Ven, 1983; Scott, 1987; Burgelman, 1991; Ziman, 2000; Baum, 2002) I 
speculate about an implicit replicator in Hannan and Freeman’s theory, and about 
possible modifications to their approach, finally signaling the potential resolution of the 
‘adaptation versus selection’ debate within the meta-theoretical framework of general 
Darwinism.  
 
Theoretical Framework of Organizational Ecology  
 
Hannan and Freeman are concerned with explaining organizational change and 
organizational diversity. In pursuance of the question ‘why are there so many (or so 
few) kinds of organizations’99 they examine differential rates of entry or ‘births’ (new 
founding, mergers, division of an existing organization) and exit or ‘deaths’ 
(disbanding, acquisition) for organizations, notably because they perceive that most of 
the variability in the core structures of organizations comes about through the creation 
of new organizations and the demise of existing ones (1989, p.12).  The prevailing 
variety for Hannan and Freeman is thus traced to the variety of organizational forms at 
founding.  Following Stinchcombe (1965) and the idea that cohorts of organizations are 
imprinted with social, cultural and technical features common to the environment at 
founding, and moreover that these ‘imprinted’ characteristics are highly resistant to 
change, Hannan and Freeman observe, in an extreme version of the Darwinian position, 
that ‘current characteristics of populations of organizations reflect historical conditions 
at the time of founding rather than recent adaptations’ (p. xiii).   
                                                 
99 The question originally poised by the authors in The American Journal of Sociology (1977)  
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  Accordingly and significantly, change in organizational form is thus seen as the result 
of selection processes operating on populations of essentially ‘inert’ organizations, so 
that the exploration of vital rates has become the dependable research strategy of 
organizational ecologists (Haverman, 2000) in what has now become an active field of 
research (Carroll 1988). Thus, significantly, in contrast to Nelson and Winter, Hannan 
and Freeman propose a ‘top-down’ explanation of evolutionary change that does not 
account for firm-level adaptational change. In other words, whereas the former 
acknowledge that population level changes are also influenced by the variety brought 
about through mutations (learning, imitation, random errors), Hannan and Freeman see 
evolutionary change explained principally through the selection and retention of new 
species. 
 
Macro-Social Processes 
 
Hannan and Freeman focus on organizations and social structures, exploring economic, 
political and social institutions, or what they call ‘macro-social processes’, and the 
constraining impact of these on the structures of organizations.  Firms certainly 
constitute a large body of their research, though the organizational ecologists’ remit 
extends beyond that of economists to include all kinds of organizations, such as, 
universities, voluntary associations, government agencies and social movement 
organizations (Hannan, 2005). What they want to understand is ‘the dynamics of 
organizational diversity, how social changes affect the mix of organizations in society 
and vice versa’ (p. 15). 100  Hannan and Freeman seek to explain these important 
processes through their theory of ‘organizational ecology’, an approach which is derived 
from human population ecology (Hawley, 1950, 1968) and niche theory (Hutchinson, 
1957, 1978). Drawing on biological models of how populations survive and prosper on 
the resources of specific ecosystems, they speculate about the survival and growth of 
populations of organizations (Burt, 1992). Niche theory, as they point out, usefully 
expresses in a general way ‘how environmental variations and competition affect the 
growth rates of populations’ (p. 95).  Given its approach, organizational ecology is what 
we might call a ‘macro-theory’, a theory that, contrary to traditional organizational 
theory, shifts the analysis away from the individual organization up to the level of 
populations of organizations.   
 
                                                 
100 Vice versa in this context meaning the effects of other organizations 
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 Organizational Inertia and Environmental Selection 
 
For Hannan and Freeman organization theorists have been misguided in their fixation 
with the individual organization. The traditional adaptation explanations of the 
evolution of organizational forms (Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963), which emphasize strategy and the flexibility of firms in changing 
environments, are considered problematic and unrealistic. Hannan and Freeman argue 
that whilst much has usefully been learnt about the internal structures and behaviours of 
organizations, the analysis has been stymied by its lack of contextual environmental 
considerations, thus, causality has been misconstrued. In their view the adaptation 
perspective erroneously suggests that organizations have a ‘unitary stable preference 
structure’ and thus can respond speedily to changing environments.101  Accordingly this 
perspective overlooks both the internal politics of organizations, which forestall quick 
and decisive action, and the causally important, powerful inertial forces acting upon 
organizations and constraining their options. These are critical omissions and this is 
what prompted the formation of their population ecology approach (1977, 1989).  
 Hannan and Freeman sought to redress the balance in the organizations literature by, 
amongst other things, portraying organizations as complicated systems which in reality 
have strong limitations on flexibility and speed of response. They set out to construct a 
theory that takes into account the important competitive environment of other 
organizations and to explain how forces external to these organizations impact on their 
changing structures. In framing their agenda they (p. 13) posed the important and 
currently pressing question; ‘does change in major features of organizations over time 
reflect mainly adaptation or selection and replacement?’ Organizational ecology argues 
unreservedly that it reflects selection and replacement. 
 
The Research Agenda and its Impact 
 
This important question shapes the whole research agenda where there is undoubtedly 
a heavy focus on the selection process and clearly a movement away from, what 
Hannan and Freeman (p. xii) call, a ‘focal-organization perspective.’ 102  Indeed, 
through the population ecology approach the authors claim to bring about an important 
                                                 
101 For Hannan and Freeman such assumptions are largely due to the tendency for social scientists to think 
anthropomorphically about organizations (pp. xi-xii)  
102 The ‘focus on action of individual organizations faced with specified environmental problems’ 
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 ‘reorientation’ of organization theory.103 And their theoretical and academic objectives 
they address in a number of ways (p. 331); firstly, by ‘shifting the focus to the 
population level’; secondly, by ‘moving from a static to a dynamic approach’; thirdly 
by ‘recognising the strong limits on the speed with which existing organizations can 
adapt to rapidly changing environments’; and finally by ‘examining change in diverse 
but internally homogenous organizational populations over their full histories’.        
 Significantly, Hannan and Freeman’s organizational ecology model has had a major 
impact on organization science (Carroll, 1988; Burgelman, 1991; Levinthal, 1991; Zald, 
1994; Bruderer and Singh, 1996). The authors (1977) are credited with introducing 
niche theory104 or ‘contextual causation’ into the mainstream of organization science 
and with pioneering the field of organizational population ecology (McKelvey and 
Baum, 1999).  Moreover, organization ecology has been noted for its successful 
application to all kinds of organizations (Sandell 2001), including semiconductor 
manufacturers, breweries, banks, newspapers, and social movement organizations 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Singh and Lumsden, 1990). Organizational ecology is 
undoubtedly one of the most important and influential evolutionary theories in the social 
sciences, frequently cited beyond the sociological or organizational disciplinary 
boundaries. Indeed, often cited alongside Nelson and Winter, Hannan and Freeman 
present a particularly interesting case-study here, as much as for what they share, in 
terms of the ‘Darwinian thread’, with the former, as with how they differ in their use of 
Darwinian evolutionary ideas. And so, it is to this exploration that we now turn.   
 
The Evolutionary Approach 
 
How do Hannan and Freeman construct their dynamic organizational ecology theory?  
And what are the evolutionary ideas that they employ?  In point of fact, in many 
respects organizational ecology resembles Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary 
economics, which explains why they are often linked together in the literature.105  There 
is, for example, the ‘population thinking’ approach that emphasizes the importance of 
                                                 
103 Hannan and Freeman felt that organizational theorists became detached from a concern with the 
‘classic problems of the relations of organizations to society and the effects of organizations on social 
change and levels of inequality’ (p. 11). 
104 Derived from Hutchinson’s (1957, 1978) ‘fundamental niche’, Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 96) 
describe the fundamental niche as consisting of ‘the set of all environmental conditions in which the 
population can grow and at least sustain its numbers’  
105 Linked, for example, as ‘selection-based’ explanations (Murmann et al, 2003).  Similarly they are 
described as ‘population’ or ‘system’ level approaches.  
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 variety for selection and evolutionary change; there is the population or system level of 
analysis which features an organizational form that is differentially selected and 
retained; in accordance with the notion of group selection, the organizational form has a 
collective, cohesive character; and there is an emphasis on both inertial (continuity) and 
competitive (change) forces operating at the intersection between the organizational 
form and the environment.  
 For our purposes here, it is, of course, important to establish the way in which these 
evolutionary ideas have been deployed in the theory. For example, to what extent are 
the entities, mechanisms and processes Darwinian? Is there a coherent evolutionary 
explanation? Is the theory complete? And what is the explanatory potential of the 
theory?  We shall begin to address these questions by looking in more detail at the 
various strands of the theory indicated above. From this review the differences between 
Hannan and Freeman and Nelson and Winter’s respective accounts will then become 
apparent. What we will discover is that in spite of many corresponding assumptions, 
these two approaches diverge in quite significant ways, the most important of which 
relates to causality and the notion of adaptation. 
 
Explicit Darwinism 
 
The first notable difference between Nelson and Winter, on the one hand, and Hannan 
and Freeman, on the other, is that where the former declare themselves Lamarckians in 
spite of their evident use of Darwinian principles, the latter are unambiguous and 
immediately identify their theory as Darwinian (p.xii). Indeed they are quite explicit 
about their use of the ‘promising’ analytical structure of evolutionary models of 
population and community ecology. They acknowledge the Darwinian ‘population 
thinking’ basis to their theory and describe the inspirational role of population ecology 
derived from Hawley’s (1950, 1968) work on human population ecology. Moreover, 
they openly acknowledge the ‘implicit taboo’ in the social sciences of using selection 
theory, and unperturbed, they go on to spell out their own ‘modeling strategy’ based on 
this.    
 They stress that they do not adopt a reductionist approach by using biological theory 
to explain organizational change, and explain that they do not use metaphors between 
the spheres of biology and sociology, but instead utilise ‘models’ from population 
ecology, since for them, these ‘clarify the social processes of interests’.  With echoes 
of Campbell (1965), they go on to explain (p. xiii-xiv); 
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The model is an abstraction that will lead to insight whenever the stated conditions 
are approximated…we use ecological models as frameworks within which to study 
sociological processes. 
 
 Thus Hannan and Freeman evidently see the general applicability of Darwinian 
evolutionary ideas, a point they clearly make several times throughout the text.  
Indeed, they are refreshingly, conceptually very precise, there are few ambiguities. 
They usefully devote several pages (pp. 17-23) to a discussion of the term ‘evolution’ 
and its various manifestations in the organizations literature, and carefully explain 
their own interpretation, which is explicitly ‘Darwinian’ (p. 20); 
 
Our work approximates a Malthusian-Darwinian position on the nature of change 
in organizational population over time.  We think that the current diversity of 
organizational forms reflects the cumulative effect of a long history of variation 
and selection, including the consequences of founding processes, mortality 
processes, and merger processes. 
 
 Having explicitly identified with Darwin it becomes interesting then to observe how 
the separate strands of theory are treated by Hannan and Freeman, particularly, for 
example, the variation – selection – retention dynamic.  We begin to explore this 
below with a discussion of Darwin’s population thinking perspective and how this is 
assumed in the theory.     
 
Darwinian Ontology: Population Thinking and Population Ecology 
 
Hannan and Freeman ground their theory very firmly in the population thinking 
perspective. However, there are two senses in which population thinking may be 
discerned in their theory, one implicit and the other explicit and to avoid confusion, it 
is important to stress that these are consistent and that they both derive from 
Darwinism. The first implicit sense is the population thinking perspective which is 
notably attributed to Darwin and which famously replaced typological thinking and 
the treatment of variety in terms of ideal, representative types (Mayr 1959). The 
second is explicitly associated, by Hannan and Freeman, with population ecology and 
the population level of analysis. The first implicit sense is usefully illustrated by 
Metcalfe (1987, p. 56), below, where he highlights the benefits to economics of the 
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 Darwinian population thinking perspective and explains its role in making sense of 
variety in economic behaviour; 
 
In typological thinking species are regarded as fixed and identifiable in terms of a 
few distinct characteristics which represent the essence of the entity.  In this view 
all variations around the ideal type are accidental, and are to be interpreted as 
aberrations … By contrast, in population thinking, species are described in terms of 
a distribution of characteristics and, whereas in typological thinking variation is a 
nuisance, in population thinking it is of all-consuming interest because it is the 
variety in the system which drives the evolutionary process.  
 
 The deployment of this Darwinian population thinking perspective is implicit 
throughout Hannan and Freeman’s theory. However, rather confusingly, although 
Hannan and Freeman head up passages on ‘population thinking’ (1977, p. 933; 1989, 
p. 15), signalling its importance for evolutionary theorising, this is not to explain it in 
the terms outlined by Metcalfe above; instead, this is to elucidate the second sense in 
which population thinking resides in the theory, which is expressed in terms of 
‘population ecology’, and emphasizes the population level of analysis and the notion 
of aggregates of organizations and shared fate with respect to environmental 
constraints. Crucially, as suggested, one is nevertheless derived from, and is consistent 
with the other. The population ecology (Hawley, 1950, 1968) which inspires Hannan 
and Freeman’s theory is built on Darwin’s population thinking perspective and indeed 
its inherent assumptions about the existence and persistence of variety. The question of 
the source of that variety is a different matter, to which we shall return in due course, 
but, importantly, its characterization within the selection process is positively drawn 
from the population thinking approach. 
 
Population Ecology 
 
Ecology is the branch of biology that deals with the relations of organisms to one 
another and to their physical surroundings (Pearsall, 2001). As noted, Hannan and 
Freeman derive their theory from the human ecology associated with Hawley.  
Specifically this seeks to explain patterns of adaptation of human communities to 
ecological settings (Hannan, 1989, p. xii).  At its heart is the principle of 
‘isomorphism’, which states that, in equilibrium, ‘units subjected to the same 
environmental conditions, or to environmental conditions as mediated by a given key 
unit, acquire a similar form of organization’ (Hawley, 1968, p. 334). They saw that by 
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 modifying Hawley’s approach, to deal with dynamic populations within environmental 
settings that are spatially and temporally heterogeneous, they could facilitate a 
population level analysis of organizations. 
 Hannan and Freeman are evidently focused on the environment and a population 
level perspective. In order to make their evolutionary schema tractable, following the 
ecologists, they deliberately take the analysis up to the level of the population. What 
they are essentially discussing then is a species-level approach; in a Darwinian sense 
they are looking at outcomes at the species level or, in other words, at Nelson and 
Winter’s industry level. This is what they mean when they say they are moving away 
from the ‘focal-organization perspective’ and the tendency in the organizations 
literature to think ‘anthropomorphically’ about organizations. In this way they explain, 
they can look at the impact of ‘selection and replacement in populations of 
organizations.’  Controversially, in terms of causality, this means no longer thinking in 
terms of organizational outcomes shaped by individual intentions but rather outcomes 
that are shaped instead by impersonal forces. For Hannan and Freeman this approach 
provides a more complete and realistic picture, and it facilitates the ultimate goal of 
understanding the forces ‘that shape the structures of organizations over long time 
spans.’  They summarize the population ecology perspective below (p. 13); 
 
The population ecology perspective concentrates on the sources of variability and 
homogeneity of organizational forms. It considers the rise of new organizational 
forms and the demise or transformation of existing ones.  In doing so, it pays 
considerable attention to population dynamics, especially the processes of 
competition among diverse organizations for limited resources such as membership, 
capital and legitimacy. 
  
 The above indicates both the flavour and focus of Hannan and Freeman’s work. 
They clearly seek to explain the diversity of organizational forms and understand the 
implications of such diversity, and indeed this has characterized all their research 
studies (1977, 1978, 1984, 1986, and 1987). In justifying this approach, they explain 
the methodological reasoning behind its higher-level perspective and in so doing they 
signal the precise nature of their selection process as well as the relatively minor role 
that they cast for adaptive causality (p. 339); 
 
We have tried to develop theories at the population level that are robust with 
respect to assumptions about individual motivation. In this respect, our goal is to 
develop theories like Darwin’s theory of evolution, which continues to have value 
despite great changes in our understanding of the detailed genetic processes upon 
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 which processes of biotic evolution depend. A macro theory is robust with respect 
to assumptions about individual motivations if the theoretical structure does not 
have to be reassembled each time a micro assumption is changed. 
 
 As will become apparent in the discussion of their selection process, while such an 
approach does indeed accord with a tractable general selection theory it cannot strictly 
be described as a modern ‘neo-Darwinian’ selection process,106 and thus has major 
limitations for a socio-economic theory of evolution (Knudsen, 2004). In order to 
unpack this, the analysis will continue with the population thinking theme, looking 
more closely at variation, its composition and its source. This will then lead to their 
treatment of selection and inheritance, and hence to adaptation and the question of 
causality in evolutionary processes. The notion of variation begs the question about 
evolutionary entities, thus we begin by briefly highlighting what Hannan and Freeman 
identify as their key entities. 
 
Evolutionary Entities: Organizational Forms and Populations  
 
Whilst criticized for their vagueness about boundaries of form (Young, 1988) Hannan 
and Freeman (1989, p. 48) nevertheless do offer a definition of their central 
evolutionary entity, the ‘organizational form’, and significantly this takes the form of a 
collective group entity and its treatment corresponds with the modern Darwinian 
definition of an ‘interactor’ and thus a unit of selection (Hull, 1988; Sober, 1984);  
 
We have suggested (1977) that organizational forms be defined analogously, as 
instructions for building organizations and for conducting collective action. 
 
 It is clear throughout the text that this is the primary entity that interacts with the 
environment and is differentially selected. The other key entity in Hannan and 
Freeman’s theory is the ‘population’, and interestingly, from a modern Darwinian 
perspective, while this serves as the competitive environment for organizations, in 
accordance with their explicit promotion of additional levels of selection (populations, 
communities) this too has the features of an interactor; 
 
Populations can be defined in such a way that they have a unitary character, which 
means that the members of the populations have a common standing with respect 
                                                 
106 ‘Neo-Darwinism’ here refers to the synthesis of Darwinian selection theory with Mendelian genetics 
which articulates an inheritance system based on the replicator-interactor distinction. 
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 to the processes of interest. The most salient kind of unitary character for our 
concerns is common dependence on the material and social environment. 
 
 Thus, in a sense, we have the original Darwinian selection hierarchy of the organism 
and the species.  Notice however, that in Hannan and Freeman’s evolutionary hierarchy 
there is no attempt to include a ‘gene-like’ replicating entity. This is a very important 
and somewhat contradictory point, given the obvious assumption of continuity of form 
in their theory. However, as will become more apparent below, this corresponds with 
their view of inheritance; for as they observe, without knowledge of the gene, Darwin 
could only assume some kind of heritable entity, and this did not prevent him from 
constructing his theory of natural selection. Through the following discussion of 
Hannan and Freeman’s evolutionary processes the implications of this omission for 
their socio-economic selection process will be examined. 
 
The Principle of Variation 
 
Hannan and Freeman’s theory builds on the foundational ontological assumptions of 
population thinking, and in most respects their discussions of variety bear the hallmarks 
of this critical Darwinian underpinning. For example, their populations are not limited 
to the largest and most successful organizations, but to ‘entire populations of 
organizations over the full histories of the populations’, and, significantly this includes 
all those organizations on the ‘fringes’. In other words, those enterprises attempting to 
enter the industry, for without their inclusion we would ‘miss the main source of 
organizational diversity: the creation of new organizations on the ‘fringes’’ (Hannan, 
2005, p. 53). Indeed, there is no attempt in the text to define a ‘typical’ or ‘standard’ 
organization (p. 63-64);   
 
We have not always used the conventionally defined forms directly in analysis; 
rather we have usually arrayed the forms along some analytic continuum and 
focused on variations along the continuum.  
 
 To illustrate, in the same passage they discuss their research of restaurants and 
highlight the fact that thirty three different types of restaurants were noted in the study 
and, significantly, that; 
 
We were less interested in the precise forms than in underlying differences in 
specialisms with respect to segments of the market.  Because we were interested in 
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 the evolutionary dynamics of specialism versus generalism, we classified the 33 
forms into specialist and generalist types and conducted our analysis of the 
dynamics of niche width using this distinction. 
 
 Interestingly, this approach was criticized by Young (1988) who observed that 
Hannan and Freeman’s ‘boundaries’ between organizational forms were vague and 
confusing and that this detracted from their theory. However, Hannan and Freeman 
(1989b), underlining the importance of variety in Darwin’s population thinking 
perspective, responded by arguing that the emphasis in their theory is in explanation as 
opposed to that of Young’s cited theorist, McKelvey’s (1982), whose emphasis is on 
taxonomy, and moreover that; 
 
The connection between creating useful theories of change and correct classification 
is a loose one. In fact, what matters are that classifications accurately reflect 
discontinuities in nature. All that mattered for Darwin is that he understood the main 
distinctions among species of finches and among species of barnacles. 
 
 This perception of variety and the ontological commitment to its population 
thinking foundation is very important for the elucidation of evolutionary theory in the 
natural and the social sciences, and Hannan and Freeman have grounded it well in 
their theory. Within this framework, variety is an acknowledged precondition for 
selection. And, Hannan and Freeman offer an explanation of its existence through 
birth and death rates of organizations.   
 However, this is where the Darwinian similarities begin to break down, Hannan and 
Freeman notably also argue that selection is the primary cause of organizational 
variety and evolutionary change, basically ignoring the role of an inheritance 
mechanism, and eschewing any notion of inherited adaptations. This is a very 
controversial point, from a theoretical as well as an empirical perspective, and it lies at 
the heart of the adaptation versus selection debate. Indeed the issue clearly highlights 
Hannan and Freeman’s rather different treatment of the Darwinian trilogy, of 
variation, selection, and inheritance. Hence, having introduced variation, the analysis 
now turns to the principle of selection where it will be seen that an incisive evaluation 
of Hannan and Freeman’s approach has been usefully enhanced through very recent 
developments in selection theory (Knudsen, 2002, 2004). In terms of theory 
development in the socio-economic spheres, it will also be interesting to observe that 
some of the related issues will already be familiar, particularly those associated with 
‘units’ and ‘levels’ of selection. 
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 The Principle of Selection  
 
The selection process, in Hannan and Freeman’s population ecology perspective, is 
promoted as the primary motor of change. Significantly, they thereby draw distinctive 
theoretical conclusions about the relative roles of different evolutionary processes in 
explanations of change. And this sets them apart, not only from most of their 
colleagues in sociology and organization studies but also from Nelson and Winter, and 
moreover from modern Darwinian theory. Essentially this perspective amounts to a 
reversal in causal direction, with ‘top down’ causality. Unlike Nelson and Winter who, 
more conventionally (in a Darwinian sense) see change as being generated from the 
bottom up, percolated through the firm, Hannan and Freeman see change being 
determined by their higher ‘macrosocial processes.’ As they explain below where they 
contrast the Lamarckian adaptationist approach with their own selection approach 
(1989, p. 22); 
 
The line of theory we develop builds on the assumption that change in core 
features of organizational populations is more Darwinian than Lamarckian. It 
argues that inertial pressures prevent most organizations from radically changing 
strategies and structures. 
 
 
 In fact, although they call their theory Darwinian, it appears that in significant 
respects it is not. The implications of their selection ‘bias’ is that it discounts other 
explanations of variety such as mutation and adaptation, and it avoids articulation of 
an inheritance mechanism, all of which features do appear in Nelson and Winter’s 
theory.  
 Indeed, the Darwinian ‘label’ and causality is further confused in a comparative 
analysis of these socio-economic selection processes because of the different 
articulation of ‘units’ and ‘levels’ of selection.  Nelson and Winter, for example, 
concerned with technological and economic change, focus on the firm as their unit of 
analysis, whereas Hannan and Freeman, concerned with ‘organizational ecology’, 
describe an analysis at the level of populations. Superficially, it is difficult to discern 
the organizational hierarchies and to know that we comparing like with like. Indeed 
this is an important and common problem in socio-economic theories of evolution. 
However, the apparent difference in focus107 intriguingly masks a strong degree of 
                                                 
107 Which essentially amounts to a difference in the level of analysis. 
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 convergence between these two theories. Indeed, significantly, it recalls the ‘unit of 
selection’ debate in evolutionary theory which stifled theoretical progress but was 
subsequently shown to be a dispute about semantics (Hull, 1981; Brandon, 1982, 
1999). 
 
Units and Levels of Selection 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5 above, much of the controversy arose as a direct result 
of confusions or misunderstandings about whether theorists were talking about the unit 
that was being selected or the level of the organizational hierarchy at which selection 
took place.  The ‘unit’ and ‘level’ of selection appeared to merge in conceptualisations 
of evolutionary processes; and until these became disentangled, the ‘unit of selection’ 
debate persisted.  
 The point is, Nelson and Winter and Hannan and Freeman have similarly 
approached their evolutionary theories from a ‘units’ and ‘levels’ approach, 
respectively.  Establishing this point at the outset is very important as it goes a long 
way towards explaining both the superficial differences in these socio-economic 
theories as well as their foundational similarities.  It also usefully highlights here how 
confusions arise and appear intractable in evolutionary theorising in the social realm, 
and illustrates what is still a common misunderstanding amongst evolutionary theorists 
in the social sciences. 
 Basically the immediate and obvious difference in approach could suggest different 
evolutionary interpretations.  Nelson and Winter clearly identify the firm as the unit of 
analysis and, moreover, as the unit of selection. Whereas, Hannan and Freeman talk 
about ‘shifting’ the analysis up to the level of populations of organizations and indeed 
they emphasize this contrast with tradition in organization studies.  Does this mean, 
therefore, that Hannan and Freeman are talking about selection occurring at this higher 
level?  Are populations the unit of selection?   
 A close examination of the two approaches shows that in fact the evolutionary 
hierarchies are the same.  Hannan and Freeman in their basic articulation of the 
selection process are not suggesting that populations are the primary units of selection, 
what they mean is that selection occurs at the level of the organization but that the 
effects are manifested at the population level – the level at which they make their 
analysis. This is confirmed by their characterization of their two key evolutionary 
entities above. Their primary unit of selection is the individual organization, and their 
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 second key entity is the population which is comprised of multiples of similar 
organizations. Their definition of populations perhaps adds to the confusion because of 
its stated ‘unitary character’, and as noted earlier, they propose that populations also 
act as units of selection. 
 However, taken together with their treatment of the ‘organizational form’, it is clear 
that Hannan and Freeman do concur with the basic Darwinian selection hierarchy. 
Indeed, notably, both case studies allude to the traditional single-level selection 
process 108  where, paraphrasing Sober (1984, p. 100), there is selection of the 
organization and selection for its properties, the later of which ultimately then 
characterises the population or industry. Thus, the selection process is essentially the 
same in terms of the units and levels of selection. Hannan and Freeman are essentially 
being very explicit about their population level of analysis, something that tends to be 
only implied in Nelson and Winter’s work. However, conversely, while organizational 
‘properties’ are merely implied in Hannan and Freeman’s account, Nelson and Winter 
are very explicit about their routines-as-genes analogy. 
 With these clarifications now made, the analysis finally turns to the handling of 
inheritance and transmission, and, as indicated, this is where the contrast with Nelson 
and Winter becomes most apparent. Hannan and Freeman make no attempt to 
incorporate or create an inheritance mechanism, an omission that clearly impacts on 
their selection process and goes some way towards explaining the absence of anything 
resembling a replicator in their theory, or indeed a replicator-interactor duality. 
 
The Missing Principle: Inheritance 
 
In their failure to articulate an inheritance mechanism, Hannan and Freeman 
acknowledge that their evolutionary treatment of organizational change is ‘partial at 
best’ (1989, p. 20);   
 
We do not have anything resembling a fully developed evolutionary theory of 
organizational change. Although we have learned a good deal about selection 
processes, we still know very little about the other side of the evolutionary process, 
the structures of inheritance and transmission. Sociology does not have a simple, 
well understood transmission process analogous to Mendelian genetics.  
 
                                                 
108 See table 1 above in Chapter 7, where the traditional single level selection process is depicted as 
‘position I’ 
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  Thus, whilst explicitly identifying themselves as Darwinian they have nevertheless 
omitted to include this core Darwinian principle in their evolutionary framework. 
Indeed, from a Darwinian perspective we might judge this to be the missing link in their 
theory.  The exclusion of Lamarckian inheritance from Hannan and Freeman’s theory is 
quite deliberate and twofold and is informed by empirical as well as theoretical findings. 
It reflects their long standing criticism of adaptive explanations of change in the social 
arena and it also reflects a concern, common amongst social scientists (Aldrich, 1999), 
with the difficulty in organization theory of coming up with the equivalent of a 
biological inheritance mechanism.109  On an empirical basis they believe that in the 
socio-economic realm selection is, in any case, the overriding evolutionary force and 
endeavour to show how social changes affect the form of organizations and how 
competition influences the diversity of those forms (1989, p. 11). In a summary of the 
widespread and contrasting position in the organizations literature, where they notably 
cite Nelson and Winter as typifying the flawed Lamarckian approach,110 they note (p. 
22, my parameters); 
 
Most organizational theorists assume that change is Lamarckian, that major changes 
in the forms of organizations come about through learning and imitation 
[adaptation].  Many kinds of organizations commit resources to learning; 
organizations often seek to copy the forms of their more successful competitors. In a 
rough sense, organizations make copies of themselves [inheritance] either by setting 
up new organizations, by losing or expelling personnel with the requisite knowledge 
to copy the form, or by invoking imitation.   
 
 In contrast, Hannan and Freeman explain that their own theory assumes that ‘change 
in core features of organizational populations is more Darwinian [‘selectionist’] than 
Lamarckian’ (p. 22). And, in justifying the dominance of the selection approach they 
present the argument that is often cited in defence of selectionist accounts in response 
to critics concerned about human intentionality (p. 22); 
 
                                                 
109 Hannan and Freeman (1977, p. 930) ‘It is not possible to specify a simple transmission mechanism by 
which the ability to construct organizations of a given type is passed along among individuals and social 
groups’ (p. 21).   
110 Indeed this raises another interesting point of comparison between Hannan and Freeman and Nelson 
and Winter, for while the former certainly do declare themselves ‘Lamarckian’ referring, for example, to 
changes being ‘passed on’ to ‘tomorrow’s firms’, it is noticeable that the actual transmission processes 
are nevertheless underplayed in their theory. Indeed there are no ‘generations’ as such in Nelson and 
Winter’s theory and like Hannan and Freeman, it is the selection process that is emphasized at the firm 
level. Thus it could be argued that there is a notable degree of convergence between these theories at the 
firm level. 
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 Even when actors strive to cope with their environments, action may be random with 
respect to adaptation as long as the environments are highly uncertain or the 
connections between means and ends are not well understood.  It is the match 
between action and environmental outcomes that must be random on the average for 
selection models to apply. In a world of high uncertainty, adaptive efforts by 
individuals may turn out to be essentially random with respect to future value. 
  
 Hannan and Freeman argue that it is mistaken of adaptationists to place so much 
emphasis on the intentional actions of organizations. They believe that the adaptation 
or ‘focal-organization perspective’ is an inadequate explanation of change in form or 
organizational structure, because it fails to properly account for environmental effects 
and the powerful inertial pressures on organizations. As a consequence, however, they 
end up presenting a theory that effectively denies that organizations learn or that 
managers might make consequential choices.  
 Earlier (1977) they highlighted how the adaptation perspective dominated the 
literature on organizations; the management literature, sociological literature and 
indeed the literature emanating from the influential behavioural theories focused on 
decision making (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1953). They argued that 
these theories place far too much confidence in the ability of managers and 
organizations to plan and adapt to the environment and thus shape the organization.111 
Whist acknowledging that adaptive behaviour or learning is bound to be partially 
reflected in the relationship between structure and environment, significantly they 
concluded (p. 930) that ‘there is no reason to presume that the great structural 
variability among organizations reflects only or even primarily adaptation’. 
 
Adaptation Versus Selection  
 
Thus Hannan and Freeman essentially offer the population ecology perspective as ‘an 
alternative’ (p. 29), and position themselves on the selection side of the adaptation 
versus selection debate.  In so doing, they elevate the effects of the environment on 
organizational change. The ‘environmental’ or ‘systems’ view is clearly best 
expressed for Hannan and Freeman in an ecological perspective which focuses on 
interactions with the environment and competition, and thus selection processes. 
                                                 
111In Organizational Ecology (1989, p. 69) they cite March (1989, p. 563) to illustrate the point; 
‘Organizations are continually changing, routinely, easily, and responsively, but change within 
organizations cannot be arbitrarily controlled…What most reports on implementation indicate…is not 
that organizations are rigid and inflexible, but that they are impressively imaginative.’ 
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 Patterns in nature are more appropriately attributed to the action of selection 
processes.   
 Thus for Hannan and Freeman diversity of organizations is to be explained not 
through the strategic decision making of managers at the top of organizations but 
through recognition of inertial pressures on organizations (Burns, 1961; Stinchcombe, 
1965), and the measurement of ‘vital rates’. Organizational diversity, they argue, 
depends on several of these rates; ‘the rate of founding and entry into a population, the 
rate of change in strategy and structure, and the rate of failure or mortality’ (p. 201). 
They conclude that ‘a broad social change can shape organizational diversity by 
affecting any one of these rates’.  And this is what leads to their argument that macro-
social processes determine the success or failure of organizations, and thus the 
characteristics of the population or industry. Organizations are subject to internal and 
external ‘inertial forces’ and as a result ‘the dynamics of diversity depend mainly on 
the rate at which new and diverse organizations are created and the rate at which 
organizations of various types disappear.’(p. 201) In other words, inertial pressures 
prevent changes at the organizational level from impacting at the population level. 
 In terms of the important question of causality, it appears then that unlike Nelson and 
Winter, Hannan and Freeman effectively promote a ‘top-down’ explanation of 
organizational change. In the former’s Lamarckian explanation of change, they promote 
the idea of firms adapting and changing in response to their environments. Thus, where 
they work from the micro-level up, and see change as being generated primarily from 
routines, Hannan and Freeman see change being determined by macro-social processes. 
This is clearly an important difference in terms of causal explanation between the two 
theories, and it evidently hinges on the latter’s reluctance to acknowledge adaptationist 
explanations of change. Indeed, in Hannan and Freeman’s terms it would seem that 
Nelson and Winter have the more ‘complete’ theory; one that combines adaptation and 
selection.   
 As has been highlighted throughout this study, there is increasing concern about the 
theoretical chasm that now exists between the two dominant models of industrial change 
(Zald, 1994; Murmann, 2004, 2003; Baum and McKelvey, 1999). And as a consequence 
each account is deemed to be lacking in explanatory scope (Haverman, 2000; Baum and 
Singh, 1994; Murmann et al, 2003). Furthermore, as Murmann (2004) observes, ‘even 
those scholars who acknowledge the importance of both selection and adaptation tend to 
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 favour one over the other.’112 Although a few theorists are attempting to bridge the 
divide (Bruderer and Singh, 1996; Levinthal, 1991), suggesting that ‘there need not be a 
fundamental opposition of ecological and strategic perspectives, and that a fruitful 
integration of these ideas is possible’ (Burgelman, 1991 p. 239), and others (Baum and 
Singh, 1994) are praised for their efforts in bringing these perspectives together (Zald, 
1994), it is clear, even from these works, that without the necessary theoretical tools the 
gulf will persist.113 So where does this leave Hannan and Freeman’s selection theory? Is 
it, from a Darwinian perspective, only a partial theory? 
 
A Partial Darwinian Theory? 
 
Are Hannan and Freeman presenting a partial, and thus flawed, evolutionary theory? 
Evidently they want to present a selection theory without the Lamarckian inheritance 
mechanism, and by their own admission (referring to the modern synthesis)114 they do 
not even attempt to discuss a Darwinian inheritance mechanism or posit a replicating 
entity. Surely their selection theory is flawed without some kind of inheritance 
mechanism? Indeed, is it even possible to have an evolutionary selection process 
without an inheritance mechanism or a replicator-interactor distinction?  
 From a Darwinian perspective critics argue that this is simply not possible. For 
example, Hull (2000, p. 54) explains that any adequate understanding of selection 
requires specification of the mechanisms that bring about correlations in cultural traits 
in successive generations; Metcalfe (1987, p. 57) and others suggest that it would be a 
‘crude error’ to interpret the evolutionary argument solely in terms of Darwinian 
selection, and indeed, notably, Hannan and Freeman’s account is singled out as 
‘inadequate’ for this reason. As Metcalfe explains, it is very important to account for 
upward causation, and by separating selection from developmental processes theorists 
risk missing a major element of understanding (2004).  
                                                 
112 To a certain extent this can even be said of Nelson and Winter who are also concerned about inertial 
forces and who do place greater emphasis on selection in their theory. More recently Nelson (1991) 
vividly summed up their position, ‘economists are interested in the game and its outcomes, rather than in 
the particular play or performance of individual firms’. 
113 While significant advances have being made in terms of acknowledgement in empirical works of, for 
example, a replicator-interactor duality (Baum and Singh, 1994) and Lamarckian inheritance within a 
Darwinian framework (Ziman, 2002), as suggested earlier, the units and levels confusion and continued 
widespread perception of a Lamarckian-Darwinian rivalry continues to thwart progress.  
114 In this context Hannan and Freeman make it clear that they are referring to modern ‘neo-Darwinian’ 
theory which is informed by Mendelian genetics. 
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  However, through further clarifications of the concept of selection, which are derived 
from its general mathematical definition in the Price Equation (1995),115 it has recently 
been demonstrated that it is possible to have an evolutionary selection theory without 
specifying a meaningful principle of inheritance (Knudsen, 2002, 2004). 116  In an 
important paper where Knudsen discusses the significance of the Price Equation for a 
general selection theory he summarizes below the critical insight it provides for 
evolutionary theorists (2004, p. 155);  
 
For conceptual purposes the Price Equation can be used to distinguish between the 
bare minimal requirements of a valid evolutionary explanation. In any recent 
definition, evolution occurs by selection, and selection is only defined when a 
minimal principle of continuity (including the possibility of inheritance) is in place 
… For empirical purposes, the Price Equation allows a distinction between selection 
and transmission effects, which is useful when identifying the actual sources of 
evolution. 
 
 This is undoubtedly an important theoretical development, particularly for the socio-
economic domain. Knudsen shows how it is possible to distinguish between the change 
that is caused by selection, and change that comes about when information is transferred 
through, for example, learning, experimentation or development at the individual level 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004c). Significantly, as well as showing how adaptation may 
be reconciled with selection, for our purposes here, general selection theory also 
usefully demonstrates that selection without inheritance may also well occur (Knudsen, 
2004 p. 158). To illustrate, Knudsen cites a useful example offered by Price (1995, p. 
389);  
 
In palaeontology and archaeology, selection especially favours stones, pottery, and 
teeth, and greatly increases the frequency of mandibles among the bones of the 
human skeleton’. In this example, there is no obvious meaningful 
replicator/interactor distinction, and there is no meaningful principle of inheritance 
involved. Yet there is selection, variety and continuity. 
 
                                                 
115 Knudsen (2004, p. 152) ‘Price’s (1970, 1972) equation … offers an exact and complete mathematical 
description of evolutionary change under all conditions … this description includes evolution by 
selection, as well as change in population properties that occurs because of transmission.’ 
116 Elsewhere (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004c, p. 4), Knudsen offers a full definition of the concept of 
general selection: ‘Selection involves an anterior set of entities, each interacting with their environment, 
and somehow being transformed into a posterior set, where all members of the posterior set are 
sufficiently similar to some members of the anterior set, and where the resulting frequencies of posterior 
entities depend upon their properties in the environmental context’  
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  Thus, selection without inheritance can clearly occur. So is this how we would 
categorize Hannan and Freeman’s theory? They stress that their theory is a selection 
theory and acknowledge that it is thus only partial, and they clearly seem to want to 
make claims about the real world based on how it presently stands. Their view is that 
that we can tell a satisfactory evolutionary story without a ‘definition of forms based on 
organizational genetics’ or indeed the articulation of an inheritance mechanism, and 
they even cite the authority of Darwin to support their selectionist position.117  
 Nonetheless, it is argued here that in spite of Hannan and Freeman’s failure to 
articulate an inheritance mechanism, their theory could not be described as strictly 
selectionist in the terms outlined above. In other words, a selection process without 
inheritance or replication. Indeed Knudsen makes it clear that such processes are most 
unlikely in the social domain (2002, 2004). The important point is textual analysis 
confirms that at the very least Hannan and Freeman are describing undirected heritable 
variation, that is, modern neo-Darwinian selection (Darwinian Mendelian synthesis). 
The fact is that through their inertial principle, continuity or ‘inheritance’ is clearly 
implied. A replicator is implicit in their theory. And furthermore, a replicator-interactor 
distinction can even be discerned in their theory.  
 
General Selection Theory and Implied Inheritance 
 
Knudsen observes that there are two senses in which Darwinism is adopted in the socio-
economic sphere, one metaphorical and the other analogical. In the first case theorists 
use natural selection to model a competitive struggle that results in the survival of the 
fittest (2002, p. 443), and in the second, analogical sense, it is implied that the process 
of selection in the economic domain is very similar to neo-Darwinian selection in 
biology (p. 444).  He goes on to stress that the two senses are often confused in the 
literature. Hannan and Freeman, as we saw above, describe their theory as ‘Darwinian’ 
though they resist articulating an inheritance process. In order to perceive their implied 
inheritance and indeed to clarify the true nature of their selection process we need to 
observe Knudsen’s above distinction and to consider his clarifications below about the 
relationship between general selection theory and Darwinian evolution.   
 The definition of selection based on the Price Equation can be applied to anything 
that evolves (Knudsen, 2004, p. 148). Thus, general selection theory covers the two 
                                                 
117 (1989, p. 50) ‘Darwin relied less on a complete set of species classifications than on his own 
naturalistic observations … Darwin built a successful theory of evolution using the wrong theory of 
genetics – a theory of blending inheritance – and an inaccurate set of species classifications’. 
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 quite different concepts of selection that tend to be employed in science (p. 151).  The 
first is ‘subset selection’ (Price, 1995) and refers to the selection of a subset of elements 
according to a criterion of preference or excellence,118 and the second is Darwinian 
selection which refers to ‘replicating populations in which continuity is secured by 
inheritance’. Knudsen observes that general selection theory includes Darwinian natural 
selection as a special case, which in turn includes ‘neo-Darwinian’ selection  as a 
special case, as well as other types of selection like Lamarckian selection. Clarification 
of the selection process provides clarification of variety and continuity in each of these 
scenarios and thus enables useful distinctions to be drawn between them and, thereby, 
the easier identification of evolutionary accounts, such as the case study here under 
review.  
 For example, it is suggested here that Hannan and Freeman would probably cast 
themselves in the first category, that is, what we might call ‘pre-Mendelian’ Darwinian 
natural selection, alluding as they do to Darwin’s broader notion of natural selection 
which concerned replicating populations but which did not, in their view, invoke a 
replicator-interactor distinction. Alternatively, they might be persuaded to the view 
here, that they are better cast in the second category, that of neo-Darwinian selection. 
Whilst Nelson and Winter, on the other hand, would most likely fall into the third 
Darwinian / Lamarckian selection category. 
 To illustrate, Knudsen (p. 160) demonstrates that although replication and the 
replicator-interactor distinction are not necessary for evolution to take place, because 
the replicator-interactor distinction is a feature of ‘particularly persistent evolutionary 
systems’, there are nevertheless good reasons why we would expect to see it at the 
core of social and economic selection processes. And this relates to the ‘protection’ of 
the hereditary mechanism in replication processes (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry, 
1999), as he goes on to explain; 
 
The hereditary material is encoded in the replicator. When the replicator and the 
interactor are ontologically distinct entities, and a barrier separates the two, it 
follows that the hereditary material is protected. By contrast, if the hereditary 
material was altered in each and every instance, it would simply reflect the noise of 
the environment, and evolution would come to a halt. Unless a separation actually 
exists between replicators and interactors, evolutionary processes would be very 
erratic and very limited. This contradicts the remarkable endurance of, at least 
some forms of cultural evolution (Durham, 1991; Boyd and Richerson).  
                                                 
118 Knudsen offers examples of a manager’s selection of a subset of applicants for vacant positions and a 
housewife’s selection of a subset of apples on display at the market. 
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  And relatedly, another important implication of the ontological separation of the 
replicator and interactor in the social domain is stressed by Knudsen, which underlines 
the argument here that Hannan and Freeman’s account is closer to neo-Darwinism, 
and thus returns the analysis to the subject of an implicit replicator-interactor duality. 
Essentially, as Knudsen (p. 161) explains, a replicator-interactor distinction in the 
social realm would suggest that ‘genotypic’ features of social organizations would 
change more slowly than the ‘phenotypic’ features, in other words, the routines would 
change more slowly than the actual behaviours. And, significantly this is precisely 
what Hannan and Freeman express through their concept of structural inertia (core 
features change more slowly than peripheral ones), and what they demonstrate in their 
empirical studies (Carroll and Hannan, 1995; Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
 
Structural Inertia  
 
In spite of Hannan and Freeman’s omission and contrary to what they claim, modern 
neo-Darwinian inheritance is nonetheless assumed in their theory. It is expressed in 
their concept of structural inertia and in the definition and treatment of their central 
interacting entity, the ‘relatively inert’ organizational form.119 Hannan and Freeman 
(1970, 1984, and 1989) are consistent in their recognition of ‘faithfully reproducing 
structures that resist transformation’ (Hannan, 2005, p. 59). Indeed the inertial 
principle logically implies replication or transmission,120 and replication is perceived 
in their concept of fitness and focus on ‘vital rates’. Essentially the details of 
replicating processes are subsumed in the rates of foundings and mergers, those rates 
that indicate fitness. Fitness denotes the ability of organizations to improve their 
numbers or grow, and in a selection process we are naturally talking about this 
‘fitness’ in competition, as Hannan and Freeman illustrate (p. 20); 
                                                                                                                                                                
We do think that selection in organizational populations is systematic, that various 
kinds of organizations differ in their survival chances, and that selection capitalizes 
on such differences. 
 
                                                 
119 They do not claim that organizations never change, rather, that they respond relatively slowly to the 
threats and opportunities in their environment (1989, p. 70); ‘The concept of inertia, like fitness, refers to 
a correspondence between the behavioural capabilities of a class of organizations and their environments’ 
120 Richerson (Personal Communication, 8th October 2005) ‘The inertial principle is described as the 
inheritance or continuity that generates a certain inertia in the population so that if nothing else happens 
the population stays the same from one time period to the next’. 
181 
  Furthermore, picking up on Knudsen’s points above about the likelihood of the 
replicator-interactor distinction in the social realm, and the view here of its implication 
in Hannan and Freeman’s own empirical findings and core assumptions, it is perhaps 
not surprising to find that they do, in fact, acknowledge the existence of some kind of 
genotypic equivalent in the organizational world, in other words, some kind of social 
entity able to pass on encoded information. Significantly, returning to their definition of 
the organizational form, there appears to be a clear conflation of the replicating and 
interacting entities.  Note that in their description below, organizations are both the 
instruction set and the outcome (p. 48, my italics); 
 
We have suggested (1977) that organizational forms be defined analogously, as 
instructions for building organizations and for conducting collective action. 
 
 Thus, not only is there Darwinian inheritance in Hannan and Freeman’s theory but it 
is implicitly a modern Darwinian inheritance which embraces the replicator-interactor 
duality. 
 As noted at the outset Hannan and Freeman never deny the inheritance process they 
simply declare their inability to explain it. And we are reminded here of their comments 
regarding the robustness of a macro theory that does not have to be reassembled each 
time a micro assumption is changed. Indeed we can see how this effectively releases 
them from the analytical obligation to explore the detailed mechanisms of replication 
and inheritance. Nevertheless, through the careful analysis here of Hannan and 
Freeman’s selection process their latent Darwinian inheritance mechanism has usefully 
been revealed. Hence it just remains here to ponder the question of their rejection of 
Lamarckian inheritance, and the implications of this for their evolutionary account of 
organizations. 
 
Towards a More Complete Evolutionary Theory 
 
Whilst neo-Darwinian inheritance may be demonstrated in Hannan and Freeman’s 
‘partial’ theory it is clear that the same cannot be said for Lamarckian inheritance.  As 
noted earlier, many commentators see this as a major flaw in their theory. Baum and 
Singh (1994), for example, cite a host of studies that provide evidence that 
organizations can and do change, and furthermore that these changes are important to 
understanding what organizations do as individuals, as populations, and as communities 
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 (p. 3). Indeed they see this as a major area of research for evolutionary theorists in the 
socio-economic domain (p. 6);  
 
By and large, organizational ecologists have not attempted to link ecological 
processes of interaction and genealogical processes of replication.  Consequently we 
still know very little about the other side of the evolutionary process - the structures 
of organizational inheritance and transmission (Baum, 1989). How are 
organizational structures and practices perpetuated through time? What is inherited 
and how? 
 
 Metcalfe (2004) underlines the crucial point that we cannot separate selection 
processes from development processes, stressing, for example, that variety drives 
economic evolution and that technological innovation is what feeds variety. Indeed, in 
praise of Nelson and Winter’s (1989) models of search behaviour he (1987, p. 64) 
observes that their theory usefully accounts for the behaviours that generate the very 
variety on which selection operates,  and applauds their insightful micro-to-macro style 
Darwinian account, which clearly and appropriately embraces Lamarckian inheritance 
(2003); 
 
One of the central lessons of the Nelson and Winter world view is the need to build 
a theory of growth in a bottom up fashion with due attention paid to the emergence 
of constraints at higher levels of aggregation.  
 
 In summary, although Hannan and Freeman reject Lamarckian inheritance it is very 
important to note that their work represents an empirical rather than a theoretical 
rejection of Lamarckism (Hodgson, 2001, p. 113). Indeed significantly there is nothing 
in their theory that suggests that Lamarckian inheritance is impossible in principle. 
Moreover, as indicated above they do not deny that organizations change, only that the 
change cannot account for the evolutionary change manifested at the population level. 
The point is there is clearly scope for the productive development of their theory. 
Ultimately reconciliation between Hannan and Freeman’s Darwinian selection and 
Lamarckian inheritance is theoretically possible. For as demonstrated in earlier Chapters 
and exemplified in the analysis of Nelson and Winter in Chapter 8, Lamarckism can 
assuredly be accommodated within the meta-theoretical framework of modern 
generalized Darwinism. 
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 Conclusion  
 
Clearly the modern Darwinian perspective, enhanced by recent clarifications of the 
selection process, has usefully enabled an incisive evaluation of Hannan and Freeman’s 
evolutionary theory, and indeed provided the conceptual tools for a useful comparative 
analysis. Evidently the Darwinian thread is even stronger than its characterization as a 
partial theory suggests.  As demonstrated here, implicit in this well-crafted Darwinian 
selectionist account is the crucial replicator and interactor distinction, and significantly, 
its development would not appear to be inconsistent with the existing theory.  Indeed in 
their recognition of their selection bias the author’s acknowledge inheritance as a gap in 
their theory and signal this as an important area for future research. Certainly empirical 
research is currently fueling the need for the theoretical accommodation of transmission 
processes (particularly ‘Lamarckian’) adding voice to the call for reconciliation between 
selectionists and adaptationist perspectives. 
 
The implications are that for a complete and more realistic account of social theories of 
evolution, theorists need to incorporate the Darwinian idea of a social replicator. This is 
powerfully demonstrated in Nelson and Winter’s account, it is evident here, and it will 
be now be underlined in the analysis of Howard Aldrich’s Organizations Evolving 
below. 
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 10   Howard Aldrich’s Organizations Evolving:  
       The Complete Darwinian Account? 
 
 
 
Evolutionary theory applies to many levels of analysis: groups, organizations, 
populations, and communities. Variation, selection, retention, and struggle are processes 
occurring within all social units and across all levels of analysis. 
                                                                                                                          Aldrich (1999) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents the final case study and the most recent evolutionary theory here 
under review. As well as underlining the inevitability and potential of Darwinism for the 
socio-economic realm, the work of Howard Aldrich (1999), in terms of its scope, also 
represents the closest approximation to a ‘general Darwinian’ approach.  Again, the 
philosophy of biology and recent theoretical and conceptual clarifications provide 
access and careful evaluation here. And interestingly, it is noted that although this is 
emphatically a Darwinian perspective and the Darwinian thread is never far from the 
surface, explicit references to Darwin, Darwinism or Darwinian are curiously absent 
from the text.   
 Broadest in scope and receptive to the most up-to-date developments in evolutionary 
theory, Aldrich’s approach essentially contemplates the origins or ‘emergence’ of 
organizations; the evolution of organizations via Darwinian selection; the units of 
selection issue; the replicator-interactor distinction; ‘Lamarckian’ inheritance and; 
group and multilevel selection. 
 
The Case of Howard Aldrich 
 
So do we yet have an all-encompassing or complete evolutionary account in the socio-
economic domain? On the face of it, compared to the preceding case studies, Howard 
Aldrich in, Organizations Evolving (1999), presents the most ‘Darwinian’ and, most 
inclusive account of the evolution of organizations. Embracing Darwinism as a ‘meta’ 
theory, Aldrich promotes a unifying schema for the social sciences which intuitively 
follows in the footsteps of the latest theoretical advances in evolutionary theory. 
 
 Following Campbell (1965), Aldrich explicitly adopts Darwin’s principles of variation, 
selection and inheritance. He implicitly promotes the organization as the primary unit of 
selection and organizational routines or competencies as the enduring gene-like entities 
which are selected for. Moreover, he wholeheartedly endorses multilevel selection 
theory, promoting the idea of intra-organizational selection as well as selection at the 
levels of the organization, the population, and beyond. Finally, in a decisive leap 
forward, Aldrich implicitly addresses the adaptationist and selectionist polarization and 
encourages a general Darwinian perspective which acknowledges the causal influence 
of both organizational routines and industrial selection environments.  
 Notably, however, in a book entitled ‘Organizations Evolving’, where the author 
admits to being more focused on the emergence of organizations, the reader looking for 
the ‘Darwinian imperative’ could, as Buenger (2000) argues, be disappointed. Despite 
setting out his evolutionary approach in Campbell’s (1965) popularly revised formula of 
variation, selection and retention, there is little expansion of these mechanisms at the 
expected junctures, so that their application is mostly implied and operation not always 
clear.   
 And relatedly, with regard to the underlying theme here of implicit Darwinism, it is 
surprising how few references there are to ‘Darwin’, ‘Darwinian’ or ‘Darwinism’ in the 
text. Having acknowledged Darwin as the source of Campbell’s inspiration (p. 21) and 
underlined the generic nature of Darwinian theory, it would seem that Aldrich is more 
comfortable thereafter using the broader term ‘evolutionary’ when referring to his own 
approach. Indeed in an early observation of the negative reactions of social scientists 
towards evolutionary theory, particularly Darwinian theory, in the same passage  
endorsing a general Darwinism, Aldrich hints at the reasons for his own reticence about 
explicit references to Darwin (p. 21);  
 
Many [social scientists] have been reluctant to consider the evolutionary approach 
because of misunderstandings caused by authors who confuse old fashioned social 
Darwinist ideas with modern evolutionary ideas … As evolutionary applications 
become more common, I expect such misunderstandings to diminish in frequency 
and intensity. 
 
 This Chapter offers an evaluation of how Darwinian evolutionary ideas have been 
deployed in Aldrich’s schema.  Beginning with a summary of Aldrich’s approach and 
its Darwinian ingredients, this will serve as a review of the evidence proposed to 
support the assertion that Aldrich presents the most inclusive Darwinian perspective. 
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 We will then take a closer look at the various strands of theory, evaluating how they 
relate to each other and impact on the viability of Aldrich’s evolutionary argument. 
Here it will be shown that within Aldrich’s approach are the same type of problems that 
became apparent within the ‘units debate’ of evolutionary biology, and thus an implicit 
limitation on his multileveled account. This will be assessed in the light of Aldrich’s 
overarching framework, empirical observations and implicit assumptions, leading to a 
concluding section on the scope for further development of an evolutionary theory of 
organizational change.  
 
Aldrich’s Evolutionary Approach: The Darwinian Ingredients 
 
An accomplished organization theorist whose pioneering work (1979) inspired many 
investigations of organizational change in the evolutionary mode (Wade, 2002), Aldrich 
(1999) here offers the first stab at a much more inclusive Darwinian evolutionary 
approach with an attempt to explain organizational origins as well as organizational 
evolution. Moreover, bringing the theory up-to-date theoretically and conceptually, it 
grapples with the units and levels issue, discusses the replicator-interactor distinction 
and explicitly promotes a multileveled evolutionary account. Notably, this is an 
approach that is thoroughly Darwinian in character.  And yet crucially (in common with 
Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 428) and Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 11)), Aldrich is 
careful not to allow the peculiarities of the biological domain to dictate or skew his 
analysis of socio-economic phenomena (p. 21), but in an insightful way he illustrates 
the full range of its general applicability. Comfortable and fluent as he is with the 
evolutionary approach he is unapologetic about its use and indeed asserts that in the last 
few decades it has become a much more taken-for-granted generic approach (p. 21). 
 
Darwinian Processes: Variation, Retention and Selection 
 
In keeping with the Darwinian approach, Aldrich immediately signals his adoption of its 
three core principles (p. 20). Inspired by Campbell’s variation and selective retention 
model, he adds an interesting fourth principle, which he refers to as ‘struggle’. Variation 
is described as ‘change from current routines and competencies’ or ‘change in 
organizational forms’. Significantly, in terms of a more inclusive approach, variation, 
for Aldrich, is pre-existing and, moreover, has many causes which include the 
intentional; ‘when people actively attempt to generate alternatives and seek solutions to 
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 problems’, and the blind; which ‘occurs independently of environmental or selection 
pressures (p. 22). Selection is defined as the ‘differential elimination of certain types of 
variations’, whilst retention, is described as ‘selected variations [that] are preserved, 
duplicated, or otherwise reproduced’. Finally, Aldrich’s additional principle of 
‘struggle’ is defined as the ‘contest to obtain scarce resources because their supply is 
limited’.   
 
The Fourth Principle 
 
In the passage below Aldrich indicates the interconnectedness of these core principles in 
the evolutionary process. Evidently the fourth principle is meant to illustrate the point 
that units subjected to the selection environment are not the passive entities portrayed 
by organizational ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) since in their ‘struggle’ to 
prevail they respond to their environment and adjust strategies accordingly.  Thus, I 
would suggest, that through Aldrich’s principle of struggle we also perceive the 
inclusion of adaptive or Lamarckian explanations of change (p. 33); 
 
Variation generates the raw materials for selection, by environmental or internal 
criteria; retention processes preserve the selected variation.  But retention processes 
also restrict the kinds of variations that may occur, and competitive struggles as well 
as cooperative alliances may change the shape of selection criteria. 
 
 Aldrich presents these four ‘necessary and sufficient’ (p. 21) processes as the key 
mechanisms of evolutionary theory. Then, to emphasize their generic nature and 
explanatory value for organization theory, he explains that such evolutionary models do 
not specify the engines driving variation, selection and retention, but depend upon ideas 
from other approaches.  In other words, Aldrich underlines the point that domain 
specific, auxiliary explanations are required to give these Darwinian mechanisms their 
meaning and relevance.  And this is where Aldrich admirably brings the concepts to life 
and illustrates his eclectic approach.  In a comprehensive survey of organizational 
research he provides a wealth of ‘domain specific’ theoretical and empirical 
observations that typify the engines that drive these mechanisms in the socio-economic 
world. Underpinning the view, that the evolutionary approach serves as an overarching 
theory within which others are recognised, he suitably reviews several organization 
science perspectives illustrating their contribution and relevance. These include, the 
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 ecological, institutional, interpretive, organizational learning, resource dependent and 
transaction cost economizing approaches. 
 
Emergence 
 
Notably, in contrast to Nelson and Winter, Hannan and Freeman, and indeed most other 
organization scholars who study existing organizations, Aldrich’s main pre-occupation 
is with the genesis or emergence of new organizations. 121  As a result, some 
commentators see it as somewhat inconsistent that his agenda is explicitly framed by 
Campbell’s (1965) model of variation, selection and retention which addresses 
transformation, whilst his explanations appear to be derived from a different set of ideas 
which address emergence (Strang, 2002).  However, I would suggest that this apparent 
inconsistency reflects both the ambitious scope of Aldrich’s scheme - to uniquely 
attempt an evolutionary explanation of both organizational change and founding - and 
the subtlety of his argument. The point is, having devoted a Chapter to the evolutionary 
approach, where he discusses his interpretation and use of these mechanisms, he is 
rather remiss thereafter at signalling their role or significance. It is fair to say that 
whether we are talking about emergence or transformation, much of Aldrich’s 
evolutionary argument, in terms of variation, selection and retention, is implied, and 
each of these processes of evolution (and others, like mutation and learning) appear to 
be subsumed into, what he sees as, the ‘selection logic’.  This will become clearer when 
we take a closer look at Aldrich’s treatment of selection. 
 Unusually within the organizations community (with the exception of the 
organizational ecologists) and reflecting a Darwinian population thinking perspective, 
Aldrich really emphasizes variety. Indeed, his aim is to ‘ground the book in the 
substance of organizations in all their diversity, rather than to write as if the Fortune 500 
were the only creatures in the organizational zoo’ (p. 1).  For Aldrich, our understanding 
of the source of variety is crucial to our understanding of existing organizational 
diversity. As he explains, ‘without understanding why and how new social units 
emerge, we miss the connection between the on-going creative ferment in human 
                                                 
121 It is not always clear what Aldrich means by the term ‘emergence’ and how this is understood by his 
reviewers.  He uses the words ‘founding’ and ‘emergence’ interchangeably to refer to the creation of new 
organizations. Their frequent use reflects Aldrich’s deliberate avoidance of the word ‘birth’ which fails to 
describe the process he wishes to explain.  As he makes clear, ‘I used the term foundings rather than 
‘births’ to convey a sense of the process-driven, emergent nature of organizational creation’ (p. 260).  
Nevertheless, emergence appears simultaneously to relate to the philosophical meaning of emergence in 
terms of ‘emergent properties’.  This second sense, however, where Aldrich treats higher level entities as 
emerging from lower level entities in the organizational hierarchy, tends to be assumed in his analysis.  
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 societies and the particular realizations of it in organizations.’122 Thus he extends the 
range of organizations to be studied beyond the medium and small to include the actual 
genesis of organizations.  Accordingly his analysis focuses on the activities of nascent 
entrepreneurs and their creative role in founding organizations.  
 
Multilevel Selection 
 
Again, indicating the inclusiveness of his Darwinian perspective, in a significant 
advance on the previous case studies, Aldrich elaborates a multileveled selection 
analysis. This is central to his approach and is in keeping with his focus not only on the 
genesis and transformation of organizations, but also on that of organizational 
populations and communities. For Aldrich this means the application of variation, 
selection and retention ‘across levels’, with selection occurring simultaneously at all 
levels of the organizational hierarchy (p. 40). Evidently, in this comprehensive schema, 
Aldrich seeks to address the links between micro and macro processes and focus 
attention on the important dynamics within and between units and levels. Again we can 
perceive advancement on Hannan and Freeman, and Nelson and Winter’s respective 
accounts, where the former have little to say on the internal activities of the firm and the 
latter, whose attempts to show the influence on industrial characteristics emanating from 
this lower level were somewhat confused in their ambiguous ‘search’ concept where 
units and levels of selection became muddled. 
 
Unit of Selection 
 
Linked to the multilevel selection approach, is the considered attention Aldrich pays to 
the unit of selection in organization science (pp. 35-41), 123  that crucial entity in 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, the nature of which clearly determines the very 
tractability of the theory.  Indeed the book is structured such that Aldrich’s Chapters 
deal in turn with the emergence, then evolutionary transformation, of organizations, 
populations and communities; all of which he treats as potential units of selection. 
However, Aldrich’s multileveled approach hinges on his treatment of the units at the 
                                                 
122 It is interesting to observe similar sentiments expressed recently by Hannan (2005); ‘If one pays 
attention only to those organizations that have succeeded in moving from fringe to centre, then severe 
problems of sample selectivity arise in explaining how specific organizational characteristics affect 
success and failure.  Such a focus will also miss the main source of organizational diversity: the creation 
of new organizations on the “fringes.”’ 
123 That is the unit of selection as expressed by Sober (1984) 
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 foundation of this hierarchy, and it is here where we begin to detect a problem for the 
development of his theory.  
 Aldrich fittingly highlights the important and unresolved issue amongst organization 
scholars over the preferred unit of selection, noting a general demarcation in the 
literature between the ‘routine’ and the ‘organization’. In his analysis of the debate he 
observes the nature of this distinction and notes the units being favoured by opposing 
sides (p. 35); 
 
We can distinguish between the bounded entities that are engaged in competition 
and cooperation (groups and organizations) from the organizational competencies 
(routines, operating procedures, competencies) that are carried by the entities. 
 
 In Aldrich’s own analysis it is clear that he favours the organization as the primary 
unit of selection 124  and in his discussions of multilevel selection, in addition to 
populations and communities, he also implicitly promotes entrepreneurs, routines and 
competencies as units of selection. However, embedded in his distinction between the 
various units of selection, is the important functional distinction that actually defines the 
unit of selection; namely the replicator and interactor distinction (Hull, 1988). Whilst it 
is significant, from a Darwinian point of view, that Aldrich discusses and recognises 
this distinction, with routines and competencies, for example, featuring in his portrayal 
of retention (p. 30), it is similarly important to note that these replicating entities are 
simultaneously featured by Aldrich as units of selection. As previously noted, this subtle 
and oft-repeated confusion has since been clarified by Sober’s (1984) useful distinction. 
Expressed in Aldrich’s terminology Sober explained that there is selection of the 
‘bounded entities’ and selection for their corresponding ‘organizational competencies’.   
 Aldrich’s merging of unit of selection distinctions with functional distinctions 
essentially amounts to a duplication of the same confusions that became apparent in the 
fraught ‘units debate’ of evolutionary biology and indeed there are echoes of the 
theoretical problems encountered in Nelson and Winter (1982).  However, as will be 
demonstrated in due course, there is clear potential for its similar resolution through the 
explicit adoption of the generalized replicator and interactor concepts.  This would 
certainly enhance the articulation of Aldrich’s theory and crucially, it would not deny 
the prospect of routines and organizations simultaneously being treated as units of 
selection.   
                                                 
124 That is to say the ‘primary interactor’ (Hull, 1988, p. 434) 
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 Group Selection and Social Replicators 
 
On a closely related topic, and significantly advancing the scope of his evolutionary 
account and its Darwinian credentials, subsumed in Aldrich’s argument about additional 
units of selection, and in his treatment of emergence, is the implicit adoption of the 
modern understanding of group selection (Henrich, 2004). Much of Aldrich’s analysis 
and empirical observations bolster this theoretical imperative, particularly his 
discussions of ‘organizational boundaries’ (pp. 113-140). In his discussions of group 
formation and maintenance, Aldrich implicitly recognises the within-group and 
between-group selection dynamic, in other words the simultaneous operation of internal 
and external selection processes. Accordingly he acknowledges that there will be 
conditions under which group selection will swamp individual selection (Henrich, 
2004).   
 As discussed in Chapter 7 above, this is a critical development for socio-economic 
theories of evolution for it logically invites the notion of a social replicator,125 and, the 
possibility of multilevel selection. For example, citing the work of Keisler and Keisler, 
Aldrich explains (p. 336);  
 
Homogeneity increases among the members of fledgling organizations because of 
selection processes at two levels. Inside new organizations, members’ attentions are 
increasingly biased toward sampling shared information, and they tend to ignore 
non-shared information. This frequency-dependent bias amplifies the majority’s 
views and further suppresses those of the minority, reducing intra-organizational 
variation (Keisler and Keisler 1969).  
 
 Essentially this expresses the idea of ‘partitioned selection’ (Price 1970, 1972) which 
accommodates the inherent tension between competition and cooperation in individual 
versus group selection scenarios, and enables the articulation of multiple levels of 
selection (Henrich, 2004). Indeed without the idea of group selection it would be 
impossible to conceptualize selection above the level of the individual and this would 
naturally prevent the conceptualization of multilevel selection, and thus significantly 
curtail an evolutionary theory of the social domain. Significantly Aldrich’s group 
selectionist assumptions facilitate his multileveled approach. 
 
                                                 
125 The establishment of group selection in the social arena logically implies the existence of some kind of 
social replicator. In other words, some trait, that improves the group’s fitness and enables it to flourish in 
competition with other groups, is being selected for. 
192 
 Indeterminacy and Intentionality 
 
Finally, in another reinforcing demonstration of the Darwinian outlook, Aldrich 
highlights the ‘indeterminacy’ of evolutionary theory and thus, for him, its perfect 
suitability for an evolutionary theory of organizational change (p. 33). In the socio-
economic domain change is viewed as being stochastic with chance playing a large role 
in evolutionary outcomes.  Aldrich thus pushes the controversial point (for many 
organizations scholars) that the organizational world is ‘inherently dynamic and 
vigorous but not inherently modernizing’ (Dobbin, 2001 p. 1523, my italics).  
 Observing the resistance to indeterminacy and what it means for theorists, Aldrich 
acknowledges that ‘the most difficult premise to convey is that selection derives from 
the consequences of action, [and] not the intentions of actors’ (p. 336). Human 
intentionality, as noted in previous Chapters, is a very important issue, and it continues 
to cause problems for social scientists.  However, importantly, Aldrich shows that 
Darwinian selection does not deny intentionality but inevitably operates on its 
outcomes. He thereby underpins the subtle but important empirical point that intentional 
and insightful human behaviour cannot be equated with ‘infallible behaviour’ or 
‘perfect foresight’ of future economic conditions (Vromen, 2004 p. 223), as is otherwise 
being suggested. 
 
Towards an Inclusive Darwinian Approach 
 
From a Darwinian perspective, it is apparent from the above overview that Aldrich has 
all the essential ingredients of a viable evolutionary theory. Whilst he acknowledges 
that the work in itself does not lead to a ‘well wrapped ending point’ (p. 331), it 
nevertheless arguably provides a promising theoretical framework for a credible 
evolutionary theory of organizational change. Aldrich proposes the core Darwinian 
principles of variation, retention and selection, he assumes the replicator and interactor 
duality, accommodates adaptive change, and promotes group and multilevel selection. 
In a major leap forward Aldrich admirably synthesizes the oft-criticized ‘multi-
paradigmatic’ field of organization studies under the unifying framework of modern 
Darwinism. 
 The following analysis will now consider the aforementioned anomalies relating to 
Aldrich’s replicator and interactor distinction and how this compromises his multilevel 
schema. This begins with a discussion of the unit of selection and the problems that this 
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 presents for Aldrich and his organizations colleagues. Reflecting on theoretical and 
conceptual developments in evolutionary theory relating to the process of selection, the 
discussion then points to the resolution of the theoretical problems raised in Aldrich’s 
theory, moving on to a renewed evaluation of the possibilities for his multileveled 
account. Building on this evaluation, the remainder of the Chapter then offers a more 
detailed investigation of the key strands of Aldrich’s evolutionary theory, illustrating its 
Darwinian and much more inclusive nature.  This incorporates the examination of 
emergence, group-selection and intra-group dynamics, as well as inter-group dynamics 
and adaptation. As we shall see, Aldrich’s discerning research agenda curiously mimics 
the current theoretical agenda in evolutionary biology and the related theoretical and 
conceptual developments in generalized Darwinism.  
 
Units of Selection: ‘Activities and Structures’ and ‘Bounded Entities’ 
 
As noted, Aldrich promptly draws attention to the important and unsettled issue of the 
unit of selection and suggests that a multileveled approach is key to its resolution (pp. 
14, 35). However, unwittingly, in setting out the points of disagreement amongst 
organization theorists he also manages to duplicate the classic confusion over units and 
levels of selection. And this is in spite of an excellent discussion in Chapter 2 of the 
replicator-interator distinction.  
 Aldrich observes the two most favored units of selection in the organizations 
literature which he notes are characterized either by the ‘activities and structures’ on 
which evolution operates, or by the ‘bounded entities’ that carry those activities and 
structures (p. 21).  In the first case he shows that scholars are focused on routines, 
competencies and jobs, whereas in the second they focus on groups, organizations, 
populations and communities.  Aldrich states that he reviews these options without 
offering a strong defense for either point of view (p. 35).  Indeed he seemingly relieves 
himself of this task by virtue of his multileveled selection approach. In point of fact this 
oversimplifies the position. Significantly, Aldrich wholly embraces both types of ‘units 
of selection’ within his multileveled hierarchy. But, as indicated above, this is not a 
straightforward hierarchy of similar entities. Indeed, it is his conflation of different 
types of entities that ultimately causes problems for his theory. In order to illustrate this 
theoretical ambiguity, we will first consider the influences on his thinking about units 
from the organizations literature.  
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  To illustrate the ‘routines and competencies’ as units, Aldrich (p. 35) cites theorists 
who have explored evolution inside the organization, who have studied, for example, 
the differential survival of strategic initiatives (Burgelman and Mittman, 1994), 
managerial actions (Miner, 1991, 1994), and hiring rules and personnel (Warglien, 
1993). These equate with Aldrich’s organizational routines and competencies, which he 
describes as being ‘carried’ in bounded entities. Interestingly, in view of the discussion 
above in Chapter 8 about the units confusions, Aldrich identifies Nelson and Winter 
(1982), along with organizational learning theorists (March, 1991), for favouring 
routines and competencies as units of selection. However, as I argued, Nelson and 
Winter explicitly posited selection of firms, and only implicitly, through their ‘search’ 
process, suggested selection for routines.  
 To illustrate the alternative view of ‘organizations’ as units of selection, Aldrich 
contrasts the approach of the population ecologists, Hannan and Freeman, who, as he 
reminds us, perceive changes in organizational form as occurring ‘through the selective 
elimination of certain organizations and the survival of others’ (p. 37).  He describes 
below how population ecologists perceive these organizational entities, or what Aldrich 
calls ‘bounded entities’; 
 
To be a unit of selection, an entity must have the characteristics of a bounded system 
and have boundary-maintaining processes organized around the persistence of the 
unit and the perpetuation of its activities. Work groups, departments, divisions, 
organizations, and populations have this character, although in varying degrees. 
 
 Aldrich then cites other theorists who advocate even higher units of selection such as 
populations (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Astley, 1985), communities and ecosystems 
(Baum and Singh, 1994; Hodgson, 1993), but notes that these are very few in number. 
 
Return to the Problems of the ‘Units Debate’  
 
Reflecting on this delineation in the literature Aldrich is clear that the distinction 
indicates for him, two distinguishable or alternative units of selection as well as two 
distinguishable levels of selection. However, what is also evident in Aldrich’s 
characterizations above is a replicator and interactor distinction, a functionally related 
distinction that he is notably equally keen to stress.126 Elsewhere, he observes and 
                                                 
126 Aldrich (Personal Communication, 18th June 2004) ‘In my 1999 book, in Chapter 2, I took on this 
issue and argued for distinguishing between organizations as ‘carriers’ or ‘vehicles’ for routines versus 
195 
 reiterates these functional distinctions, with routines, for example, being acknowledged 
as the drivers of the fate of the organizations, and the organizations being portrayed as 
their ‘carriers’ (pp. 40-41). It is clear that Aldrich sees the organization as the 
‘interacting’ unit and it is apparent throughout the text that routines are understood as 
the enduring entities of which organizations are comprised.  
 Aldrich thus invites confusion when (having acknowledged routines and 
organizations as separate units of selection) in his explanation of the process of 
selection, as it operates on the routine, he actually identifies the group as the unit of 
selection. As can be seen in his summary of the ‘routines as units of selection’ position, 
which he later explicitly endorses (p. 40-41), Aldrich effectively manages to merge two 
‘units of selection’ into one selection process (p. 36 my italics); 
 
From this perspective, evolutionary processes affect the course of change – at 
whatever level – by their selective effects on the entities embodying routines and 
competencies.  Organizations, then, are the temporary repositories of competencies 
and routines that are held by their members and embedded in their technologies, 
material artifacts, and other structures.  The distribution of these competencies and 
routines in a population depends on the selective survival and growth of 
organizations that contain different combinations of them. Analysis should therefore 
focus on conditions favoring the selection of routines and competencies, with 
organizational survival a secondary consideration. 
 
 Notice that in this explanation of the routine as the unit of selection, it is only 
‘vicariously’ selected, via the organization. Thus what we actually see here is a 
description of the traditional single level selection process where, in a nested hierarchy 
of entities (routines, organizations and populations) there is selection of organizations 
and selection for their particular routines.  In other words these routines are selected as a 
consequence of their host organization being selected, so that the organization is the unit 
of selection and not the routine.  
 Aldrich evidently needs to be clear about which unit he is nominating as the primary 
unit of selection. His expressed concern to embrace both (‘I also believe that both 
modes of selection – routines and competencies, and entire organizations – have a place 
in evolutionary analysis’ (p. 40)) is unfortunately not supplemented by a satisfactory 
explanation of how this is to be achieved. Indeed, his account at times is reminiscent of 
Dawkin’s (1976) gene-selectionist position where genes (routines) are primary and the 
phenotype (organization) is merely the temporary carrier of routines.  Dawkins had 
                                                                                                                                               
the routines themselves.  This is the distinction in other words between interactors and replicators, 
although I didn’t use these terms’. 
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 exacerbated the debate amongst evolutionary biologists with his gene selectionist 
position. We recall, however, from Hull’s (1980, 1981) elucidation of the selection 
process, which was subsequently endorsed by Dawkins (1982), 127  that the classic 
formulation essentially describes a single level selection process which crucially is 
comprised of the sub-processes of replication and interaction.  
 Thus, although Aldrich explicitly promotes a multileveled evolutionary approach, 
which embraces the various levels favoured by researchers, his failure to unpack the 
selection process and the functional role of the replicator has rather curtailed his 
argument on this front. With confusion at this primary level, over which unit actually 
functions as the unit of selection, it makes it difficult to envisage an orderly hierarchy of 
ascending units of selection. As already elaborated, however, the untangling of the 
various elements of the selection process for evolutionary theorists was no easy task, 
causing prolonged disagreement in the philosophy of biology. It is thus not surprising to 
see how it has clearly presented similar challenges for those applying Darwinian 
selection to socio-economic evolution. 
 
Aldrich’s Social Replicators and Interactors 
 
Notably, according to Aldrich’s own definitions, routines and organizations are very 
different kinds of entities. Indeed, as he observes, this is key to the justification of 
theorists opting for different units of selection. The routine is portrayed as the enduring, 
replicating entity (resistant to change), whilst the organization is portrayed as the carrier 
of routines which interacts with and is selected by the environment. Thus Aldrich is 
clearly recognising and embracing a replicator-interactor distinction. As demonstrated 
in previous Chapters, this is a very significant distinction when it comes to articulating 
the process of selection, not only as it operates on one unit of selection but particularly 
when it comes to expressing multiple levels of selection.128 Indeed, the confusion and its 
resolution lie in this critical functional difference between the replicator and interactor, 
in other words between Aldrich’s alternatives of ‘organizational routines’ and ‘bounded 
entities’. 
 
                                                 
127 It is worth noting that Dawkins (1982) also recognized organisms and higher-level units as being 
interactors, in other words, the units directly confronting selection. 
128 See Chapter 7 above on multilevel selection theory  
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 Resolution of the Units Debate in Aldrich’s Theory 
 
Significantly, whilst Aldrich may not have fully unpacked the modern articulation of the 
selection process, all the critical ingredients and foundational assumptions are 
nevertheless present in his theory. As has been established, selection is a ‘two-step’ 
process comprised of the sub-processes of replication and interaction, and it is only after 
establishing the ‘peculiar duality’ of the unit of selection that it is possible to go on to 
articulate multilevel selection. Crucially, this same duality is very evident in Aldrich’s 
portrayal of routines and organizations, for example (p. 4); 
 
I use the term routines as a generic term, following Levitt and March (1988, p. 320): 
‘the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around 
which organizations are constructed and through which they operate’. 
 
 Aldrich, in the following passage, reinforces this duality and, moreover, appears to 
recognise its foundational role (as the primary interactor) in a multileveled account of 
selection, such as that described in Chapter 7 above (p. 113) as position V (p.  41,  my 
italics); 
 
Organizations constitute the key site for the replication of routines and 
competencies.  Organizations are at the intersection of many forces: the 
competencies carried by experienced members, accumulated understandings within 
a work group, competitive and cooperative pressures from a population, and 
normative and regulatory obligations from a community and society. The persistence 
of entities at all levels therefore depends heavily upon reproduction and retention 
processes at the organizational level. The significance of organizations as carriers of 
routines and competencies and as bounded entities probably explains why most 
evolutionary analyses are still carried out at the organizational level (Baum and 
Singh, 1994). 
 
 Indeed, the ‘dual aspect’ notion of the organization can clearly be seen in the above 
exposition. There the idea of a self-contained unit (interactor) which is somehow 
imbued with a mechanism which ensures its own persistence (replicator). And the 
multileveled organizational hierarchy (of interactors) is indicated in the description of 
the interconnection between members, groups, populations and communities, which 
clearly has the organization as primary interactor. The critical point is that this 
characterization of the ‘unit’ that operates in an organizational selection process is 
clearly consistent with the dual aspect nature of the unit of selection, with its replicator 
and interactor sub-processes. And significantly, it also implicitly concurs with Hull’s 
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 requirements for a generalized multileveled account. Thus although Aldrich does not 
attempt to elaborate the specific roles of the replicating and interacting entities within 
the selection process, it would appear that his theory would nevertheless be receptive to 
this modern Darwinian articulation. 
 
Viability of Aldrich’s Multilevel Selection Theory 
 
To be sure, what I have endeavoured to emphasize above is that firstly, Aldrich posits a 
replicating entity and that secondly, he firmly acknowledges a replicator and interactor 
distinction.129 Having shown this to be the case, after highlighting the anomaly he 
presented in the portrayal of these same entities as a ‘merged’ unit of selection, we can 
now move on to show that, from a modern Darwinian perspective, the latter does not, in 
fact, compromise his multilevel analysis.  Reflecting on Chapters 5 and 7 above, we will 
recall that Hull’s explanation of the selection process accommodated multiple levels of 
selection. That is, in acknowledging the viability of a social replicator (1988, p. 406),130 
his conceptual apparatus permits the possibility of a social hierarchy comprised of a 
primary level of replicators and multiple levels of interactors, a scenario described as  
position V on the table of multilevel selection possibilities, in Chapter 7 above.  
 What this essentially means for Aldrich, is that he can continue to have the important 
routine and organization distinction, in other words, the functional distinction now 
generalized as the replicator and interactor distinction. And, yet at the same time he can 
continue with the idea of routines and organizations being units of selection. In other 
words these and other units higher up the organizational hierarchy can also be 
considered as interactors, or units of selection, as demonstrated in the Nelson and 
Winter Chapter above.   
 Significantly, in terms of the viability of Aldrich’s theory, through the adoption of 
Hull’s generalized terminology, its consequential modification lends greater support to 
Aldrich’s claim that variation, retention and selection apply ‘across levels’.  Indeed, it 
does away with the need for Aldrich to confusingly invoke each of the three principles 
                                                 
129 Refer to footnote 126 above. 
130 In this case Hull gives the example of Dawkin’s ‘meme’ (1976). Later (p. 434) in his discussion of 
science as a selection process he gives the example of ‘ideas’ acting as social replicators; ‘What functions 
as the replicators in science? The answer is not very surprising: elements of the substantive content of 
science-beliefs about the goals of science, proper ways to go about realizing these goals, problems and 
their possible solutions, models of representation, accumulated data and so on.  Scientists in 
conversations, publications, and classroom lectures broach all these topics. These are the entities that get 
passed on in replication sequences … As in biological evolution, each replication counts as a generation 
with respect to selection. 
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 at every level, for as Hull (1980) observed, while replication tends to be concentrated at 
the lower levels, interaction [selection] occurs at a much wider variety of levels.131
 Interestingly, in view of the argument being presented here, in a recent work (Aldrich 
and Martinez, 2003) where the focus is on the constructive role of the entrepreneur, 
Aldrich does not repeat this tripartite supposition but is much more clearly invoking 
multiple levels of selection only. Here the authors present an evolutionary explanation 
which is quite evidently structured on the interconnected principles of variation, 
retention and selection, and yet only stresses selection at multiple levels.  Indeed in 
some respects this work arguably represents a clearer articulation of Aldrich’s 
multileveled position and a more fitting summary of Organizations Evolving.  Note, for 
example, in the following passage that selection forces are operating at multiple levels 
but implicitly also on the routines, which represent the variety generated from the 
lowest level via the entrepreneur (2003, p. 359 my italics); 
 
The purpose of our chapter is to review and analyze the multi-level selection 
processes that apply across three different levels of entrepreneurial social 
constructions: organizations, populations and communities. We emphasize the 
inexorable tension between selection forces at the three levels that affect variations 
generated by entrepreneurs. 
 
 To be sure this work is more focused on the idea of selection (thus interaction) 
occurring across multiple levels, with the variation, selection, retention trilogy being 
mentioned only once (p. 383), and that is to explain that it is this trilogy, acting in 
concert with the foundational level of the replicating routine, that brings about the 
organizational forms that are seen at the industrial level.132 Evidently at the heart of 
their entrepreneurial story is the critical replicating and innovating organizational 
routine.133 Aldrich and Martinez’s portrayal of the nascent entrepreneur, as the major 
source of organizational variations (p. 360), involves the portrayal of entrepreneurs as 
‘carriers’ of these routines. Thus implicitly, in their organizational hierarchy, the 
entrepreneur is an interactor and unit of selection.134  
                                                 
131 This is not to suggest that in the continuum from the organic to the social domains that an additional 
replicator cannot then enter the hierarchy at a higher level (i.e., multiple replicators and multiple 
interactors, position V in Chapter 7 above), but merely to stress that the designated replicating entity 
tends to have a ‘one and many’ relationship between its primary and ascending levels of interactors. 
132 Aldrich and Martinez (2003, p. 383) ‘technological innovation typically involves a cumulative series 
of interrelated acts of variation, selection and retention that might culminate in commercial applications’. 
133 In a thirty two page chapter the word ‘routine’ features eighteen times. 
134 Indeed this mimics Hull’s (1988) characterization of science as a selection process where the scientist 
is portrayed as the primary interactor (p. 513); ‘Selection processes are complicated because they are the 
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 Logical Possibilities of Aldrich’s Multilevel Selection  
 
We might now consider Aldrich’s multileveled account in terms of the various logical 
possibilities of multilevel selection set out in the table above in Chapter 7. The 
impression gained here is that Aldrich presents two logical possibilities. It would appear 
that in some places Aldrich corresponds with position I on the schema, the basic ‘single 
level replicator, single level interactor’ position. He repeatedly states that the same 
evolutionary processes occur at each level, ‘across levels’.  However on examination of 
how he explains variation, selection, retention, often he is linking back to the variation, 
retention and selection that occurred at lowest level and merely relating it to outcomes 
at the higher levels (like an organism within its population).  In terms of the schema, he 
is effectively describing one replicator, one interactor and one species. Thus he is 
effectively describing a single level process.  
 On the other hand, most explanations, and indeed the main assertion of the book, 
correspond with the ‘multilevel replicator and multilevel interactor’ position, which is 
‘position V’ on the schema, and which reads, in a continuum from the organic to the 
social domain, as the introduction of an additional replicator at the social level with its 
own corresponding hierarchy of interactors. This essentially translates at the social 
level, to a single level of replicators and multiple levels of interactors.135 For example 
(p. 112), ‘selection forces at the cultural, population, and interpersonal level constrain 
most variations into a reproductive mode’.  For Aldrich, this is what explains the 
empirical observations which suggest that nascent entrepreneurs tend to reproduce 
(select) existing routines, and hence ‘inertia’. In other words, the multileveled selection 
pressures effectively conspire to limit the variations emanating from the lower levels.  
Thus we have a single level replicator with multiple levels of selection having an 
influence on the continuity of that replicator. 
 The point is Aldrich consistently talks about variation, retention and selection 
occurring across multiple levels, when in fact what he means is that selection is 
happening at these multiple levels. These important conceptual clarifications clearly 
thereby resolve a subtle but significant theoretical problem at the heart of Aldrich’s 
                                                                                                                                               
result of the interplay through successive generations of two processes-replication and interaction. 
Conceptual change in science is even more complicated because it is the result of the interplay of at least 
half a dozen processes that intersect at the level of individual scientists. They are the most important 
vehicles for both replication and interaction’. 
135 Indeed Aldrich’s multilevel account could also map onto position III of the schema, which 
conceptually amounts to the same thing except there is no continuum between biotic and social worlds. 
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 analysis, and breaths new life into a fertile and empirically well-informed theory.  As 
suggested above, through the generalized replicator and interactor terminology, we can 
conceive of multiple levels of interaction and consequently multiple levels of selection.  
 Indeed, this clarification decisively resonates throughout other strands of Aldrich’s 
theory, such as group selection, and the dynamics between different levels of selection. 
It clearly becomes possible through this modern formulation to conceive of Aldrich’s 
key agent, the ‘nascent entrepreneur’, as an additional interactor and unit of selection. 
And, as a result, there is facilitation of a smoother theoretical linkage between Aldrich’s 
articulation of the founding and emergence of organizations and their evolution. 
 For example, Aldrich states that he uses the evolutionary approach to ‘portray how 
new organizations emerge as people mobilize resources in pursuit of opportunities’ (p. 
2). In his analysis of the creation of new organizations he features the entrepreneur as 
the critical intermediary. The Darwinian principles are posited to explain how 
organizations emerge from selection processes which, it is implied, are effectively 
operating through the entrepreneur on existing and new routines.  The entrepreneur is 
thus the agent who reconfigures routines and competencies in such a way as to present a 
new organizational form to the selection environment.  While Aldrich is criticized for 
not elaborating on these three principles as they relate to the founding or emergence of 
organizations (Strang, 2002; Buenger, 2000), it can nevertheless now be perceived how, 
in a generalized multileveled account, the entrepreneur may simply be conceived of as 
another interactor.  The entrepreneur, in other words, is an interactor at a lower level - 
between the replicating routine and the organization.  
 Significantly, the careful deployment of the replicator and interactor concepts not 
only clarifies and enhances Aldrich’s Darwinian conceptualization of emergence 
(founding) and multilevel selection, together with recent developments of selection 
theory, they also shed light on other important and related questions that Aldrich 
himself identifies as deserving of more attention (p. 336); 
 
First, can we identify the conditions under which different units of selection are 
most likely to be favored by selection forces (Sober and Wilson, 1998)? Second, to 
what extent can supra-organizational levels of analysis be used not only as contexts 
for action in our models but also as units of selection in their own right?  Third, are 
levels of analysis merely an analytic device, or do they represent selection filters? 
 
 Implicit in the preceding analysis is affirmation that supra-organizations, as 
interactors, can be units of selection in their own right, in a multileveled Darwinian 
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 selection process.  Similarly, through the notion of ‘partitioned selection’ (Price, 1970, 
1972) as articulated by Henrich (2004), it is possible to identify the conditions under 
which different units of selection (individual and group) are likely to be favoured by 
selection forces, and, moreover to perceive ascending levels of interactors as effective 
selection filters. And, this is precisely what is alluded to, by Aldrich (p. 36) in the quote 
above (p. 199) where he talks about competencies being carried by members, groups 
and populations and so on, in an ascending hierarchy. 
 Against this backdrop of possibilities we will now take a closer look at Aldrich’s 
treatment of the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance (retention) and selection. 
Aldrich holds that these occur ‘within all social units and across all levels of analysis’ 
(p. 40).  In view of the above evaluation, which suggests that Aldrich’s account points 
to selection only  at multiple levels, it is fitting that we now consider how each of these 
principles are employed by Aldrich. 
 
Variation, Retention and Selection ‘Across Levels’ 
 
Aldrich’s assertion that variation, retention and selection occur within all social units 
and across all levels of analysis, appears, at a superficial level, to stand up.  There is a 
sense in which the evolutionary theory applies to multiple levels.  However, as indicated 
above, from a modern Darwinian perspective this assertion is problematic, and even 
from an examination of the text, Aldrich does not appear to follow the assertion 
through. Although he spends time in Chapter 2 (pp. 23-33) describing the incidence of 
variation, retention, selection and struggle at each level, fleshing this out with empirical 
studies, he does not adequately explain how the mechanisms operate at each level, 
either here or in subsequent Chapters. Indeed, in keeping with the above analysis of 
multilevel selection, on close examination, what we find is that we are talking about 
outcomes at these higher levels which are caused by the initial operation of these 
interweaving causal processes at the level of the organization.  
 This is a very subtle point. It is true that Aldrich identifies variation, retention, 
selection and struggle at each level, but most significantly, the actual entity being 
discussed comes from a lower level. When we look, for example, at his description of 
retention at the level of the organization and population, we see that Aldrich continues 
to talk about retention of the routine or competence – the primary entity; he is not 
talking about retention of the organization (p. 30); 
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 At the population level, retention preserves the technological and managerial 
competence that all organizations use, collectively, to exploit the resources of their 
environments.  
  
 We can see the same causal story when he talks about selection processes occurring at 
organizational and population level, he is again referring us ‘back’ to routines (p. 28); 
 
At the organizational level, organizations founded through maladaptive variations in 
technology, managerial incompetence, non-conforming normative orders, or other 
problematic acts are likely to draw fewer resources from their environments and 
therefore are more likely to decline in performance.   
 
 Again, in the word ‘characteristics,’ below, in his description of variation at the 
organizational and population level, we can perceive the enduring entity as being the 
routine or competence (p. 25); 
 
Variations are potentially introduced into populations and communities whenever 
new organizations are founded. Intentions play a pivotal role in the goal-directed 
activities involved in organizational foundings … Most founders apparently intend 
to reproduce the characteristics of organizations perceived as successful.  
 
 It is misleading, I would argue, to suggest that these core processes occur at all levels, 
and it compromises his analysis.  It would be far less confusing to say that selection 
occurs at all levels, which is, after all, what his argument implies. The point is, to claim 
that variation, retention and selection all occur at multiple levels logically implies that at 
the social level there are multiple replicators as well as multiple interactors. However, 
as Hull explains, the replicator-interactor relationship is a ‘one and many relationship’, 
with replication concentrated at the primary level and interaction at multiple ascending 
levels (1980, p. 324). Indeed, in spite of Aldrich’s suggestions to the contrary, this is 
implicit in his own analysis above, and throughout the text, where the organization (and 
sometimes the entrepreneur) is the primary interacting entity, and the routine is the only 
entity that is referred to in terms of preservation, or in the evolutionary sense of 
replication.  Accordingly, in every case, Aldrich refers to the routine being replicated 
throughout the hierarchy. In other words, organizations are not replicators and 
populations are not replicators, they are always interactors. So, what does this say about 
his Darwinian theory? 
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  At this stage it is clear that the anomalies around units and levels can be put down to 
semantics. It is evident that Aldrich supposes the replicator and interactor dynamic,136 
and it is also evident that the ‘dual-natured’ organization is his central unit of analysis 
(p. 5), and furthermore that he proposes multilevel selection. Retention is associated 
throughout with the ‘primary level’ routine and variation is apparent at every level of 
the hierarchy where selection is operational. Referring back to the multilevel analysis in 
Chapter 7, we can see that Aldrich implicitly promotes position V, the multilevel 
replicator and multilevel interactor position. Thus in modern Darwinian terms, in a 
multilevel continuum from the biotic (where genes are the replicators) to the social 
sphere, Aldrich is describing selection of the population, the organization and the 
entrepreneur, and consequently, selection for the routine, and ultimately, selection for 
the gene.137
 Thus, significantly, the approach, implicitly at least, appears to be consistent with 
current evolutionary thinking and is thus viable in the modern Darwinian formulation. 
In addition to the replicator-interactor dynamic of the unit of selection, Aldrich employs 
the traditional principles of variation, retention and selection within a multileveled 
selection framework. 
 It should be stressed however, that the concept of multilevel selection, remains 
underdeveloped in evolutionary biology, thus the problems highlighted, in the above 
two sections, are not in the least bit unexpected.  The interesting thing to observe, 
nonetheless, from a Darwinian perspective, is the impetus for the creative theoretical 
and empirical exploration of multilevel selection in the socio-economic domain.  
Aldrich, as we have seen, has made a credible job of establishing the existence of 
multiple levels of selection in the socio-economic realm, and provided a useful platform 
for further theoretical research.   
 Moreover, as part of his broad application of Darwinian principles, we recall that 
Aldrich also seeks to explain emergence and intra-group dynamics in the same terms. 
Again these evolutionary dynamics are still not yet well understood, so that it is 
instructive to observe how close Aldrich is to current thinking in his exploration of these 
processes (Keller, 1999). Accordingly, in the following assessment of Aldrich’s 
explanation of emergence I shall expand on the suggestion here that he is unwittingly 
                                                 
136 See Aldrich (1999, pp. 2-5), where he defines the organization as ‘goal-directed, boundary-
maintaining, and socially constructed systems of human activity’, and where he unpacks its ‘three 
dimensions’ to reveal that the ‘activity systems’ dimension explicitly refers to the routines component. 
137 See footnote 98 above (p. 156). Also Aldrich’s quotation below (p. 208) 
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 suggesting an interactor role for entrepreneurs, and show how his treatment of this 
entity also informs his conceptualization of intra-group group dynamics. 
 
Emergence and Intra-Group Dynamics 
 
The main theme of Aldrich’s book according to most reviewers is ‘emergence’ 
(Buenger, 2000; Strang, 2002; Wade, 2002; Rao, 2002). Although Buenger, at least, 
concedes that, ‘at a very high level, Organizations Evolving is about variation, selection 
and retention’ (2000, p. 1003). Certainly, as argued in the preceding section, it would 
appear that the variation, retention and selection trinity is underplayed by Aldrich.  
However, as I have also argued in his defence, Aldrich’s adoption of these principles is 
perhaps more intuitive and nuanced than we are led to expect. Indeed, through a 
generous Darwinian lens, sharply focused with the generalized Darwinian terminology, 
their application can be perceived ‘across levels’ and include, not only his process of 
emergence but also his key individual, the ‘nascent entrepreneur’.  I aim to demonstrate 
here how Aldrich’s multilevel selection approach, with its focus on selection, does not 
diminish the processes of variety creation and retention but implicitly tends to focus 
their respective roles at these primary generative levels.  This is not a claim that Aldrich 
himself makes, but, as suggested, it may be interpreted this way from a modern 
Darwinian perspective. 
 Before pursuing the above exposition it would be useful here to reiterate that there are 
two senses in which Aldrich employs the term ‘emergence’. The first is explicit and 
relates to organizational births and foundings and is simply Aldrich’s preferred term to 
describe what he sees as a process as opposed to an event.  The second sense in which 
Aldrich uses emergence is more implicit and relates to the philosophical notion of 
‘emergent properties.’138  It is this second sense, where Aldrich treats higher level 
entities as emerging from lower level entities in the organizational hierarchy, that tends 
to be assumed in his analysis, and it is this sense of emergence that we shall be focusing 
upon here.  
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Hodgson (2004, p. 32) ‘A property may be said to be emergent if its existence and nature depend 
upon entities at a lower level, but the property is neither reducible to, nor predictable from, properties of 
entities found at the lower level.’ 
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 The ‘Emergentist’ Focus 
 
Emergence in this second sense of emergent properties is evidently a key theme for 
Aldrich. He devotes whole Chapters to the ‘emergence of new organizations’, the 
‘emergence of communities of practice’ and the ‘emergence of new populations of 
organizations’ respectively. And he explains that he uses the generic framework of the 
evolutionary approach to ‘portray how new organizations emerge as people mobilize 
resources in pursuit of opportunities’ (p. 2). 
 Indeed, the structure of the book, as Aldrich acknowledges (2000), reflects his 
“‘emergentist focus” – communities are built on populations, which are built on 
organizations, which emerge from the actions of entrepreneurs’.  It would seem that 
there are essentially two intertwined agendas, one being the explanation of evolution at 
multiple levels and the other being the explanation of emergence (‘births’) at multiple 
levels. 
 Aldrich’s treatment of emergence is undoubtedly informed by evolutionary theory, 
but it needs a little unpacking.  It involves the entrepreneur, the notion of ‘boundary 
formation’ and the question of ‘the conditions under which organizations emerge and 
coalesce as social units’ (p. 14), all of which call on the Darwinian selection process.  
Drawing on network analysis, social psychology and cognitive psychology, to explain 
how the founding process unfolds, Aldrich portrays the entrepreneur as being subject to 
strong selection forces at the interpersonal, the population and the cultural level (again 
indicating the notion of multiple interactors). He describes the process below, after the 
entrepreneur survives the initial selection process (p. 112); 
 
If, in spite of all the odds, all the elements in the founding process converge, an 
organization begins to take shape.  As the people dealing with the organization begin 
to treat it as an ecological entity, the new organization emerges as a social unit with 
a life of its own. Founders make commitments in the name of the new entity, deal 
with government agencies as a representative of it, and find that people act toward 
the organization as if it really exists. 
 
Group Selection 
 
Although Aldrich makes no explicit reference to the notion of group selection it is 
interesting to perceive the implicit application above of the logic of Price’s (1970, 1972) 
partitioned selection, as recently expressed by Henrich (2004) in his description of 
selection acting on intra-group and inter-group variation and resulting in organizational 
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 emergence.139  Notably, in accordance with this, whilst Aldrich states that variation, 
retention and selection apply across all levels (to include the process of emergence), it is 
essentially the selection process that he calls upon for his explanatory device. Basically, 
for Aldrich, emergence, or the founding process, is shaped by selection forces acting 
upon individuals.140  Accordingly, anticipating Henrich, at an empirical as well as a 
theoretical level, Aldrich explores the conditions under which group selection then 
dominates individual selection to ultimately produce a new entity, the founding firm. 
 To reiterate, Aldrich essentially describes a selection process at the level of the 
entrepreneur which is associated with the selection of new or newly combined 
routines.141  Once an organization is derived from the selection process occurring at this 
lower level, partitioned selection acts such that selection becomes more relevant at the 
organizational level. In other words, within organization variety (various routines) will 
be dominated by the between-organization variety (all the organizations in the relevant 
industry) as selection operates upon organizations. 
  
Organizational Boundaries and Social Replicators 
 
 A very important aspect of this explanation of organizational emergence for Aldrich, 
and which, significantly, is again consistent with the modern Darwinian interpretation 
(Henrich 2004), is the development of organizational boundaries; indeed he devotes a 
whole Chapter to the subject.  He stresses, for example, the importance of achieving 
standing in a population and gaining legitimacy before the organization counts as a 
viable unit and is able to contribute to the population character and dynamics. He then 
goes on to stress the importance of boundary maintenance, which includes the 
stabilizing replication of successful routines. And he thus reaffirms the idea and 
evolutionary significance of a social replicator.142  In the following passage it can be 
                                                 
139 See Chapter 7 above  
140 Or, as otherwise expressed (Aldrich and Martinez, 2003), entrepreneurship is an ‘evolutionary process 
of social construction’. 
141 Indeed Aldrich’s treatment of the entrepreneur, within this multilevel perspective, maps very neatly 
onto a habit-based view of action, where in a multivariate population of habit-driven entrepreneurs it is 
adaptation and selection processes that account for evolutionary change. There is, of course, the classical 
or Austrian view of entrepreneurship, which tends to depict entrepreneurs as spontaneously generated, 
and the extent to which this is compatible with a habit-based view of action is still open to question. For 
example, would they be seen as ‘random mutations’ or just another set of habits?  Aldrich’s discussion of 
entrepreneurs mostly suggests the latter. 
142 (p. 3) “Boundary-maintaining … The establishment of an organization implies a distinction between 
members and non-members, thus setting organizations off from their environments (Weber, 1947). 
Boundaries may be permeable.  Thus, maintaining this distinction requires boundary-maintenance 
activity. Many organizations establish an authoritative process to enforce membership distinctions … ”  
208 
 seen how he links this process of emergence with the evolutionary process of change in 
organizations in one long continuum, illustrating his expressed desire (p. 1) to link the 
important questions of the origins and the persistence of organizations (p. 113); 
 
A true test of the knowledge and resources assembled by founders occurs when an 
organization achieves standing as a population member … Organizations contribute 
to population dynamics only after they become fully fledged units of selection.  As 
bounded entities, they become actors that compete and cooperate with others … 
[A]fter boundaries coalesce and activities begin, organizations become viable 
carriers of routines and competencies.  They thus contribute to the reproduction of 
population-level knowledge and become point of knowledge diffusion. As new 
entities, they are potential sources of variation within populations … [A]fter it 
emerges as an entity, an organization becomes another arena in which new routines 
and competencies can be generated, nurtured, and possibly copied by others. Every 
new organizational entity represents another test of an organizational form’s fit with 
its environment, as well as an opportunity to modify the form. 
 
 Significantly, through Aldrich’s work on organizational origins or emergence, he has 
considerably advanced the development of evolutionary theory for business economics 
and organization studies.  By extending evolutionary theory to the process of emergence 
he offers a more comprehensive explanatory framework which moves beyond the 
traditional organizations’ focus on structure and stability and embraces the processes 
involved in emergence and change (notably indicating the role of the replictor).  In 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) account, firms were depicted as growing and contracting 
but their origins or initiations were never addressed.  Similarly, while Hannan and 
Freeman’s (1989) approach is characterized by their interest in founding rates, this is 
not matched by any exploration of the processes involved in the actual founding of an 
organization.  
 
Group Selection and Dynamics Between Levels  
 
At this juncture it is clear that in his exploration of emergence at the organizational, 
population and community levels, Aldrich is looking at the dynamics between levels. 
But whilst his empirical illustrations of these processes are plentiful, as, for example, 
with the recruiting practices and reward systems used by founders to help establish 
organizations as a bounded entity, it must be said the theoretical underpinnings are still 
                                                                                                                                               
Hence, in indicating that there is something for which the organization or the group is selected Aldrich 
implicitly promotes the notion of a social replicator. 
209 
 at an exploratory stage. Significantly however, Aldrich’s research agenda nevertheless 
shows dramatic potential, in that it mirrors very recent developments in evolutionary 
theory in both the natural and social sciences (Keller, 1999; Pepper, 2003; Henrich, 
2004; Knudsen, 2002, 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004b, 2006a), and I would argue 
that this bodes well for theory development in both fields. Aldrich clearly prioritizes 
emergence and the formation of individual organizations. He is also keen to look at the 
dynamics between the different levels of selection and at how selection effects are 
distributed across levels. And, as can be seen from Keller’s comments below, Aldrich, 
in these senses, is effectively well ahead of the game in the social domain (1999, p. 7); 
 
The current theoretical excitement in theoretical and empirical research in multilevel 
selection centres on the two problems set forth … namely (1) how natural selection 
among lower-level biological vehicles143 creates higher-level vehicles, [and] (2) 
given that multiple levels of vehicles exist, how natural selection at one level affects 
selection at lower or higher levels. 
 
 Indeed significantly, as indicated earlier, the questions that Keller and Aldrich pose 
for themselves, as well as the character of their respective explorations, intriguingly call 
to mind Henrich’s (2004) eloquent explanation of the formation of groups under Prices’ 
partitioned selection forces. Note for example, Keller’s further speculations below; 
 
What attractive evolutionary forces bind low-level vehicles (i.e., vehicles nearly at 
the same level as the replicators themselves), like physical stretches of DNA 
(replicators being the genetic information encoded in such stretches), chromosomes, 
and cells, into intermediate-level vehicles, like multicellular organisms?  Under what 
conditions do these attractive forces exceed the repulsive and centrifugal forces and 
under what conditions do they not? 
  
 As indicated above, Aldrich evidently begins to address these problems in the social 
domain by drawing on an extensive literature in organization science, and by exploring 
the tension between competition and cooperation at each level,  and it is significant that 
he recognizes the role of the replicator (115); 
 
                                                 
143 Notice that Keller adopts Dawkin’s term ‘vehicle’, which was subsequently replaced by Hull’s 
‘interactor’ concept, with Dawkin’s approval. Keller’s use of the term merely reflects a personal 
preference for this label, and it is clear in his work that he uses it alongside the replicator concept in 
accordance with Hull’s definitions. 
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 Given the large-scale boundary crossings occurring each day, what holds 
organizations together?...If intentions, resources, and boundaries converge an 
entrepreneur’s activities take on sufficient coherence so that the people dealing with 
the organization began to treat it as an ecological entity, a social unit with a life of 
its own. Welborne and Andrews (1996: 896) used the term structural cohesion to 
refer to “an employee-generated synergy that propels a company forward”.  
Emergence as a recognized entity secures a tentative place for an organization in a 
population, but its persistence depends upon the continual replication of its routines 
and competence.  
 
Darwinian Logic and the Social Replicator 
 
To be sure, this is the sense in which I argue that Aldrich promotes a unifying schema 
which intuitively follows in the footsteps of recent theoretical advances in evolutionary 
theory.  As evidenced in the above passage, in the way that he links the process of 
emergence with the process of replication (routines), Aldrich’s analysis extends beyond 
the evolution of organizations and industry, to the formation of organizations and their 
inter-organizational and intra-organizational dynamics. There is a consistent Darwinian 
logic to the meta-theoretical structure that he proposes, with, for example, the process of 
emergence corresponding with the internal dynamics of organizations and their own 
evolution. 
 Indeed, Aldrich displays an uncanny sense for the critical theoretical issues involved 
in evolutionary theory, even if he fails to articulate them as such. His coverage of the 
issue of boundary establishment and maintenance clearly illustrates the point. As 
Henrich (2002, 2004) made clear regarding the question of what it is that maintains 
variety between groups and dilutes variety within groups, there must be some kind of 
social constraint on within-group variety that ultimately serves to sustain the group. 
Henrich talks about ‘prosociality’, Boyd and Richerson suggest (1985) ‘conformist 
transmission’, Nunney (1990) suggests ‘policing mechanisms’ and Wilson (2002) 
recently proffered ‘religious beliefs’. From this logic we can derive the notion of a 
social replicator (Hull, 1988; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004b). Significantly Aldrich 
seems to assume social constraints throughout his theory in relation to both existing and 
emerging organizations. His comments in the passage below are typical of this stance 
(p. 125);   
 
If dissimilarities are discovered of such a magnitude as to make members 
uncomfortable, the most dissimilar will be encouraged to leave.  “Over time, these 
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 processes create psychologically homogeneous work groups” (Jackson et al., 1991: 
676; See also George, 1990; and Moreland and Levine, 1982).  However, the high 
salience of task demands in emerging organizations may partially offset the effects 
of dissimilarity.  Members who are totally engrossed in their tasks may be willing to 
tolerate dissimilar others, thus sustaining a potential source of organizational 
variability. 
 
 As noted by Keller above, like multilevel selection theory, the theoretical 
development of inter-group dynamics in evolutionary theory is still very much at the 
infancy stage.  For our purposes here it is nevertheless pertinent to illustrate the 
important development of Aldrich’s thinking in this regard, to signal both the broad 
scope of his evolutionary analysis as well as its potential as a unified schema. Pepper 
(2003), below, confirms the significance of such theoretical explorations; 
 
Standard evolutionary theory is based on selection among individuals, but during a 
transition the very quality of ‘individuality’ shifts from one level of organization to 
another. The theory of multilevel selection provides a powerful tool for investigating 
the dynamics that cause the focus of selection to shift to a higher level, thereby 
producing new levels of adaptation and functional integration.   
 
 The prospect of a unifying schema brings the discussion to the last important 
evolutionary component in Aldrich’s theory. This is the entrenched idea in organization 
studies, notably rejected by Hannan and Freeman but nevertheless proven useful to 
scholars concerned with explaining change at the organization level, that is ,the idea of 
adaptive change.  Arguably, it is through this element of Aldrich’s theory that he most 
clearly recognizes the causal influence of organizational routines, and thus crucially 
demonstrates his rejection of the adaptationist versus selectionist polarization of 
evolutionary theory. 
 
Selection and Adaptation 
 
Significantly, mirroring the modern conceptualization of Darwinian theory and 
addressing the clarion call for resolution of the ‘adaptation versus selection’ controversy 
Aldrich’s evolutionary model clearly accommodates ‘adaptationist’ forms of change. 
This is assumed in his fourth evolutionary principle, in what he calls, the principle of 
‘struggle’ and it is indicated in his multilevel selection approach. Where Hannan and 
Freeman essentially reject the idea that firms adapt to their environments, effectively 
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 dismissing the suggestion that firms ‘learn’ or that managers make consequential 
choices, Aldrich embraces firm-level dynamics as an important part of the evolutionary 
explanatory framework.  This crucial component of Aldrich’s theory is implicated in the 
discussion above on intra-organizational dynamics and is neatly summarized by Dobbin 
(2001, p. 1522), below;  
 
[Aldrich] sees the struggle between rival strategies within organizations as 
determined by evolutionary forces, to be sure, but he sees organizations as 
inherently dynamic and as constantly looking to the environment for new routines 
and strategies to embrace … It is key that proponents of particular organizational 
routines, managers of particular organizations, and entire populations of 
organizations actively fight to prevail and that in doing so they adjust their 
strategies. 
 
 It is suggested here that Aldrich’s fourth principle of ‘struggle’ essentially represents 
the within-organization process of change that has traditionally been referred to in the 
organizations literature as adaptive or ‘Lamarckian’ change. Despite the fact that 
Aldrich does not even mention Lamarck, or the adaptationist perspective with which the 
later is associated, his evolutionary account undoubtedly incorporates this important 
form of change. Indeed it is implicit throughout his work, and it is encapsulated in the 
concept of ‘struggle’.   
 This is a subtle but significant step. Aldrich has effectively managed to surpass the 
long running ‘Lamarckism versus Darwinism’ debate, which divides over whether 
adaptation (organization-level dynamics) should be considered as the overriding 
evolutionary force in the social realm or the selection process. Because of his 
generalized Darwinian approach he has made it possible to encapsulate both, reinforcing 
the view that adaptation and selection play complementary and interrelated roles in the 
evolutionary process (Burgelman, 1991; Levinthal, 1991; Bruderer and Singh, 1996; 
Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001; Metcalfe, 2003, 2004). Aldrich is thus the first of the 
case studies to bridge this important theoretical divide, effectively paving the way for 
the resolution of the infamous ‘adaptation versus selection’ debate. Interestingly, this 
development is again consistent with theoretical advances in evolutionary theory where, 
it has been shown that Lamarckism (adaptation) ‘nests’ in the Darwinian theoretical 
framework (Hodgson, 2001b; Knudsen, 2001).  
 Through his fourth principle of ‘struggle’, Aldrich clearly accounts for the adaptive 
behaviour of organizations as they adjust to changing political and economic 
environments.  Struggle over scarce resources involves continuous negotiation and 
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 contemplation of rival strategies as organizations compete with each other. Moreover, 
within his multileveled approach, as understood here, it can be seen how struggle can be 
equated with the internal selection process at the organizational level.  This is an 
intriguing discovery, for while it may appear to duplicate certain assumptions adopted 
by Nelson and Winter, which caused them problems, it actually offers a notable advance 
on their position in terms of conceptual clarifications and tractability. Nelson and 
Winter sought to convey the idea of firms adapting to their environments through a 
similar concept of ‘search’.  Similarly expressed in terms of the organization’s 
deliberate attempts to seek out better routines and change accordingly, they portrayed 
this in the traditional Lamarckian sense of adaptive change. However, search becomes 
confused in their theory with the selection process; in an account which is essentially 
unclear about the level at which selection operates. 
 Aldrich, on the other hand, does not constrain his theory by labelling it, or indeed 
even associating it with Lamarckism.  However, he still manages to incorporate the 
important firm-level adaptation within his Darwinian framework, through this fourth 
principle of struggle. As suggested here, this effectively amounts to a selection process 
at the organizational level and it is consistent with his account of multiple levels of 
selection.  Accordingly it could be said that Aldrich advances Nelson and Winter’s 
position in that he circuitously provides a less complicated foundation for an 
adaptationist account nesting within a Darwinian selectionist framework. In other 
words, adaptive behaviour, which is expressed in Nelson and Winter’s search 
mechanism, equates with Aldrich’s principle of struggle which in turn equates with 
another level of selection.  Moreover, perhaps more dramatically, Aldrich significantly 
advances the ecological perspective by enabling the reintroduction of firm level 
dynamics to the evolutionary story.   
 
Conclusion: The Complete Darwinian Account? 
 
If population ecology theory was more or less fixed at birth, like the organizations it 
describes, Aldrich’s evolutionary theory has mutated to add the best characteristics of 
rival theories, like the organizations he describes.     
                                                  Dobbin (2001) 
 
Aldrich evidently embraces evolutionary theory as a Meta theory, and in his use of key 
insights from numerous organization theories he clearly demonstrates the belief ‘that the 
evolutionary approach serves as an overarching framework within which the value of 
other approaches can be recognized and appreciated’ (p.42). To be sure, a close reading 
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 of Aldrich from a modern Darwinian perspective reveals a comprehensive evolutionary 
approach with considerable potential. It builds on and advances the theoretical 
achievements of both Hannan and Freeman and Nelson and Winter, effectively merging 
the ecological with the evolutionary approach and crucially establishing for organization 
theory that ‘Lamarckian adaptation’ and ‘Darwinian selection’ play important and 
complementary roles in socio-economic evolution. In addition, Aldrich uniquely posits 
emergence as another important source of variety, significantly thereby enriching 
understanding of diversity in organization theory. Together with his implicit 
acknowledgement of the replicator and interactor distinction, and assured inclusion of 
multilevel selection theory Aldrich has thus laid the foundations of a comprehensive and 
tractable evolutionary theory of organizational change. 
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 Part IV 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Nothing I have said is intrinsically a matter of biological analogy, it is a matter of 
evolutionary logic. Evolutionary theory is a manner of reasoning in its own right quite 
independently of the use made of it by biologist. They simply got there first … 
 
J. Stanley Metcalfe (1998) 
 
 
 11   Conclusion 
       The Destiny of the Darwinian Paradigm in  
      Socio-Economic Theories of Evolution 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In a recent paper which surveyed earlier attempts to apply the Darwinian model to 
socio-cultural phenomena,144 Hodgson (2005, p. 11) observed the absence of rigorous 
definitions of the core Darwinian concepts, as well as the absence of a distinction 
between the unit being selected (interactor) and the entities that replicate differentially 
(replicators) as a result of selection. Through the detailed evaluation here of leading 
contemporary evolutionary accounts and consideration of the use of Darwinian ideas 
across the organization studies and evolutionary economics literatures it is now possible 
to reflect upon the more recent developments of Darwinism in the socio-economic 
domain and to make a useful corresponding assessment of the emerging Darwinian 
paradigm. While research shows that rigorous definitions have still yet to be established 
and that the critical replicator-interactor distinction is still not widely appreciated it also 
reveals that on several fronts scholars are nevertheless unquestionably advancing in this 
direction.  
 As demonstrated through the systematic Darwinian application and dissection of the 
case studies above, regardless of their notable differences or how they might be 
labelled, a strong Darwinian thread runs through each of these accounts. And 
significantly, some kind of replicating entity is assumed in every case and there is clear 
acknowledgement of the replicator-interactor distinction in two of the three theories. 
Furthermore, as has been documented, the treatment of the Darwinian model by these 
influential authors is representative of the main strands of evolutionary thought across 
their respective disciplines. And finally these developments have notably been 
complemented by important work on the refinement of concepts and investigation of 
what entities might count as replicators and interactors in the social arena. Indeed the 
                                                 
144 For example, the work of Bagehot (1872), Ritchie (1889), Veblen (1898), Baldwin (1909) and Keller 
(1915) 
 
 combined evidence suggests that ‘the possibility of a Darwinian and evolutionary social 
science is now in prospect’ (Hodgson, 2005, p. 12). 
 Significantly, evidence here suggests that as well as notable improvements in the 
quality of Darwinian theorizing there has also been a marked increase in the amount of 
adoption of Darwinian ideas by social scientists, thus underpinning the argument set out 
in Chapters 2 and 3 about the ontological assumptions of evolutionary economists and 
organization scholars, and the inevitability of the Darwinian model for their respective 
disciplines. What this comparative analysis has clearly shown, is that even ‘non-
Darwinians’, through their own theoretical and empirical investigations, invariably end 
up drawing on the explanatory logic of Darwinian theory; whether they recognize it or 
not. Indeed, one key development to be revealed in this investigation of the explosion of 
evolutionary rhetoric is the underlying explosion of ‘Darwinian thinking’ on the part of 
theorists. 
 Certainly one of the main aims of this thesis has been to demonstrate the prevalence 
of ‘covert Darwinism’ in the organization studies and evolutionary economics 
literatures, but following on from this, it has also been to evaluate the important 
implications of this for socio-economic theories of evolution, and ultimately to 
demonstrate why it is important that scholars explicitly recognize and adopt the 
Darwinian concepts. Essentially, as has been evidenced here, whilst covert Darwinism 
basically suggests agreement with the modern Darwinian paradigm, significantly it also 
typically signals incomplete understanding of the theory. As detailed evaluation of the 
case-studies has shown, the Darwinian concepts have crucial importance for helping 
scholars understand and articulate the evolutionary processes they seek to explain. The 
explicit adoption, for example, of the replicator-interactor concepts offers immediate 
clarification about the complex evolutionary selection process, with the types of social 
entities that might be identified as the interacting unit of selection (firm) helpfully 
separated out from the entities that might function as the enduring social replicators 
(organizational routines). Clearly, firm foundations for rigorous definitions now exist 
and it is quite evident that the Darwinian system has potential for yielding further results 
in the socio-cultural realm, both theoretically and empirically. Thus it is plainly 
commonsensical that social scientists become familiar with and actively engage with the 
theory. 
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 Darwinian Substance 
 
Significantly, both implicitly and explicitly the theories of Nelson and Winter, Hannan 
and Freeman, and Howard Aldrich, all reinforce the Darwinian imperative, exemplify 
the intuitive development towards the modern Darwinian framework, and affirm a 
Darwinian social ontology. For example, the important foundational assumptions and 
basic Darwinian ingredients are all present, the Darwinian population thinking 
perspective and distinctive role of variety is apparent in every case as well as the 
distinctive Darwinian selection process. And an inheritance mechanism, if not explicitly 
articulated (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) is at least assumed. 
 Regarding the modern expression of generalized Darwinism, the notion of group 
selection is invoked in the collective entity of the firm (or organization) and 
significantly, this is then treated as the ‘primary interactor’ and unit of selection in the 
respective selection processes. Moreover, in the accounts of Nelson and Winter and 
Howard Aldrich, there are clear depictions of the replicator-interactor distinction. 
Furthermore, implicit in the group selection assumption, and variously expressed by the 
authors, is the idea of multilevel selection. Indeed, as demonstrated in the respective 
Chapters, although variously interpreted, and with different degrees of emphasis, 
foundational Darwinian ideas are present in each of these prominent accounts and 
Darwinian entities and processes are clearly implicated in the social domain. There is, in 
other words, a decided shift from analogy to ontology. Assuredly, there is no doubting 
the Darwinian substance to these theories, or the receptive soil for its modern 
articulation.  
 
Covert Darwinism 
 
This study has identified a covert Darwinism, illustrating not only the schizophrenic 
relationship that social scientists have with Darwinism, but also endorsing the 
explanatory power and unavoidability of Darwinian ideas. Undoubtedly, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the way that Darwinian ideas are used by scholars tells its own story about 
perceptions and understanding of the theory. It has been argued here that the widespread 
implicit use of Darwinian ideas is largely due to the rhetoric of ‘Social Darwinism’ and 
the acute hostility to all intellectual intercourse with biology. Significantly, the fear of 
association with Social Darwinism has not only led to the ‘covert’ use of its ideas, but 
crucially it has prevented social scientists from actively engaging with the modern 
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 developments of the theory, and fuelled continuing misconceptions about its nature and 
scope.  
 Essentially, the implicit use of Darwinian ideas fundamentally reinforces the generic 
nature of the theory and its appropriateness for the social domain, and moreover it 
reflects the Darwinian nature of evolutionary phenomena under study. Indeed, to 
underline the point, it has been shown here that in addition to a ‘knowing’ implicit 
Darwinism,145 the literature also reveals an ‘unknowing’ implicit Darwinism where 
scholars inadvertently or intuitively grapple towards the general Darwinian model, 
‘discovering’, for example, the logic of the population thinking perspective, or realizing 
in the complexities of the selection process the notion of an enduring ‘gene-like’ 
replicating entity. Essentially Darwinian entities and processes emerge and the 
Darwinian perspective becomes inevitable. Accordingly, as has also been demonstrated 
here, it is important, for the tractability of their theories, that scholars recognize this, 
take the next step, and explicitly adopt the clarifying concepts of generalized 
Darwinism. 
 
Explicit Adoption of Darwinism 
 
Through the systematic dissection of these case studies and illustration of their various 
gaps and inconsistencies, it has been shown here that the generalized Darwinian 
concepts have an importance for constructing tractable theories and helping scholars 
understand the evolutionary processes they seek to explain. The main challenge to their 
productive exploitation, however, continues to be the lack of engagement with 
Darwinian theory. As observed by many commentators and illustrated here in detail, 
evolutionary theory has been changing far more than people realize; its generic 
character now clearly articulated through the generalized concepts, and major objections 
to Darwinism and associated misconceptions all satisfactorily addressed. Indeed, as 
previously argued, it is time for the ‘Berlin Wall’ to come down and for social scientists 
to become acquainted with generalized Darwinism. Significantly, even ‘Darwinian’ 
thinkers in these fields appear to be unfamiliar with the theoretical clarifications and 
conceptual developments that would enhance their own theories and advance the 
Darwinian model.  
 It has been shown here through the case studies that most problems in theory relate to 
misconceptions of evolutionary theory. Problems are typically experienced in the 
                                                 
145 Where ideas are adopted but not acknowledged as Darwinian because of its negative associations 
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 articulation of an evolutionary selection process, in the handling of continuity or 
inheritance in the selection process, and in the accommodation of Lamarckian 
inheritance therein. By unpacking the respective theories and identifying their particular 
conundrums, as well as revealing the extent of their Darwinian assumptions, it was 
possible to demonstrate how the modern Darwinian concepts unravelled the confusions 
and reinvigorated the theories. 
 Nelson and Winter, whilst labelling their theory ‘Lamarckian’, were clearly shown to 
be applying the core Darwinian principles and mimicking the corresponding modern 
Darwinian explanations. Although the analysis revealed confusions over units and 
levels of selection and the evolutionary role of organizational routines, it became 
apparent that by up-dating this Darwinian model with the modern concepts, the 
problems manifested in their ‘search’ mechanism were redeemable, yet the theory still 
remained consistent with the authors’ evolutionary story as well as with the general 
Darwinian model. It was shown how their confusions could be untangled and theory 
‘rescued’ by explicitly adopting the replicator and interactor concepts. Specifically, this 
was by applying the replicator-interactor distinction within a multileveled selection 
framework, positing their primary set of organizational routines as the first level of their 
organizational hierarchy, followed by their higher level strategic routines as the 
‘primary interactors’, followed by multiple ascending levels of interactors (i.e., from the 
team to the group to the firm). And significantly, this is all accommodated within the 
meta-theoretical framework of generalized Darwinism which also accommodates 
Nelson and Winter’s Lamarckian form of inheritance. 
 Whilst Hannan and Freeman claim to be Darwinian they notably play down the 
evolutionary significance of micro-economic change, essentially dismissing the notion 
of inheritance, presenting a biased selectionist account of evolutionary change and 
impoverishing their theory as a result. Again an incisive Darwinian analysis of their 
selection process revealed how their ecological account nevertheless implicitly assumed 
a replicating entity and would thus lend itself, through explicit adoption of the replicator 
concept, to further development into a more comprehensive evolutionary theory which 
significantly would accommodate both adaptation and selection. Moreover, their 
multileveled selection story would also be much more easily articulated through the 
complementary explicit adoption of the interactor concept. 
 Even in Aldrich’s explicitly Darwinian and notably more modern account, the explicit 
adoption of the modern replicator-interactor terms was noticeably absent and their 
potential not exploited in the theory where they could have been most useful, for 
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 example, in his discussion of the unit of selection problem and in his own multilevel 
selection theory.  
 Thus significantly, in terms of the explicit adoption of the Darwinian concepts, the 
study also reveals that even ‘Darwinian’ scholars fail to fully exploit the Darwinian 
system. And yet it is evident here that they all need generalized Darwinism to facilitate 
the theoretical tractability of their respective theories. As Parts II and III of this thesis 
elaborated, and the dissection of these pioneering case studies made clear, the meta-
theoretical framework of general Darwinism is entirely appropriate for the socio-
economic domain and moreover the explicit adoption of the replicator-interactor 
concepts are required for the clear expression of their evolutionary processes. It was 
shown in the Hannan and Freeman Chapter that, at the very least, some form of 
replicator needs to be posited in order to articulate selection processes in complex open 
systems such as those in the social realm. In Nelson and Winter’s Chapter it was shown 
that in order to properly articulate inheritance, Darwinian as well as Lamarkian, a 
replicator-interactor distinction must be stipulated. And in this and Aldrich’s Chapter it 
was also demonstrated how the replicator-interactor distinction is similarly required to 
articulate group, and indeed multilevel selection processes.  
 Indeed, as has been clearly and repeatedly demonstrated here, evolutionary scholars 
have much to gain both from the explicit recognition of the Darwinian character of their 
theories as well as the explicit adoption of its modern generalized concepts. As several 
scholars are notably already discovering, these concepts have huge importance for 
making sense of socio-economic evolutionary processes, providing the conceptual tools 
for their articulation and usefully guiding empirical research. The replicator concept is 
an excellent example in the way that it has provided scholars with much greater 
understanding of the evolutionary role of organizational routines in industrial growth 
and change, illustrating their role as stable information units as well as sources of new 
variety in selection processes. Conceptualizing the routine in terms of a replicator 
makes it much easier for scholars to know what they have to define and it eliminates 
much of the confusion about causality. To reiterate, the Darwinian system clearly has 
the explanatory power to generate further results in the socio-economic domain, so that 
it is important that work continues in this direction. And this point fittingly draws the 
conclusion to a close with some final comments on current and future research. 
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 Current and Future Research 
 
It has been asserted here that progress has been made towards the establishment of 
rigorous definitions of core Darwinian concepts and recognition of the replicator-
interactor distinction. Whilst covert Darwinism has disguised the extent of this progress, 
investigation of the use of Darwinism in the socio-economic theories of evolution has 
nevertheless shown that social scientists are intuitively and explicitly working in this 
direction. Moreover, as highlighted throughout the study, other scholars are currently 
working on the conceptual refinement of these definitions for the social domain. 
 In summary, on the important question of the identity of social replicators and 
interactors, Hodgson and Knudsen (2004b) are exploring the suitability of habits and 
organizational routines as replicators, and the suitability of the firm, individuals, 
families, and nations as social interactors. Such exploratory work is complex and 
dependent on other theoretical clarifications, for example, the idea of social replicators 
and interactors is dependent on group selection theory and the establishment of sociality 
of structures, but notably important work has also been achieved here (Henrich, 2002, 
2004; Boyd and Richerson, 1985) and indeed continues to be pursued (Hodgson 2005; 
Henrich and Boyd, 1998, 2000).  
 Whilst the importance of this detailed theoretical research has been identified, it is 
clear from this study that other broader theoretical questions also need to addressed, 
most pressing of which appears to be the question of the extent to which adaptation and 
selection shape evolutionary change in socio-economic realm. Many scholars featured 
here have identified the polarization of theory into adaptationist and selectionists camps 
as being the most important area of concern. While it has been shown here that social 
evolution is both Lamarckian and Darwinian, and that there is clear potential to 
reconcile adaptationist with selectionist accounts within the meta-Darwinian 
framework, it is clear that much theoretical and empirical research needs to be 
undertaken to bring this to fruition.  
 
Darwinian Destiny 
 
The important point to underline here is that Darwinism is a substrate-neutral 
philosophical system with general application. It embraces a basic philosophical 
commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations of change, and its core 
principles of variation, inheritance and selection are general principles that govern the 
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 evolution of all open complex systems which share fundamental ontological similarities. 
Given the ontological assumptions evidenced here of many evolutionary economists and 
organization scholars, it is clear that the Darwinian paradigm is inevitable and, as 
clearly demonstrated, it is indeed without alternative.  
 Whilst much theoretical and conceptual work clearly remains to be done, it is clear 
that the stage is nevertheless being set for a unified and generalized Darwinian theory of 
socio-cultural evolution. Accordingly the case has been made here for generalized 
Darwinism. By drawing together the Darwinian threads, implicit or explicit, in the case 
studies and elsewhere, it has been shown how a Darwinian meta-theory of evolution is 
emerging in the social sciences.  While the rhetoric of social Darwinism has 
undoubtedly hindered progress in the development of an evolutionary theory of socio-
cultural change, evidence here suggests that the tide is slowly turning and that the 
demonstrable convergence of thinking signals the inevitability of the Darwinian system 
for the socio-cultural realm and a decidedly ‘New Age of Darwinism’. This is the 
Darwinian Destiny. 
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